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XENOPHOBIA, RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM PARAMETERS IN PRESENT-DAY RUSSIA

**REPORT ON THE SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH
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1. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

1. identify and describe the parameters of xenophobia in various social population groups;
2. describe the structure and typology of various forms of xenophobia, identify the differences in the intensity of its manifestation (latent form evolving into open form - pogroms (massacres), attacks, vandalism) and the extent of potential threat to the society: from antisemitism to migrantophobia;
3. determine in general the level of impact of various information sources on the incidence parameters of xenophobia and its specific types, and the potential of latent aggression activation;
4. describe the mechanisms and channels for the reproduction of xenophobia and racism in the society, and for possible mobilization;
5. based on the obtained data, develop proposals and recommendations for combating and controlling antisemitism, racism and xenophobia.

Implementation of this project implied the inclusion of 25 questions in the monthly survey for the nationwide sample. The survey was conducted on August 23-30, 2018 among the representative all-Russian sample of urban and rural population including 1,600 persons aged 18 years or older, living in 136 urban localities in 52 constituent entities of the Russian Federation. The research was conducted in the form of person-to-person interviews at the respondent's home. Distribution of answers (unless stated otherwise) is given as a percentage of the total number of surveyed. The obtained data was supplemented by results and conclusions from similar Levada Center research conducted starting from 1990, and primarily, by the materials of the survey conducted in July 2018.

In this Report, the focus is on the analysis of xenophobic attitudes and their change in Russia; with less focus given to the potential and threats caused by antisemitism, as fairly recently (in 2016), the Levada Center has conducted a large-scale research of the Russian population on this issue, having also conducted a separate survey of the Russian Jews on the same subject (quantitative survey and a series of focus groups)¹, dedicated, among other things, to the dynamics of xenophobic and antisemitic attitudes in the society and the forms of their expression, and to the assessment of potential threats by the Russian Jews.

¹ Antisemitism in the Structure of Mass Xenophobia in Russia. Analytical report on the research conducted by the Levada Center for the RJC. M., 2016.

1.1 DEFINITION OF XENOPHOBIA

Xenophobia may be generally defined as an expression of negative attitudes towards representatives of various ethno-national or ethno-confessional communities (peoples) or countries, and towards social groups perceived as “aliens/foreigners” in a local or “greater” community.

Unlike the “nationalism”, most often understood as some sort of social/political ideologies, manifestations, systemically presented doctrines containing a justification of the same origins, fate and collective interests of an ethnic or political, civil social commonality, respective protection and implementation practices, xenophobia mostly manifests as diffused, vague and poorly reasoned negative responses of members of an ethnic group to current external events, and primarily, to the need to interact with any “foreigners”.

Sustainability (repeated nature) of such responses allows stating that such manifestations are not incidental, and stem from the beliefs imposed on the group, acquired in the course of group socialization, from the commonality of the “day-to-day culture” reproducible during generational change, where negative attitude to various “non-members” of a group or community, to which the xenophobe himself belongs, play an important social role of maintaining basic ideas of who is “one of us” and who is a “stranger”, protecting your own kind, asserting the merits of a group or removal, compensation of inferiority complex arising when comparing “your own kind” and “the others” (income, lifestyle, prestige, etc).

The “nationalism” of biased or elite groups appeals to the “interests” of the “ethnic majority”, “native”, “title” or “state-forming nation”, a “national whole”, which always implies a certain structure of collective identity (myths about “shared origin” and “shared fate”, projections regarding the future life of the community), while xenophobia is manifested as the demands for “exclusivity” as an aspiration to restrict the rights of “foreigners” or “migrants”, deprive ethnic groups of access to social resources, social positions, benefits, rights and advantages available (actually or virtually) to the “native people”, and other actual practices. Xenophobia relies on a basis of archaic mechanisms of social order organization, as they ensue from the myths, customs and morals of closed tribal or class-stratified societies, from the mechanisms of consolidation and maintaining traditional structures.

