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Ref.: *Submission to provide inputs on human rights violations at international borders for the preparation of the report to be presented at the 50th Session of the Human Rights Council in June 2022.*

It is with great honor that the Study and Research Group in International Law (GEPDI/CNPq) and the Legal Clinic for Migrants in irregular situation or at risk (AJESIR), both affiliated to the 'Jacy de Assis Faculty of Law' of the Federal University of Uberlândia, Uberlândia/MG – Brazil, hereby, submit information and inputs regarding human rights violations at international borders, aiming at assisting the Special Rapporteur on his report to be presented at the 50th Session of the Human Rights Council in June 2022. We will address the issue in regard to the Brazilian practice in six different topics, as it follows.

1) Brazilian Migration Law of 2017

Brazil passed a new migration law in 2017, which, in an unprecedented way, deals with the human rights of migrants.¹ The old legislation, the 1980 'Foreigner Statute, did not provide for these rights. It was suited to the context of the military dictatorship to which Brazil was subjected, in which the foreigner was considered an enemy of the State, who brought danger to the State, based on the ideology of defense of the national sovereignty.²

The re-democratization process and the enactment of the new Federal Constitution in 1988 already posed some problems to the application of such restrictive legislation, providing for the prevalence of fundamental rights and guarantees based on the international triad of 'respect, protect and promote' human rights. And the new legislation

¹ BRASIL. **Lei nº 13.445**, de 24 de março de 2017.

² WERMUTH, Maiquel Ângelo Dezordi. Brazilian migration policies and the protection of migrants's Human Rights: advances and setbacks. **Humanities and Rights Global Network Journal**, v. 3, p. 103-118, 2021.

edited in 2017, brings these assumptions, inserting the migrant as a subject of rights and obligations, on an equal basis with the national, thus repudiating xenophobia, racism and any other forms of discrimination.³

In addition to the observance of the human rights of migrants, their free movement within the national territory and the prohibition of collective expulsion or deportation are other basic regulatory principles of this new law. Furthermore, another central point was precisely the adoption of the principle of non-criminalization of the migratory situation⁴, allowing the migrant to correct his/her illegal status while still in the national territory, having 60 days (extendable for an equal period) to do so, so that only after this deadline may the deportation process be opened by the Federal Police/Ministry of Justice.

It must be said that such regularization was forbidden in the 1980 Statute, which demanded migrants to leave Brazil to regularize their status; otherwise, they would be subject to prompt deportation (in three days if they had entered illegally, or in eight days if they had remained illegally in the country). Yet, there were a few exceptions throughout the years directed to specific groups, such as Bolivians, that provided for regularization from within the country.⁵

2) Humanitarian Visas

The 2017 Migration Law instituted a new legal framework for the reception of migrants in Brazil⁶, especially regarding the granting of visas, now contemplating the so-called humanitarian visa, which had already been instituted in other opportunities such as for Haitians (in 2012) and Syrians (in 2013), but whose legality was always questioned due to the panorama of the old migration law of 1980.

The temporary visa for humanitarian purposes, currently present in art. 14(3) of the Migration Law 2017, may be granted to a stateless person or a national of any country in a situation of serious or imminent institutional instability, armed conflict, major calamity, environmental disaster or serious violation of rights human rights or international humanitarian law, or in other cases, in the form of a regulation (Decree 9,199/17). It is important, yet, to point out that the visa is an expectation of entry into the country. It does not by itself guarantee entry into Brazil, and it is up to the border officer to verify the situation on a case-by-case basis.⁷ Nevertheless, Brazil had been complying with the non-refoulement principle until de Covid-19 pandemic (*see topic 5 below*).

³ TORELLY, Marcelo (Coord.). **Visões do Contexto Migratório no Brasil**. Brasília: OIM/Ministério da Justiça, 2017, p. 23.

⁴ SQUEFF, Tatiana; ORLANDINI, Marcia. Is there a latin american child migration law? **Videre**, v. 11, n. 21, jan./jun. 2019.

⁵ SQUEFF, Tatiana; BORGES, Rosa M.; AYZAMA, Alex C. ; VOLCATO, Vitória . A regularização de bolivianos no Brasil como forma de enfrentamento ao trabalho escravo. **Revista Jurídica- Unicuritiba**, v. 4, p. 1-30, 2021.

