**Survey on Nationality (Citizenship) Frameworks and Equality in Matters of Nationality**

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will jointly organize on 21 October 2021 a Virtual Roundtable on the Importance of Equality and Non-discrimination in Nationality Matters to End Statelessness.

The Virtual Roundtable will bring together State representatives, United Nations human rights mechanisms, civil society organizations and stateless persons to discuss statelessness, human rights and non-discrimination in nationality matters. The findings and recommendations emanating from the Virtual Roundtable will inform the 2021 Minorities Forum, and will be shared widely, including with States, National Human Rights Institutions, UN entities, civil society organisations and human rights defenders.

In preparation for the Virtual Roundtable, OHCHR and UNHCR are undertaking a stocktaking on national law, policy and practice in these areas. We would be grateful for your responses to a short survey below. The results of this survey aim to inform the discussions at the roundtable as well as any recommendations emanating from them.

Please kindly send responses by 10 September 2021 to: minorities@ohchr.org

Please note that in all our answers below, we focus on (risks of) statelessness, and draw on evidence gathered from our [Statelessness Index](https://index.statelessness.eu) and the work of our over 170 members in 41 countries around Europe.[[1]](#footnote-2)

1. **Are the State’s legal rules and regulations regarding the acquisition, conferral, change and retention of nationality (citizenship) the same for everyone, irrespective of one’s real or perceived racial or ethnic origin,[[2]](#footnote-3) or do they restrict (in law or practice) certain groups from acquiring or conferring nationality, or from being protected from deprivation of nationality?**

**No:**

International law prohibits deprivation of nationality on racial, ethnic, religious, or political grounds, and the European Convention on Nationality also specifies that States should not discriminate between different categories of nationals. Most countries in Europe distinguish between single and multiple nationality holders for the purposes of safeguarding against statelessness in their legislation on loss or deprivation of nationality. While such discrimination may be intended to avoid statelessness, it could constitute direct discrimination on the basis of ‘national or social origin’.[[3]](#footnote-4) Several countries with provisions on deprivation of nationality also distinguish between naturalised and birthright nationals, including **Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Ireland, Italy,** and **Latvia**. Such measures discriminate between nationals according to how they acquired their nationality. This type of distinction is often found in provisions relating to deprivation on national security grounds and risks disproportionately impacting on minority communities, reinforcing already present racialised inequalities.

1. **Are the State’s legal rules and regulations regarding the acquisition, conferral, change and retention of nationality the same for everyone, irrespective of one’s religious affiliation, religious or spiritual beliefs, or do they restrict (in law or practice) members of certain religious or belief minorities from acquiring or conferring nationality or from being protected from deprivation of nationality?**

We do not have enough information from our work/members to answer this question.

1. **Do members of any minorities[[4]](#footnote-5) face particular burdens or obstacles as concerns the acquisition, conferral, change and retention of nationality (citizenship)?**

**Yes:**Across Europe, many Roma still struggle to assert their nationality, while in the Baltic States hundreds of thousands of people from ethnic Russian populations remain stateless. The main causes of statelessness among Roma in the Western Balkans are state succession, recent histories of forced displacement, lack of civil documentation, and the inheritance of statelessness. Many thousands of Romani people continue to be disproportionately impacted by these issues, which are exacerbated by deep-rooted antigypsyism. Without birth certificates or any other identification documents to assert their nationality, people face difficulties accessing other rights like education, healthcare, employment, and housing. A major obstacle to obtaining documents is complex administrative systems.[[5]](#footnote-6) When technical legal barriers and antigypsyism combine, these systems become almost impossible to navigate without legal aid, underpinning and reinforcing the risk of statelessness.[[6]](#footnote-7)
In **North Macedonia,** birth registration requirementsare extremely difficult to meet among marginalised communities, particularly affecting Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians.[[7]](#footnote-8) These communities are disproportionately affected due to a range of factors, including inability to meet documentary evidence requirements, discriminatory attitudes of registry officials, and poverty and marginalisation. There are credible reports from MYLA, UNHCR, UNICEF, the European Commission, UN treaty bodies and others that some births are not being registered due to lack of documentation, and that this disproportionately affects minority groups.[[8]](#footnote-9)