The level of xenophobia toxicity or aggression is determined by the real possibilities of discriminating against those stigmatized as “strangers”, the practices of actual exclusion from social, economic, political and other life of those, declared “strangers” or not belonging to the main (or prevalent ethnic) group of the population, rather than by the incidence of certain prejudice. In this aspect, the functions of xenophobia boil down, on the one hand, to strict labelling of the borders of one’s own group or community, maintaining a loose and poorly rationalizable group identity (the “we” mentality). On the other hand, xenophobia is also an archaic form of protection of shared identity, group beliefs, collective

myths and values, from blurring and erosion caused by the increasing frequency of contacts and interactions with other social actors, perceived as “strangers”, incomprehensible and dangerous for this community or even “hostile” towards it, posing a threat for certain aspects of existence or values of such community. In a situation where a society (state) is being maintained and reproduced, where legal culture is poorly developed, in a civil society and in a situation of social interaction relying on the ability to perceive and handle a social variety of actors, etc – xenophobic attitudes play a role of a “social glue” of a kind, binding the “society” on a negative basis and prompting self-isolation and exclusion rather than social development and sophistication.

Unlike the “nationalism” implying a more or less articulate, rationalized or conceptually ideologized set of views, opinions and beliefs, xenophobia is always extremely amorphous, may never be reasonable or systemically manifest. In other words, the danger of xenophobia skyrockets if it is merged with violence as a tool for implementation of xenophobic attitudes and demands, whether we are talking about spontaneous excessive acts of a crowd or a state-organized administrative management system. In the first case, we are dealing with individual instances of aggression and massacre, while in the second case, this is a systemic practice of ethnic or cultural discrimination legitimized by a respective ideology of nationalism, open or latent (as happened during the years of the post-war Soviet government).

In its current form, Russian nationalism currently results from the breakup of the imperial culture, previously claiming ethnic universality with an actually unequal status of internal ethno-national communities (dividing the peoples into republics of the union, autonomous republics, autonomous territories or regions, ethnic groups having no state or administrative forms of their own, and thus, having no rights, resources, institutes, etc). Therefore, we are now witnessing the traces of this institutional system in the form of sustainable ethnic preferences and prejudice, potential conflicts and tensions, unsolved problems related to securing equality of citizens’ rights, irrespective of their national affiliation, expressed as certain irrational attitudes. It is not always that the issues of interaction with “others”, “strangers”, “those who are not the same as we are”, relevant for certain groups, are “interesting”, relevant or even an “issue” at all for the main bulk of the population. We can conclude as much from the unsteady share of “hard to tell/declined to answer” answers given to the questions of the questionnaire. Besides its subject matter or content (being directed at certain ethnic, racial or cultural targets of collective dislike), xenophobia may and should be characterized by the intensity of its manifestations: from weak and barely registrable (latent, dormant) prejudices, preferences and antipathies, ethnic clichés (stereotypes and images of the “strangers”) to the expression of outright aggression and a tendency to isolate, or strong demands that the government should pursue a discriminatory policy, up to spontaneous or orchestrated unrest and massacres.

Xenophobia primarily manifests as verbal dislike or aggression towards “strangers” (such negative verbal attitudes are often called “hate speech” or “the language of hatred”). Normally, xenophobic manifestations are restrained by the regulated norms of socially acceptable behavior, limiting outright manifestations of aggression, intolerance to others and open hostility in the developed countries of the world. The same may be said about Russia. In Russia, open expression of racist, antisemitic or xenophobic views is perceived as unwelcome radicalism (“fascism”), threatening with instability, social unrest and overall disruption, and has been a target of constant (since the late 1980s) criticism by the public. This is why no nationalist party or movement, including antisemitic, antimigrant or anti-Caucasian (Russian National Unity, Congress of the Russian Communities, Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will) National Revival Party, the Movement Against Illegal Immigration or others) has been able to secure any meaningful support among the population, even though their mottos are rather widely supported (this is evidenced by success of the parties putting the same demands in a more “smooth” and moderate form, for instance, Rogozin’s Rodina (Motherland) in 2003). “Xenophobia is essentially ineradicable, as the elements creating it play a highly significant role in the systems of initial ethnographic and social identification, and thus, in maintaining social order. Negativism, hostility and ethnic dislike towards the others constitute an essential pre-requisite for the formation and reproduction of public positive perception of own communality, a set of collective self-identification mechanisms and a means of constituting the “we” values, including ideal.