⁶ ZAPATA, Gisela P.; FAZITO, Dimitri. Comentário: o significado da nova lei de migração 13.445/17 no contexto histórico da mobilidade humana no Brasil. **Revista da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais**, v. 25, n. 1 e 2, p. 224-237, 2018

⁷ BRASIL, Deilton Ribeiro. As dimensões políticas, sociais e econômicas da nova lei de migração brasileira e os direitos humanos em uma sociedade globalizada. **Revista Argumentum**, v. 19, n. 3, p. 757-774, 2018

An up-to-date example of the granting of humanitarian visas based on the 2017 Migration Law is, again, to Haitians in 2020. Interministerial Ordinance No. 13 granted and authorized residency in Brazil for Haitians and stateless persons residing in Haiti⁸ through the granting of humanitarian visas. Such a measure would be valid until December 31, 2021; however, this has changed due to the large flow of requests combined with the recent events that have taken place in Haiti, such as the assassination of former Haitian President Jovenel Moïse, and a new earthquake. Therefore, through the Interministerial Ordinance n. 27, the deadline was extended until April 30, 2022.⁹

Another example is the humanitarian visas granted for Afghans in 2021, made possible through the Interministerial Ordinance No. 2 that granted and authorized residence in Brazil for Afghans fleeing the country. As of December 1, 2021, in the first 90 days of the Ordinance being issued, Brazil had already granted 339 visas.¹⁰

3) *Decree of the Ministry of Justice n. 666*

Ordinance No. 666 of 2019¹¹ was edited at the beginning of Bolsonaro's government (known for refuting humanitarian aspects of international migrations¹²), bringing provisions on the impediment of entry, repatriation and summary deportation of migrants in two cases. The first, of the person considered "dangerous"; and the second, the one who has practiced "an act contrary to the principles and objectives set forth in the Federal Constitution".

The document also determined a list of situations that fit these definitions, such as terrorism, organized criminal groups, drug trafficking, people or firearms, pornography or sexual exploitation of children and youth and fans with a history of violence in stadiums. In these cases, the ordinance prohibited the person from entering Brazilian soil, in addition to stipulating measures of repatriation and summary deportation, therefore, openly contrary to the 2017 Migration Law, even though it anticipated the possibility of

⁸ This is an important issue, as many Haitian descents who were born in the Dominican Republic have become stateless due to the alteration of the Dominican Constitution. This issue has been challenged in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, but no changes so far have been promoted by the Dominican government to undue such illegal measure. For this debate, see: SQUEFF, Tatiana FEITOZA, Daniel U. A sentença 168/13 do Tribunal Contitucional Dominicano: consequências acerca das regras de aquisição de nacionalidade e a sua (in)compatibilidade com o Sistema Interamericano de proteção de direitos humanos. **Revista de Direito Constitucional e Internacional**, RT, 2022 (forthcoming); and SQUEFF, Tatiana; PALUMA, Thiago ; AYZAMA, Alex C. . ¿Justicia a través de la Corte? La (in)efectividad de contestar la discriminación de los Haitianos en la Republica Dominicana.. **Revista Jurídica- Unicuritiba**, v. 03, p. 196-222, 2020.

⁹ BRASIL. **Portaria n.º 13**, de 16 de dezembro de 2020; BRASIL. **Portaria n.º 27**, de 30 de dezembro de 2021; see also <https://www.gov.br/pf/pt-br/assuntos/imigracao/autorizacao-residencia/autorizacao-de-residencia-para-fins-de-acolhida-humanitaria-para-cidadaos-haitianos-e-apatridas-residentes-na-republica-do-haiti> (last accessed on 27 feb 2022).

¹⁰ See https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/vistos-humanitarios-para-afegaos-1deg-de-dezembro-de-2021>. Acesso em: 24 fev. 2022 (last accessed on 27 feb 2022).

¹¹ BRASIL. **Portaria n. 666**, de 25 de julho de 2019. See <http://www.in.gov.br/en/web/dou/-/portaria-n-666-de-25-de-julho-de-2019-207244569> (last accessed on feb. 27, 2022).