Permanent residence remains one of the most important factors for the enjoyment and exercise of many rights in **Bosnia-Herzegovina,** including to access civil registration, identity documents, healthcare, social welfare, and travel documents. Romani people living in informal settlements are usually unable to register theirpermanent residence at the address where they live. The authorities have discretion when assessing the evidence of those in vulnerable circumstances, but rarely use it in such cases, exacerbating documentation challenges and the risk of statelessness.[[9]](#footnote-10)

Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities in **Kosovo** continue to be disproportionately impacted by the risk of statelessness, contributing to their marginalisation, and preventing access to public services as well as political, social, and economic rights. These rights and services were and still are exacerbated by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Unregistered persons were not considered under any relief measures offered by authorities.[[10]](#footnote-11)

The majority of stateless persons in **Montenegro** belong to the Roma community, many of whom came to Montenegro after the 1999 Kosovo war. Many of these people were not able to apply for legal status as they missed the deadline to apply under a public call in 2015, and so are residing in Montenegro with insecure legal status. They face the risk of deportation to Kosovo at any time. Most applications by these individuals to resolve their legal status in Montenegro are rejected.[[11]](#footnote-12)

Romani communities are also disproportionately impacted by the risk of statelessness in **Serbia**. According to bylaws, to register the birth and name of a child immediately upon birth, parents must possess birth certificates and ID cards. Children cannot be registered immediately after birth if parents are undocumented. This issue disproportionately impacts on the Roma community. The Serbian Government committed to addressing civil registration issues and ending Roma statelessness through the Poznan Declaration process in 2019 and 2020. Serbia has received a number of recommendations from international bodies to address this issue.[[12]](#footnote-13)

**Albania** has pledged to address remaining gaps in the legal framework and has taken recent steps to prevent and reduce the risk of statelessness. However, children may still face a risk of statelessness if parents are undocumented or have irregularities in their documentation, particularly if born abroad. There is evidence that Romani and Egyptian communities are disproportionately impacted.[[13]](#footnote-14)

Antigypsyism also affects Roma communities in Western Europe. For example, in **the Netherlands** there is a facilitated route to naturalisation for people officially registered as ‘stateless’. However, there is a recurring practice of registering some Roma as having ‘unknown nationality’ and authorities often fail to identify their statelessness due to the absence of a statelessness determination procedure. This registration practice, combined with the particular residence status accorded to some Roma, creates obstacles to naturalisation, subjecting Romani people to unreasonable bureaucratic requirements. As a result, people who have lived lawfully in the country for many years (some for over 40 years), are still unable to apply for Dutch citizenship. These problems are compounded by antigypsyism, a lack of consultation with Roma representatives on the problems encountered in relation to their registration status and statelessness and the failure to recognise Roma as a national minority in the Netherlands.[[14]](#footnote-15)

Hundreds of thousands of people among the Russian-speaking populations of the Baltic States, especially in **Estonia** and **Latvia**, remain stateless following the break-up of the Soviet Union. Excluded from citizenship under nationality laws enacted in the 1990s, they are granted certain rights and legal residency, but are not considered nationals and so do not enjoy political rights, cannot work in certain professions, and do not benefit from EU citizenship. Both countries have received recommendations from UN treaty bodies to address these issues.