Xenophobia is indestructible. Only its most destructive manifestations may be regulated, to a certain extent.² Its social danger does not lie in the very content of negative prejudice and beliefs, but rather in abusing and using various public forces and state institutes – political and public parties and movements, mass media mobilizing the grassroots to take active action against the “strangers”, appealing to the police and courts who validate discrimination against “minorities” of any types and sorts (such use of xenophobia was, for instance, visible in 2013, when ethnic massacres were taking place in the Moscow district of Biryulyovo).

² L. Gudkov, B. Dubin. The Impossible Nationalism: Rhetoric of the Political Establishment and Mass Xenophobia //Russian Nationalism in the Political Space (research on nationalism in Russia). M., 2007. page. 283. [9]

*A deeper consideration of the nature of xenophobia prompts the conclusion that it focuses on several sore points or elements of social structure or social order reproduction system. Setting a social distance as regards the reproduction of social commonality (prohibition or limitation, not wanting to see “strangers”, “people who are not our kind”) manifests as a **negative assessment or attitude towards:***

- a) marriage to “strangers” (ethnically or racially different);
- b) prohibition on access to the “community” (living in the territory of the community, not wanting to live alongside or work together with “strangers”, talking to “foreigners”);
- c) access to symbolic positions of prestige, authority, influence or dominance in the social structure – regulation (control, limitation) of employment with law enforcement authorities or military forces (prohibition on access to structures having a monopoly on violence), on employment in education and mass communications;
- d) access to leadership positions in the social hierarchy – the authority, government, leadership, being elected president, embodying symbolic values and the values of the entire collective whole.

Expressing negativity towards imaginary strangers (that the absolute majority of the population, members of a community or group have never even dealt with) is a means of articulating own merits, virtues, values or meaningful traits, but in a negative form, self-assertion not directly linked to any achievements. It is only basing itself on a more or less articulated image of the “stranger” that the traditional and poorly structured undifferentiated social environment of the “ethnic majority” may express its positive traits. A “stranger” is needed here as a condition and projection of everything bad and repressed in their self-assessment, what the group is trying to get rid of, ascribing such properties to the imaginary other person. In this case, the level of aggression is low, as interaction with a virtual “other person” has a conditional nature, and has no direct practical meaning in the day-to-day life. (This does not render it irrelevant for other purposes, e.g., political exploitation by the government of xenophobia potential where it is necessary to mobilize government support, solidarity “with your own kind” against “strangers”). Besides, it points to the nature of developing own identity, self-understanding and understanding of a society having antimodern features.

2. GENERAL PARAMETERS OF XENOPHOBIA, ANTISEMITISM AND RACISM

2.1 SOCIAL DISTANCE

For this research, we have taken several types of “non-Russians”, people of a different ethno-national affiliation, as nominal diagnostic means registering a certain range of social distance – from a modern-day European type (the extremity of modernity and civility) to a representative of traditional Asia and the Caucasus (types and areas of Soviet and pre-Soviet colonization), on the other hand, and the types that are culturally and racially extremely foreign (black, Gypsies), on the other hand (Table 1).