¹² Before even taking Office, Bolsonaro had manifested himself against the UN Global Compact for Migration of 2018, for instance. See SQUEFF, Tatiana. A relevância do Pacto Global de Migrações no mundo contemporâneo. **Consultor Jurídico**, 27 dez. 2019, at <https://www.conjur.com.br/2018-dez-27/tatiana-squeff-relevancia-pacto-global-migracoes-mundo> (last accessed on feb. 27, 2022).

defense within a period of 24 hours (also considered illegal under the Law).

Before the possibility of deportation based on vague and even extrajudicial criteria on the danger of individuals, this Ordinance represented a tightening of the rules concerning Brazilian immigration law, breaking with the ideals of 2017¹³. Therefore, it suffered several criticisms¹⁴, which led to its repeal and replacement by another rule – Ordinance No. 777 of 2019¹⁵.

This regulation maintained the security approach around the migration issue. However, positively, it extended the deadline for defense in case of deportation, also reiterating the non-applicability of such provisions for refugees, especially due to the principle of non-refoulement.

4) '*Operação Acolhida*' for Venezuelan Migrants

Due to the current crisis Venezuela is going through, several of its citizens have chosen Brazil as their destination country.¹⁶ Although being only the 5th country that most received Venezuelans fleeing the country¹⁷, Brazil inaugurated a public policy aimed exclusively at welcoming those who decided to migrate to the country.¹⁸

Thus, the Brazil created, in 2018, the so-called '*Operação Acolhida*' in the state of Roraima (RR), which borders Venezuela, and Amazonas (AM). The initiative consists of a far-reaching humanitarian task force, coordinated by the Federal Government and based on the support of federal entities, UN agencies, such as UNHCR, international organizations, civil society organizations and private entities, in all, with more than 100 partners.¹⁹ '*Operação Acolhida*' has three aspects of assistance to Venezuelan migrants arriving in Brazil, namely: Reception, Sheltering and Interiorization.²⁰

The *reception* pillar consists of Posts located in Boa Vista/RR, Pacaraima/RR and Manaus/AM, which offer various services to indigenous and non-indigenous Venezuelan migrants, such as information services, a place for bathing, sanitary facilities, luggage

¹³ WERMUTH, M; AGUIAR, J. Direitos humanos e políticas migratórias brasileiras: do estatuto do estrangeiro à nova lei de migrações, rupturas e continuidades. **Revista Culturas Jurídicas**, Niterói, Vol. 5, Núm. 10, pp. 228-258, jan./abr., 2018.

¹⁴ MORO recua e muda regra para deportação sumária. **IstoÉ**, Rio de Janeiro, 14 out. 2019, at <https://www.istoedinheiro.com.br/moro-recua-e-muda-regra-para-deportacao-sumaria> (last accessed on feb. 27, 2022); and NADIR, P. PGR pede que STF suspenda portaria de Moro sobre deportação. **Poder360**, Brasília, 13 set. 2019.

¹⁵ BRASIL. **Portaria n. 770**, de 11 de outubro de 2019. See <http://www.in.gov.br/en/web/dou/-/portaria-n-770-de-11-de-outubro-de-2019-221565769> (last accessed on feb. 27, 2022).

¹⁶ SQUEFF, Tatiana; WEIMER, Sarah F. Crise venezuelana, emigração e fechamento de fronteira: análise da Ação Cível Originária n.3121/RR. **Pensar**, v. 25, pp. 1-19, 2020

¹⁷ See <https://www.gov.br/casacivil/pt-br/acolhida/sobre-a-operacao-acolhida-2> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022)

¹⁸ PECKER, Julia P; SQUEFF, Tatiana. Os desafios do processo de recepção de venezuelanos no Brasil em face ao fechamento da fronteira pela pandemia do novo coronavírus. In: MOREIRA, Thiago et al. **Direitos humanos dos migrantes e pandemia**. Curitiba: Instituto Memória, 2021, p. 369-394

¹⁹ See <https://www.gov.br/casacivil/pt-br/acolhida/sobre-a-operacao-acolhida-2> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022)

²⁰ SQUEFF, Tatiana. Migrações em tempos Líquidos e a postura (positiva) brasileira frente ao êxodo venezuelano. In: PALUMA, Thiago; SQUEFF, Tatiana. (Orgs.). **Migrações Internacionais no Século XXI**: perspectivas e desafios. Belo Horizonte: Arraes, 2019, p. 117-143.