In **Latvia**, the Government has taken some steps towards reducing statelessness, including a new Law on Terminating the Granting of Non-Citizen Status to Children in 2019 and amendments to the Citizenship Law in 2013 to facilitate the process for ‘non-citizen’ children to acquire nationality, and providing information and support for ‘non-citizens’ to naturalise. However, more than 200,000 people - 65% of whom identify as members of the ethnic Russian minority – remain stateless with ‘non-citizen’ status in the country.[[15]](#footnote-16)

In **Estonia**,as much as a third of Estonia’s population became stateless when it regained its independence in 1991, including many who were born and had lived since birth in Estonia. Those affected are known within the Estonian legal system as ‘persons with undetermined citizenship’ (*määratlemata kodakondsusega isikud*) and enjoy a stable legal status and broad range of rights, but not all of the rights and entitlements that Estonian nationals hold are extended to this population. UNHCR reports 75,599 persons under their statelessness mandate in Estonia in 2020.[[16]](#footnote-17) Children of parents with ‘undetermined citizenship’ have faced restrictions in acquiring Estonian citizenship by naturalisation, although Estonia has been taking some steps to reduce childhood statelessness.[[17]](#footnote-18)

1. **Are the State’s legal rules and regulations regarding the acquisition, conferral, change and retention of nationality the same for everyone, irrespective of one’s sex (i.e., are the rules identical for women and men), or do they restrict (in law or practice) women from acquiring or conferring nationality or from being protected from deprivation of nationality?**

**No:**

Several European countries reviewed in the Statelessness Index still have discriminatory clauses in their nationality laws or practices. These tend to relate to the conferral of nationality to children based on ‘descent’ *or ius sanguinis*, and often disadvantages fathers, particularly where parents are not married.

In **Malta**, there is a provision in the Citizenship Act for Maltese nationality to automatically be conferred through *ius sanguinis* to children born to Maltese nationals either in Malta or abroad, but there are discriminatory limitations in the Act, which exclude children born to unmarried parents with a Maltese father. Under the limitations, in the case of unmarried parents, a child born in Malta on or after 1 August 1989 shall only become Maltese if the mother is a Maltese national, which leaves a risk of statelessness if only the father is Maltese and the mother cannot confer her nationality to the child, as long as the safeguard against children born stateless on the territory is not implemented in practice. Additionally, under these same limitations, children born abroad to an unmarried Maltese father and foreign mother on or after 1 August 1989 would also not acquire Maltese nationality, even if rendered stateless. Despite being ruled discriminatory by the European Court of Human Rights in 2011 (*Genovese v. Malta*), Maltese law still contains these limitations distinguishing between children born in and out of wedlock and between children born to a Maltese mother as opposed to a Maltese father when unmarried.[[18]](#footnote-19)

In **Austria**, women and men do not have equal rights when it comes to transmitting nationality to their children based on *ius sanguinis* provisions. Children born to nationals abroad acquire Austrian nationality by descent if their mother is a national or if their father is a national and they are born in wedlock. If born out of wedlock, nationality is automatically conferred to children abroad if their father is a national and acknowledged paternity within eight weeks of birth; or if their father is a national and his paternity has been judicially declared within eight weeks of birth.[[19]](#footnote-20)

In **the Netherlands**, access to nationality by descent also has discriminatory aspects. In the case of a Dutch father and a foreign mother, the father must officially acknowledge the child before they reach seven years-old if they are not married. If the Dutch father acknowledges the child at or after the age of seven, they must present DNA evidence of paternity. In practice, Dutch fathers can face difficulties and delays acknowledging their child when the mother does not have legal residence and official identification documents.[[20]](#footnote-21)

1. **Are the State’s legal rules and regulations regarding the acquisition, conferral, change and retention of nationality the same for everyone, irrespective of one’s sexual orientation, gender identity and/or expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC), or do they restrict (in law or practice) persons with diverse sexual orientations, gender identities or expressions, or sex characteristics from acquiring or conferring nationality or from being protected from deprivation of nationality?**

**No:**

The laws and regulations on acquisition and conferral of nationality of European countries in Europe do not directly discriminate people with diverse SOGIESC. However, the lack of recognition of same-sex partnerships or marriages, and of the legal parentage between children and their non-biological parents, may leave children from cross-border families stateless or at risk of statelessness. Issues may arise from the failure of the authorities in one country to recognise birth certificates issued in another country, when the certificates include the names of both same-sex parents. In other cases, national legislation and policy mean that it is not possible to register the birth of a child with same-sex parents, or to include both parents on a birth certificate.