Table 1

What is your attitude to ...? August 2018, N = 1600

to...	I like them and they are interesting to me	I'm okay about them, no particular emotions	They annoy me and I don't like them	Distrustful and scared	Sum total of negativity
Jews	10	80	5	5	10
English	10	76	9	5	14
Chechens	6	65	13	16	29
Gypsies	3	51	21	25	46
Black	7	74	9	8	17
Uzbeks	6	73	12	9	21

Social and demographic differences between various social population groups as regards the nature and intensity of xenophobic or racist manifestations are fairly insignificant, which evidences the integrative nature of negativist ethnic beliefs. However, one should notice the trend of somewhat heightened negativity and resentment in poorly educated, elderly and low-income respondents. A drastic upswing in ethnic and racial antipathy is only registered in Moscow with respect to the “cultural foreigners” or “cultural aliens” – Gypsies, Chechens (in this case, social hostility factors – concentrated presence of Chechens (Kadyrov’s groups having a distinctly aggressive and demonstrative behavior), black migrants from African countries and the migrants from the Central Asia (Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kirgiz). This is due to the fact that Moscow (and to a lesser extent, Saint Petersburg and other metropolitan cities) are magnets drawing in migrants from all over the world, due to having a labor market and being a center of financial and administrative activity, and thus, having the highest shares of migrants and the highest intensity of inter-ethnic contacts (and conflicts).

Table 2

Negative attitude (annoyance, distrust, fear) towards ...

	Jews	English	Chechens	Gypsies	Black	Uzbeks
Average	10	14	29	46	17	21
Age						
18-24	9	7	27	47	15	19
25-39	10	8	31	46	16	23
40-54	12	16	27	46	16	20
55 and older	9	21	30	45	21	21
Education						
Higher	8	13	30	48	17	23
Secondary professional	9	13	29	46	16	20
Secondary general education	12	17	27	44	18	21
Below secondary education	12	24	37	40	24	21
Consumer status						
Barely enough money to buy food	15	17	32	44	21	23
Enough money to buy food and clothes	9	15	27	46	16	19
Can afford durable goods	7	12	30	47	17	24
Type of residence						
Moscow	9	13	52	66	40	30
A big city	8	12	27	45	14	23
A medium-sized city	8	17	29	46	15	23
A small town	10	14	24	41	13	15
A village	13	16	28	44	19	22

If we base ourselves on these measurements, it appears at a glance that the scale of xenophobia and racism in Russia is not so extensive, unless we count the long-time prejudice against the Gypsies (supported by negative coverage of the Gypsies in the mass media as drug dealers, asocial elements, etc) and against the Chechens (which does not really require any explanations as the two Chechen wars have left in the mass mind a deep trace causing the perception of the Chechens as separatist, cruel bandits, uncivilized barbarians maintaining archaic customs and traditions). The main bulk, most of the population have at least “no particular feelings” about the “others”. However, such relatively “quiet” or neutral attitudes to others have behind them some very clear negative attitudes – detachment, indifference (up to derogatory attitude, cruelty or dehumanization), a desire to set severe barriers against the others or even a willingness to expel them from Russia (see Table 2).

Table 3

Personally, how willing are you to deal with? N = 1600

... with the Jews?	August 2010	July 2018
Ready to see them among the members of your family	2	6
Ready to see them among your close friends	3	8
Ready to see them among your neighbors	8	13
Ready to see them among your colleagues	9	6
Ready to see them among the Russian citizens	27	32
Would only allow them temporary access to Russia	17	11
Would deny them access to Russia	17	15
Hard to tell	16	10
...with the Chinese?	August 2010	July 2018
Ready to see them among the members of your family	1	2
Ready to see them among your close friends	1	5
Ready to see them among your neighbors	5	8
Ready to see them among your colleagues	5	4
Ready to see them among the Russian citizens	13	20
Would only allow them temporary access to Russia	30	27
Would deny them access to Russia	32	27
Hard to tell	13	9
... with migrants from Africa (black)?	August 2010	July 2018
Ready to see them among the members of your family	1	1
Ready to see them among your close friends	1	3
Ready to see them among your neighbors	5	6
Ready to see them among your colleagues	5	2
Ready to see them among the Russian citizens	15	17
Would only allow them temporary access to Russia	29	27
Would deny them access to Russia	26	33
Hard to tell	18	10
...with "migrants from Central Asia" (Tajiks, Uzbeks)?	August 2010	July 2018
Ready to see them among the members of your family	1	2
Ready to see them among your close friends	1	3
Ready to see them among your neighbors	4	6
Ready to see them among your colleagues	4	3
Ready to see them among the Russian citizens	18	19
Would only allow them temporary access to Russia	29	30
Would deny them access to Russia	29	30
Hard to tell	13	6