storage, a place for donations and food and cafeteria. Nevertheless, it shall be said that this pillar was virtually shut down because of Covid-19 border entrance restrictions. The border was reopened in the Brazilian side in June 2021, and on the Venezuelan side on February 24th 2022.²¹

The second pillar consists of sheltering those who entered. This service was not closed during the pandemic. It consists of almost 20 shelters installed in Boa Vista, Pacaraima and Manaus, which offer temporary residents services such as food, protection, safety, health and social and educational activities. Specifically in terms of health, physiotherapy, psychology, nutrition, dentistry and social assistance services are offered, in addition to traditional medical care and vaccinations for all (including, today, the Covid-19 immunization shot²²).

In turn, the interiorization pillar consists of the voluntary displacement of Venezuelan migrants who want to restart their lives in other Brazilian states. There are four different types of internalization: institutional, family reunification, social gathering, and flagged job vacancy. There are about 64.000 Venezuelans that went through interiorization, meaning that 1 in every 5 Venezuelans assisted by the 'Operação' (estimated in 287.000 at the end of 2021²³) are reallocated in 700 cities throughout the country. This pillar is considered to be very efficient.²⁴

5) The closure of borders during the pandemic

In Brazil, 31 ordinances were issued regarding the exceptional and temporary restriction of entry into the country by international migrants due to the sanitary conditions caused by Covid-19. The first, dated March 17, 2020, and the last one, dated January 20, 2022. Most of the ordinances were directed at international migrants of any nationality, as recommended by the National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA).

However, it is worth noting that, in some of them, these restrictions applied to the entry, by land, of international migrants from specific countries, namely: from Uruguay; from Venezuela; from Argentina; from Bolivia; from Colombia; from French Guiana (France); from Guyana; from Paraguay; from Peru and Suriname; from China; of the European Union; from Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland; from Australia; from Iran; from Japan; from Malaysia; and from Korea. Finally, the entry of international migrants by air or water transport, regardless of nationality, was

²¹ See <https://g1.globo.com/rr/roraima/noticia/2022/02/25/venezuela-reabre-fronteira-com-o-brasil-itamaraty-diz-que-nao-foi-comunicado.ghtml> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022)

²² See <https://g1.globo.com/rr/roraima/noticia/2022/01/22/como-os-abrigos-para-refugiados-da-venezuela-em-roraima-lutam-contr-a-covid-19.ghtml> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022)

²³ See <https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/nacional/governo-regulariza-situacao-de-287-mil-refugiados-venezuelanos-na-operacao-acolhida/> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022); see also <https://www.gov.br/pt-br/noticias/assistencia-social/2021/12/governo-federal-fecha-2021-com-mais-de-287-mil-refugiados-venezuelanos-regularizados-pela-operacao-acolhida> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022)

²⁴ See <https://brasil.un.org/pt-br/126488-estudo-revela-eficiencia-da-interiorizacao-na-integracao-socioeconomica-de-refugiados-e> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022)

also temporarily restricted.

The ordinances on closing borders establish, in addition to other conditions and restrictions, that failure to comply with the provisions of the text would directly imply the civil liability of the migrant²⁵, his/her summary deportation, and his/her disqualification for requesting refuge²⁶. Such sanctions represent the creation of measures contrary to the Migration Law²⁷ and the Brazilian Refuge Law²⁸ itself, insofar as it disregards non-refoulement and due process of law.

In addition, what can be observed about these ordinances is that there were explicitly selective and discriminatory restrictions, especially with regard to Latin American migrants and refugees. For example, Ordinance No. 255 of 2020²⁹ introduced exceptions to entry restrictions directed to people coming from Venezuela, without specifying any reasons.

It should be noted that the Interministerial Ordinance No. 120 of 2020³⁰ had already stipulated the restriction of the entry of Venezuelan migrants into the country based on the principle of the National Policy on Public Security and Social Defense. Brazil justified this closure of the land border based on a protectionist discourse of the country's national security in the face of the pandemic.

However, it is understood that the closing of the borders between Brazil and Venezuela³¹ disregarded that in the context of a pandemic the vulnerability of these refugees is accentuated³², as previously recognized by Brazil³³. Furthermore, precisely because it targets the border between the state of Roraima and Venezuela, through which a large part of the Venezuelan contingent enters Brazil³⁴, it was seen as a discriminatory measure that has further deepened their condition of vulnerability³⁵.