As a birth certificate is essential evidence of a child's family ties and place of birth, it can be critical to establishing the child’s nationality. Refusal of the authorities to recognise parenthood as established in another country or to transcribe a birth certificate can contribute to difficulties in acquiring identity documents and evidencing the child’s nationality. The risk of statelessness is heightened because, contrary to international norms, few States have a full safeguard in law to ensure that children born in their territory who would otherwise be stateless can acquire the nationality of that State. Even where such a safeguard is in place, the child must demonstrate that they are unable to acquire any other nationality. This may be particularly challenging when the authorities of another State do not explicitly refuse to acknowledge that the child is a national of that country, but still hinder access to birth registration certificates or identity documents.

**Poland, Ireland, Bulgaria, Germany,** and **France** have refused to recognise or process birth certificates naming two mothers. For example, in one case the Bulgarian authorities have refused to issue a birth certificate to a child born in Spain because the Spanish birth certificate named two mothers, on the grounds that no evidence was provided to identify the biological mother and that it was contrary to public policy. In another case, both the Irish and Polish authorities refused to transcribe the birth certificate of a child born in Spain because it listed two mothers. The child could not access any identity documents or a passport as transcription of the birth certificate is a pre-requisite for obtaining proof of Polish citizenship, and therefore remained stateless.

1. **Are the State’s legal rules and regulations regarding the acquisition, conferral, change and retention of nationality the same for everyone, irrespective of one’s age, or do they restrict (in law or practice) certain age groups from acquiring or conferring nationality or from being protected from deprivation of nationality?**

**No:**In the **Netherlands,** individuals as young as 16 can be deprived of nationality if they are outside Dutch territory and deemed to be a member of a proscribed organisation included on a list composed by Ministers (Article 14(4), Dutch Nationality Code). This significantly impacts on the protection of children from deprivation of nationality, risks breaching children’s right to a nationality,[[21]](#footnote-22) and discriminates against minors who are aged 16 and 17.

1. **Are the State’s legal rules and regulations regarding the acquisition, conferral, change and retention of nationality the same for everyone, irrespective of disability, or do they restrict (in law or practice) persons with physical, mental, psychosocial, intellectual or sensory impairments from acquiring or conferring nationality or from being protected from deprivation of nationality?**

**No:**The 1954 Convention stipulates that States must facilitate naturalisation for stateless persons. UNHCR specifies that this may be achieved, for example, by reducing or waiving residence, income and language requirements for applicants and by exempting them from fees or the obligation to provide documentary evidence.[[22]](#footnote-23) In the case of disabled people, meeting requirements for naturalisation such as language and integration tests may preclude certain individuals from access to nationality all together. Few countries in Europe have safeguards to ensure disabled individuals can also access nationality through naturalisation. Of the countries reviewed in the Statelessness Index, only four have such safeguards in law.

For example, citizenship and language tests can be waived in exceptional circumstances in the **United Kingdom** which include physical or mental infirmity.[[23]](#footnote-24) In **Switzerland**, naturalisation requirements can be waived for persons who cannot fulfil the criteria due to a disability or illness or other grave personal circumstances (e.g. age, illiteracy).[[24]](#footnote-25) Other countries reviewed in the Statelessness Index who have such exemptions are **Austria** and the **Czech Republic.** Unless exemptions safeguarding access to nationality for persons with disabilities become standard practice, disabled individuals will continue to risk facing indirect discrimination.

1. **Is the acquisition, conferral, change or non-retention of nationality contingent on the ability to be self-reliant (i.e. that the person can “contribute” to society or not be a “burden”)?**

**Yes:**As outlined above (Q.7), naturalisation should be facilitated for stateless persons. Despite this, requirements for naturalisation remain extremely high in many European countries.Self-reliance and financial contributions are relatively common. Of the 27 countries reviewed in the Statelessness Index, 11 have such requirements.[[25]](#footnote-26) Some States require a ‘legal income’, a certain level of income, or ‘self-sufficiency’ in order to acquire nationality.