...with the Ukrainians?	August 2010	July 2018
Ready to see them among the members of your family	5	6
Ready to see them among your close friends	4	6
Ready to see them among your neighbors	10	8
Ready to see them among your colleagues	6	3
Ready to see them among the Russian citizens	31	29
Would only allow them temporary access to Russia	20	20
Would deny them access to Russia	13	22
Hard to tell	12	7
... with the Gypsies?	August 2010	July 2018
Ready to see them among the members of your family	1	1
Ready to see them among your close friends	1	1
Ready to see them among your neighbors	3	5
Ready to see them among your colleagues	2	1
Ready to see them among the Russian citizens	24	23
Would only allow them temporary access to Russia	19	18
Would deny them access to Russia	35	43
Hard to tell	15	8
... with the Chechens?	August 2010	July 2018
Ready to see them among the members of your family	1	2
Ready to see them among your close friends	1	4
Ready to see them among your neighbors	4	7
Ready to see them among your colleagues	3	2
Ready to see them among the Russian citizens	22	31
Would only allow them temporary access to Russia	19	19
Would deny them access to Russia	38	27
Hard to tell	13	9

Research deliverables have shown that the share of (nominal) radical xenophobes who “would not event allow” to Russia all of the seven proposed ethnic categories totaled 8% of the sample on the whole³. This is what points to the “core” of potentially aggressively xenophobic and racist-minded part of the Russian population.

³ If we highlight this group and analyze its attitudes separately, we can notice a high level of support of the “Russia for the Russians” motto (of which 60% support the most radical option “Support, it’s a long time it were implemented”); full backing of limiting the influx of guest workers (91%); endorsement of rental or job ads discriminatory on ethnic or religious grounds, demonstrated by each second among the radical xenophobes. Of them, a total of 30% respondents are “very frequently” and “rather frequently” hostile to other nationalities, which is 19 percentage points higher than the hostility figure for the sample on the whole.


Over the period of 8 years (which is a rather lengthy period of time for a change in public attitudes equal to a half of the generational shift) the level of exclusion attitudes as regards the Jews and “Gastarbeiters” (migrant workers) from Central Asia has barely changed at all: 15-17% in the first case and 29-20% in the second case (which is within the permissible standard measurement error), has decreased as regards the Chechens (from 38 to 22%), the Chinese (from 32 to 27%), has grown higher regarding the Gypsies (from 35 to 43%), the Black (from 26 to 33%), and especially, regarding the Ukrainians (from 13 to 22%). In the last case, the upswing is doubtless related to political reasons, and mostly, to the state-sponsored propaganda. It is this very circumstance that makes us specifically pay attention to the conditions and tools triggering xenophobia and ethnic negativity, and this example may be used as a model for driving up ethnic discrimination and hostility campaigns.

Distribution of answers measuring the extreme level of ethnic isolationism attitude shows a growth of anti-Gypsy sentiments. According to the deliverables of the measurement of July 2018, the Gypsies were ranked by the Russians as the least wanted nation for living in Russia. It should be noted that over the last year, the antipathies have been redistributed: previously, the population was showing a high level of support of isolationist attitudes towards the “migrants from the Caucasus” and the “migrants from Central Asia”, while currently, the Russians show a high level of support of isolationist attitudes towards the Gypsies (32%) and the Chinese (31%).

Figure 1

In your opinion, should residence in Russia be restricted for...