²⁵ As an example, such information is contained in art. 8, III, of Ordinance No. 655 of June 23, 2021. BRASIL, **Portaria nº 655**, de 23 de junho de 2021.

²⁶ The ordinances also go against the human rights that have already been established in the international agreements and treaties to which Brazil chose to be a signatory, giving the approval for new policies like this to be installed, giving the possibility of a deepening of the vulnerability of refugees in the Brazilian territory. See FERNANDES, Duval. et al. **Impactos da pandemia de covid-19 nas migrações internacionais no brasil**. Campinas, SP: Núcleo de Estudos de População Elza Berquó UNICAMP, 2020.

²⁷ The 2017 Brazilian Migration Law prohibits, for example, deportation without due process, being also necessary to notify the Federal Public Defender's Office (DPU) whenever one is notified of deportation.

²⁸ In its article 8, the Law stipulates that "Irregular entry into the national territory does not constitute an impediment for the foreigner to request refuge from the competent authorities.". BRASIL. **Lei nº 9.474**, de 22 de julho de 1997..

²⁹ BRASIL. **Portaria nº 255**, de 22 de maio de 2020. See <https://legislacao.presidencia.gov.br/atos?tipo=PRT&numero=255&ano=2020&data=22/05/2020&ato=58FITW65EMZpWTb2b> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022).

³⁰ BRASIL. **Portaria nº 120**, de 17 de março de 2020. See <http://www.in.gov.br/en/web/dou/-/portaria-n-120-de-17-de-marco-de-2020-248564454> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022).

³¹ ACNUR. **Brasil torna-se o país com maior número de refugiados venezuelanos reconhecidos na América Latina**. ACNUR, Brasília, 31 jan. 2020. See <https://www.acnur.org/portugues/2020/01/31/brasil-torna-se-o-pais-com-maior-numero-de-refugiados-venezuelanos-reconhecidos-na-america-latina> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022).

³² RODRIGUES, Igor de Assis; CAVALCANTE, João Roberto; FAERSTEIN, Eduardo. Pandemia de COVID-19 e a saúde dos refugiados no Brasil. **Physis: Revista de Saúde Coletiva**, v. 30, 2020, p. 3-4.

³³ BRASIL. **Decreto n. 9.285**, de 15 de fevereiro de 2018. See http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2015-2018/2018/Decreto/D9285.htm (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022).

³⁴ See <https://www.acnur.org/portugues/2020/08/28/brasil-reconhece-mais-77-mil-venezuelanos-como-refugiados> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022).

³⁵ SANTOS, Denise Tanaka. O Sistema Internacional de Proteção de Migrantes e Refugiados: Restrições e suspensões de direitos em tempos de pandemia. **Diké - Revista Jurídica**, v. 1, p. 336, 2021.

Such restrictions were perpetuated through subsequent ordinances such as those of no. 340³⁶, no. 419³⁷, no. 456³⁸, and no. 478³⁹, even after a request made through a Letter signed by several civil society organizations⁴⁰. It was only through Ordinance n. 655 of June 23rd 2021⁴¹ that such specific measures targeting Venezuelans were partially suppressed, as it allowed migratory regularization of individuals who were already in Brazil (including those who entered after March 18th 2020).

On the other hand, this ordinance maintained the restrictions⁴² on entry by land when the number of Venezuelans crossing the Santa Elena (Venezuela) – Pacaraima (Brazil) border exceeded 50 per day⁴³, not being clear whether the punitive measures provided for above (as per disqualification of the asylum application and immediate deportation) would still apply in the event of exceeding the daily limit or for irregular entry.

6) Considerations on Brazil as a Safe Third Country

During former US President Donald Trump's administration, the “safe third country”

³⁶ BRASIL. **Portaria nº 340**, de 30 de junho de 2020. See <https://legislacao.presidencia.gov.br/atos/?tipo=PRT&numero=340&ano=2020&data=30/06/2020&ato=c65IzaE9EMZpWta38> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022).

³⁷ BRASIL. **Portaria nº 419**, de 26 de agosto de 2020. See <https://legislacao.presidencia.gov.br/atos/?tipo=PRT&numero=419&ano=2020&data=26/08/2020&ato=865ITWE1UMZpWTe d2> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022).