For example, in **Germany**, naturalisation requirements include the ability to support oneself and any dependents without recourse to social security,[[26]](#footnote-27) while in **Poland,** documents proving income must be presented.[[27]](#footnote-28) In **Norway,** one must prove self-sufficiency, which demands a gross income of NOK 246,246 (23,972 EUR) over the 12 months prior to the application, and must not have received financial support under the Social Services Act during this period in order to naturalise.[[28]](#footnote-29) **Slovenia** requires ‘guaranteed means of subsistence in the amount of the basic minimum income’.[[29]](#footnote-30) In **Serbia**, it is necessary to provide proof of possession of means of subsistence and health insurance.[[30]](#footnote-31) In **Belgium,** participation in economic life must be shown.[[31]](#footnote-32)

1. Is the acquisition, conferral, change or non-retention of nationality contingent on the ability to read or speak a certain language (e.g. language requirements)?

**Yes:**Naturalisation requirementsin many European countries contain language requirements in the form of language tests. Of the 27 countries reviewed in the Statelessness Index, 20 have such language tests requirements.[[32]](#footnote-33) Rarely are these language requirements waived in the case of stateless persons even though facilitated access to nationality is required under the 1954 Convention.

For example, in **France,** a citizenship and language test (B1 spoken) in the form of an interview applies to all applicants for French nationality, including stateless people, and there are no exemptions.[[33]](#footnote-34) In **Spain,** an integration exam and language test must be passed (at additional cost - approx. 85 EUR for integration exam and 130 EUR for language test) and there are no exemptions for stateless people.[[34]](#footnote-35) In **Bulgaria,** a language test is also required but is free of charge to applicants.[[35]](#footnote-36) **Malta** requires ‘adequate English or Maltese’ for naturalisation.[[36]](#footnote-37) Portugal’s naturalisation requirement in terms of language is A2 level Portuguese.[[37]](#footnote-38) In **Slovenia,** naturalisation requires ‘a command of the Slovenian language’.[[38]](#footnote-39) **Switzerland** requires knowledge of a national language to a minimum spoken level of B1 and written level of A2.[[39]](#footnote-40) Naturalisation in the **UK** requires B1 level English.[[40]](#footnote-41)

1. **Is the conferral of nationality to children of nationals contingent on the ability to prove a biological relationship to the child?**

**Yes:**

In some European countries, the authorities require proof of a biological link in order to register the birth or transcribe a birth certificate from another State into domestic law, which particularly affects children of same-sex parents and/or children born as a result of surrogacy arrangements. For example, in **Bulgaria**, the authorities have refused to issue birth certificates on the grounds that no evidence was provided about the child’s parentage with respect to their biological mother, and that the registration of a birth certificate with two female parents was contrary to public policy as same-sex marriages are not permitted in **Bulgaria**. As the birth certificate is a key element in establishing the child’s identity and accessing identity documents, these discriminatory birth registration practices may hinder children’s access to proof of nationality and effectively prevent them from enjoying their right to a nationality.

1. **Are there any other ground-based limitations in nationality/citizenship law, rules, procedures, guidance, policy or practice?[[41]](#footnote-42)**

**Yes:**

According to international law, children have the right to a nationality and to be registered immediately after birth regardless of the residence status or documentation of the child or their parents,[[42]](#footnote-43) but there is evidence that nationality laws and practices on acquisition of nationality and birth registration unlawfully discriminate against children based on their or their parents’ status.