(respondents could give more than one answer) N = 1600




The objective of the question about social distance is to understand the permissible boundary for interaction with a “stranger”. In this research, this boundary was measured using the question with a 7-point scale: from manifest tolerance, when a person is willing to marry or embrace as a relative an ethnically or racially different person, to the extreme level of intolerance to a “stranger” – refusing to see him in his country (see Figure 2).

Figure 2

The strongest social distance is towards ...

the share of respondents in July 2018 supporting the position of “I would deny them access to Russia”, (%) N = 1600



According to Figure 2, the Russians have the most rigid (negative) social distance towards the Gypsies: in July 2018, 43% of the respondents reported that “they would deny them access to Russia”. Support of isolationist barriers against the “Black” (33%) and “migrants from the Middle Asia” (30%) ranks second and third, respectively. Every fourth Russian “would deny access to Russia” to the “Chinese” and the Chechens (27% each), and each fifth – to Ukrainians (22%). Minimum level of support of the position denying residence in the country is reported, among those offered to choose from, for the Jews, whom 15% of the Russians “wouldn’t let in the country”. Previously, the Levada Center repeatedly noted a lowering in antisemitism in Russia over the last few years and a growth of welcoming attitude to the Jews among the Russian population⁴.

⁴ L.D. Gudkov, N.A. Zorkaya, E.V. Kochergina, E.V. Lezina. Antisemitism in the Structure of Mass Xenophobia in Russia: Negative Identity and Mobilization Potential // Public opinion bulletin. No. 1–2, 2016.

3.1 OPINIONS ON SOCIAL AND NATIONAL INEQUALITY

Such opinions are a relic of the traditional social and institutional hierarchy of the people’s situation in the pre-Soviet and Soviet Russia (the USSR). Administrative division of territories and government authorities, and ensuing inequality of the rights and the presence of all kinds of privileges (class-based privileges, privileges afforded to the higher officials of the Soviet Union, agency-based, regional, confessional and other privileges) have had a bearing on the sustainability of the views of a certain part of the Russians (about a fourth of the population) on the structure of ethno-national formations and relations receiving a sort of a “historical” ideological justification (Tables 4 and 5).

Table 4

Do you agree that there are peoples historically standing above other peoples?

	1992 April	2015 September	2018 August
Agree	22	28	27
Disagree	61	66	64
Hard to tell	17	6	9
Number of respondents	1600	1200	1600

Table 5

Would you agree that it would have been better if every people lived on their own territory only?

	1997 October	1999 April	2015 September	2018 August
Agree	36	39	46	41
Disagree	38	38	45	54
I don't care, this issue is of no interest to me	21	-	-	-
Hard to tell	5	23	9	6
Number of surveyed	1500	2000	1200	1600

Over a quarter of a century, the situation has not really changed. We can only note a weak influence of the “Crimean syndrome” – growth by 5-6 percentage points, with a standard fluctuation allowance of 3.7% (the yes/no ratio is 0.36-0.42). However, if we formulate the question more precisely, using it to identify the covert imperial supremacy complex (hiding behind it an individual’s civil and social inferiority complex), we will get a totally different picture: over the same period, the claims for dominance have more than doubled, rising from 20 to 46% (Table 6). After the collapse of the USSR and the separation of the republics of the union that have more or less successfully become national states or dictatorships relying on the ethnic majority of the population (“titular” or “native” peoples), Russia has been seeing

a slow but sure growth of homogenization of the national composition, and, consequently, stronger claims for the dominance of the Russians. Affected by the ideological policy of the revival of a “strong Russia, returning to the traditional values of the Russians, the imperial consciousness or ethnic hierarchy has been rehabilitating and recovering. There is a weakening need to form a “civil nation” (collective identity based on a commonality of political institutes, rights and liberties, and therefore, relegating to the background the issues of equality of the rights of ethnic, religious and civil unions and communities). The immunity regarding intolerance to any potential inequality, including ethno-national, has also been decreasing.