³⁸ BRASIL. **Portaria nº 456**, de 24 de setembro de 2020. See: <https://legislacao.presidencia.gov.br/atos/?tipo=PRT&numero=456&ano=2020&data=24/09/2020&ato=b6aITRU1UMZpWT36e> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022).

³⁹ BRASIL. **Portaria nº 478**, de 14 de outubro de 2020. See: <https://legislacao.presidencia.gov.br/atos/?tipo=PRT&numero=478&ano=2020&data=14/10/2020&ato=8aeMTVU1UMZpWT784> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022).

⁴⁰ This letter, signed by África do Coração, Cáritas Arquidiocesana de São Paulo, Cáritas Brasileira, Migrant Assistance Center - CAM, Center for Human Rights and Immigrant Citizenship - CDHIC, Conectas Human Rights, FICAS, Institute of Cultures and Justice of America Latin and Caribbean - ICUJAL, Mission Peace and World Vision, presents legal aspects that should be followed in the issuance of a new ordinance, such as the “exclusion of the provision for disqualification of refugee and immediate deportation” and “exclusion of §5 of Art. and §1 of Art. 5, which present discriminatory measures against people coming from Venezuela” – views that are compatible with the National Council of Human Rights requirements, and aligned with the requests made by the Public Defender's Office (DPU), but that were not respected in the edition of the new ordinances at the end. See https://conectas.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Carta-Sociedade-Civil-Altera%C3%A7%C3%B5es-Portaria-que-substituir%C3%A1-Portaria-255-15jun2020-3.pdf?_ga=2.16982513.970794635.1645797933-780421600.1645797933 (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022).

⁴¹ BRASIL. **Portaria nº 655**, de 23 junho de 2021. See <https://www.in.gov.br/en/web/dou/-/portaria-n-655-de-23-de-junho-de-2021-327674155> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022).

⁴² According to an article published by the Commission on Human Rights and Minorities, in a public hearing to revoke the aforementioned ordinance, parliamentarians requested that technical notes from ANVISA be made available to justify the maintenance of the restriction of land routes, since the Ordinance did not present a justification for such maintenance based on under technical or sanitary analysis to combat Covid-19. See <https://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/comissoes-permanentes/cdhm/noticias/parlamentares-demandam-revogacao-da-portaria-ndeg-655-2021> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022).

⁴³ The only border that was truly opened by land was between Brazil and Paraguay, according to this ordinance. Besides, this “ordinance maintained the temporary ban on foreign passengers from entering the country on flights originating in or passing through India, the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland and South Africa”. See <https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/geral/noticia/2021-06/governo-libera-entrada-de-estrangeiros-na-fronteira-com-venezuela> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022).

agreement⁴⁴ was aimed at Central American countries⁴⁵, such as Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, with the possibility of expanding across the continent, eventually reaching Brazil. Speculation grew, given the ideological proximity between Trump and Bolsonaro, but there were never direct negotiations between the countries. As Brazil is important in migrant logistics to North America, the US would benefit from Brazilian involvement in the agreement. However, due to the current opposing positions between current US President Joe Biden and Bolsonaro, such a claim becomes increasingly distant from being realized.⁴⁶

In light of the inputs provided, we hope to have helped the U.N Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants with enough information to ponder over the human rights violations at international borders, aiming at presenting a comprehensive report over the matter to the Human Rights Council.

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⁴⁴ ARREDONDO, Alejandra; AGOBIAN, Jorge. O que é “um terceiro país seguro”? **EPOCH Times**, 17 jun. 2019, at <https://www.epochtimes.com.br/terceiro-pais-seguro/> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022).

⁴⁵ See <https://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2019/11/18/eua-formulam-regulamento-de-acordo-migratorio-com-el-salvador-guatemala-e-honduras.ghtml> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022).

⁴⁶ MILLER, Milene. Acordo de “terceiro país seguro” entre EUA e América Central pode chegar ao Brasil? **MigraMundo**, 7 out. 2019 at <https://migramundo.com/acordo-de-terceiro-pais-seguro-entre-eua-e-america-central-pode-chegar-ao-brasil/> (last accessed on 27 feb. 2022).

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