Only around half of European States have full safeguards in place that enable children to acquire a nationality where they would otherwise be stateless, but even where safeguards do exist, there are several shortcomings in law and in practice.[[43]](#footnote-44) In some countries, problems arise because the safeguard requires the child or a parent to have residence status. This contravenes States’ obligations under the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness to ensure that children acquire a nationality in situations where they would otherwise be stateless, as well as the principles of non-discrimination and the best interests of the child.[[44]](#footnote-45)

Stringent evidentiary requirements, and access to birth registration procedures being conditional on parents’ residence or documentation status mean that some children are prevented from having their births registered and are not being provided with a birth certificate in some countries. Such evidential requirements clearly impact on access to birth registration for refugees and migrants whose documents may have been left behind, lost, destroyed or never issued in the first place. Conditionality of birth registration on the parents’ residence status also hinders access for migrants with irregular residence status.[[45]](#footnote-46)

1. For more information about the work of ENS and our members, see: [www.statelessness.eu](http://www.statelessness.eu) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. To be understood as any of the grounds covered under Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: “the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.” [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. OHCHR, ‘End of Mission Statement of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance at the Conclusion of Her Mission to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, The Hague’, (7 October 2019), para 32, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25100&LangID=E#_ftnref25>. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. ##  To be understood in line with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/135 of 18 December 1992.