The Russians’ claims for dominance have still not become prevalent till now, being balanced out by the more sober, tolerant and politically more rational beliefs in the civil equality of all Russian citizens. However, the share of the latter has shrunk almost 1.5 times over the 26 years, from 65 to 44% (Table 6).

Table 6

Which of the opinions below would you rather agree to?

	1992 April	1999 April	2018 August
Russians should have a certain priority when taking up government positions in Russia compared to other nationalities	20	31	46
Russians should have no priority to other nationalities when taking up government positions	65	48	44
Hard to tell	15	21	10
Number of surveyed	2100	2000	1600

Responses of “protecting” “your own kind” (i.e., the Russian majority) have mostly affected the demand to restrict access to symbolic positions in the government, having affected to a lesser degree access to social reproduction institutes. The belief that the top leadership and law enforcement agencies (army, police, intelligence agencies) should only include ethnic Russians – representing the “state-forming people” trusted by the majority, has been shared in the last 20 years by over a half of the respondents: 53-55% (this figure only fell to 48% in 2018, given the allowable standard measurement error, the reduction totaled 2-3 percentage points). For the law enforcement structures, there has been virtually no change – the surge of wanting to restrict access to the “foreigners” observed in the 2000s - 2010s has now rolled back to the level of mid-90s. In other words, the willingness to endorse such discriminatory measure, if such actions are taken by the government, manifested in the second half of the 1990s, remains high and virtually unchanged.

Another thing is that willingness to restrict prospective students' access to higher and secondary education on the grounds of nationality has been up from 9% to 18%; to impose barriers for the employment of non-Russian teachers and faculty in secondary and high school – up from 19 to 33%, to introduce a selection of ethnic employees hired to mass media, communications and propaganda outlets - up from 21 to 28-29%.

Table 7

Do you believe nationality should be taken into account when ...

a) Annual dynamics

	1997 October	2001 January	2015 September	2018 August
a person takes up a government position				
Yes I do	53	53	55	47
No I don't	40	40	39	48
Hard to tell	7	7	6	5
a person enters a university				
Yes I do	9	11	16	18
No I don't	86	86	80	77
Hard to tell	5	3	4	5
a person is being appointed to a leadership position in the army, police or a state security service				
Yes I do	43	48	50	45
No I don't	50	46	45	50
Hard to tell	7	6	5	5
a person is being hired to a position in the mass media (printed media, radio or TV)				
Yes I do	21	-	29	28
No I don't	72	-	65	66
Hard to tell	8	-	6	6
a person or a member of faculty is being hired to a school or a university				
Yes I do	19	22	30	33
No I don't	75	74	65	62
Hard to tell	6	4	5	5
Number of surveyed	1600	1600	1200	1600

b) In terms of the national composition

	Russians	Peoples of the North Caucasus	Peoples of the Povolzhye Region	Other peoples
a person takes up a government position				
Yes	51	14	33	31
No	44	85	64	59
a person enters a university				
Yes	18	13	20	20
No	77	85	77	80
a person is being appointed to a leadership position in the army, police or a state security service				
Yes	49	13	24	31
No	45	87	73	65
a person is being hired to a position in the mass media (printed media, radio or TV)				
Yes	30	16	21	21
No	72	82	73	77
a person or a member of faculty is being hired to a school or a university				
Yes	36	10	24	25
No	59	89	72	76

In all answers to these diagnostic questions the Russian respondents tend to impose discriminatory limitations more than the ethnic "non-Russians". This is particularly true for the government positions, law enforcement structures and the educational system. There is a 1.5 -3 times variance in the opinions of the Russians and other nationalities. Discriminatory effect of xenophobic attitudes of the Russians is doubtless in this case.