 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. For example, see in North Macedonia: [MYLA\_BS\_AVAJA\_ENS\_ISI - CCPR\_Submission\_North-Macedonia\_LOIPR\_133.pdf (statelessness.eu)](https://www.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/2021-08/MYLA_BS_AVAJA_ENS_ISI%20-%20CCPR_Submission_North-Macedonia_LOIPR_133.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. For more information see: ENS, ISI, & ERRC (2017), Roma Belong: Statelessness, Discrimination and Marginalisation of Roma in the Western Balkans and Ukraine, <https://www.statelessness.eu/sites/www.statelessness.eu/files/attachments/resources/roma-belong.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document. The Former Yugoslav Republic of North Macedonia.’ (10 November 2015) 61, available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. European Network on Statelessness, ‘ENS Statelessness Survey 2021: North Macedonia’ (2020) 19, available at: <https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-North_Macedonia-2020.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. European Network on Statelessness, ‘ENS Submission DG NEAR Enlargement April 2021’ (2021) p. 5, 6 [ENS Submission DG NEAR Enlargement April 2021.pdf (statelessness.eu)](https://www.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/2021-04/ENS%20Submission%20DG%20NEAR%20Enlargement%20April%202021.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. For more information, see ‘Serbia Statelessness Index Survey 2020’: [ENS\_Statelessness\_Index\_Survey-Serbia-2020.pdf](https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-Serbia-2020.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. For more information, see ‘Albania Statelessness Index Survey 2020’: <https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-Albania-2020.pdf> . [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Information provided by Dra. Michelle Mila van Burik, India ki Rasta Foundation, July 2021. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. For more information, see: <https://index.statelessness.eu/country/latvia> [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. UNHCR, Global Trends in Forced Displacement 2020, Annex Table 5, <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=MZy2ku> [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. For further details, see: <https://globalcit.eu/estonia-welcomes-new-minor-citizens/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. For more information, see ‘Malta Statelessness Index Survey 2020’: [ENS\_Statelessness\_Index\_Survey-Malta-2020.pdf](https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-Malta-2020.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. For more information, see ‘Austria Statelessness Index Survey 2020’: [ENS\_Statelessness\_Index\_Survey-Austria-2020\_0.pdf](https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-Austria-2020_0.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. For more information, see ‘Netherlands Statelessness Index Survey 2020’: [ENS\_Statelessness\_Index\_Survey-Netherlands-2020.pdf](https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-Netherlands-2020.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. Article 7, Convention on the Rights of the Child. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. UNHCR, ‘Good Practice Paper- Action 6: Establishing Statelessness Determination Procedures to Protect Sateless Persons’(2016) p.8 [Refworld | Good Practices Paper – Action 6: Establishing Statelessness Determination Procedures to Protect Stateless Persons](https://www.refworld.org/docid/57836cff4.html). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. For more information, see ‘United Kingdom Statelessness Index Survey 2020’: <https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-UK-2020.pdf> . [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. For more information, see ‘Switzerland Statelessness Index Survey 2020’: <https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-Switzerland-2020_0.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. Albania, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Spain, Slovenia. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. For more information, see ‘Germany Statelessness Index Survey 2020’: [ENS\_Statelessness\_Index\_Survey-Germany-2020.pdf](https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-Germany-2020.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. For more information, see ‘Poland Statelessness Index Survey 2020’: [ENS\_Statelessness\_Index\_Survey-Poland-2020.pdf](https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-Poland-2020.pdf).. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. For more information, see ‘Norway Statelessness Index Survey 2020’: [ENS\_Statelessness\_Index\_Survey-Norway-2020.pdf](https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-Norway-2020.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. Republic of Slovenia, ‘Third Country Nationals’, <https://infotujci.si/en/third-country-nationals/slovenian-citizenship/> . [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. For more information, see ‘Serbia Statelessness Index Survey 2020’: [ENS\_Statelessness\_Index\_Survey-Serbia-2020.pdf](https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-Serbia-2020.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. City of Brussels, ‘Belgian Nationality’, [Belgian nationality | City of Brussels](https://www.brussels.be/belgian-nationality). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Slovenia, UK [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. For more information, see ‘Frances Statelessness Index Survey 2020’: [France | Statelessness Index](https://index.statelessness.eu/country/france) and [ENS\_Statelessness\_Index\_Survey-France-2020.pdf](https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-France-2020.pdf) [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. For more information, see ‘Spain Statelessness Index Survey 2020’: [Spain | Statelessness Index](https://index.statelessness.eu/country/spain) and <https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-Spain-2020.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. For more information, see ‘Bulgaria Statelessness Index Survey 2020’: [Bulgaria | Statelessness Index](https://index.statelessness.eu/country/bulgaria) and [ENS\_Statelessness\_Index\_Survey-Bulgaria-2020.pdf](https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-Bulgaria-2020.pdf) . [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. For more information, see ‘Malta Statelessness Index Survey 2020’: <https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-Malta-2020.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. For more information, see: [Portuguese Language Test for Citizenship: Everything You Need to Know (govisafree.com)](https://govisafree.com/portuguese-language-test/). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. For more information, see ‘Slovenia Statelessness Index Survey 2020’: <https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS_Statelessness_Index_Survey-Slovenia-2020.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. Swiss Info, ‘becoming a Citizen’, [Becoming a citizen - SWI swissinfo.ch](https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/becoming-a-citizen/29288376) [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. For more information see: <https://www.britishcitizenship.org/british-citizenship-naturalisation-english-language-test/> [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. UN Treaty Bodies cover the following discrimination grounds under international human rights law: Age; Albinism; Birth; Civil, family or carer status; Colour; Descent; Disability; Economic status; Ethnicity; Gender expression; Gender identity; Genetic or other predisposition towards illness; Health status; Indigenous origin; Language; Marital status; Maternity or paternity status; Migrant status; Minority status; National origin; Nationality; Place of residence; Political or other opinion; Pregnancy; Property; Race; Refugee or asylum status; Religion or belief; Sex; Sex characteristics; Sexual orientation; Social origin; Social situation (see in particular [Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20 (E/C.12/GC/20);](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fGC%2f20&Lang=en) [Human Rights Committee General Comment 18](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2fCCPR%2fGEC%2f6622&Lang=en); and [Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 6 (CRPD/C/GC/6)](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRPD/C/GC/6&Lang=en)). [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 7, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 24(2), Council of Europe (2009) Recommendation to Member States on the Nationality of Children, Principle 23, UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4 (2012): V(c), UNHCR Global Action Plan to End Statelessness 2014-2024: Action 7, UN Sustainable Development Goal 16.9 [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. For further info and **country examples** see: ENS, No Child Should Be Stateless: Ensuring The Right To A Nationality For Children In Migration In Europe (2020), available at: <https://www.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/2020-09/ENS_Right-to-a-nationality-for-children-in-migration.pdf>; and ENS, Thematic Briefing: Birth registration and the prevention of statelessness in Europe: identifying good practices and remaining barriers (2020), available at: <https://www.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/2020-10/ENS-Birth_registrations-StatelessnessINDEX_briefing-revised.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Articles 2, 3 and 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)