The data of the sociological survey indicates that among the Russians (i.e., the dominant majority of the population), the majority (51% vs 40%) supports the introduction of additional preferences for Russians when taking up meaningful social positions and guaranteeing such preferences in principle. On the contrary, representatives of various ethnicities (mostly, Muslims) strongly object to such a policy: 72% of respondents belonging to the peoples of the North Caucasus, 58% of respondents belonging to the peoples of Povolzhye (Tatars, Bashkirs, etc), 63% - to other ethno-national minorities (the latter are given here as a sum, due to the low numbers of the groups resulting for this sample size, differences between which are statistically insignificant).

Formally, this implies the introduction of a mandatory state certified identification of ethno-national affiliation in the form of a respective entry made to passport at birth, which is not subject to change later (section 5 in the Soviet passport). Reintroduction of this practice is supported by 45% of Russians (with the same number being against it); and among respondents of other “nationalities”, introduction of a passport system is supported by a much lower number of the respondents: 33-37%, with much higher numbers of people objecting to it (56-59%).

Such a distribution (which did not exist in the 90s) means a weak but consistently growing willingness to secure certain positions for the Russian majority, feeling insecure and uncertain about the near future. The nature of the opinions among the Russian majority indicates that this issue in itself is not very much of a concern for the people (the ratio of people supporting and objecting to respective changes is not very indicative – 1.3; while the people of a different ethnic identification have a much more contrasted and pronounced ratio – 0.19 to 0.56).

4.1 JUSTIFICATION OF ETHNIC INEQUALITY

The grounds for the apology of the Russians’ dominance have long been known: this is a combination of the public mind frustrated by the collapse of the empire and a great country and mass resentment of the population searching for some external reasons for their poverty, dependence and collective deficiency, needing a sort of a “scapegoat”, a victim to be blamed for all of its failures and day-to-day hardships. Thus, the arguments of the state “patriotism” (the selfless sacrifice of the Russians for the benefit of the state, mostly declarative, “structural”, a justification of the state-supported arbitrariness during the Soviet times) are so applicable here, as well as the jealousy complex and beliefs regarding the dominant influence and authority of “non-Russians” bringing about all kinds of calamities upon Russia (from the revolution to the reforms imposed by the pro-Western democrats) (Tables 8-12).

Table 8

Would you agree that a non-Russian cannot be a true patriot of Russia?

	2015 September	2018 August
Agree	31	27
Disagree	61	65
Hard to tell	8	8
Number of surveyed	1200	1600

Table 9

In your opinion, do national minorities have a better or worse life in Russia compared to Russians? N=1600

	2004	2005	2006	2018
Much better	17	11	10	8
Somewhat better	21	20	19	17
Very much the same	34	44	43	47
Somewhat worse	13	14	12	13
Much worse	4	2	3	2
Hard to tell	11	9	13	13
Better/worse	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.7

Table 10

Do you agree that national minorities have too much power in our country?

	2004	2005	2006	2009	2017	2018
Certainly yes	16	15	12	11	11	11
Rather yes	31	31	26	24	22	23
Rather no	34	30	32	27	28	39
Certainly no	11	16	19	20	20	14
Hard to tell	8	8	11	18	19	13
Number of surveyed	1600	1900	1600	1600	6000	1600
Yes/no	1.04	1.0	0.75	0.74	0.69	0.64

Table 11

Do you agree with the following opinion: Russia's current troubles are to be blamed on the non-Russians living in Russia? N=1600

	1999 February	2018 August
Yes, I do agree	7	8
Rather agree	14	16
Rather disagree	27	40
No, I don't agree	44	27
Hard to tell	8	9

Analyzing the dynamics in public opinions (Tables 8-11), it may be said that the share of public ethnically conditioned resentment, the share of respondents feeling envious or prejudiced has considerably decreased over 15-18 years, and on the contrary, the bulk of the people not inclined to maintain xenophobic attitudes and positions (deny the habitual discriminatory stereotypes) has somewhat increased. The opinions that “non-Russians” have a “better” life are clearly fading (from 38 down to 25%, with the opinion that “non-Russians have a worse life than Russians” remaining very much at the same level of 17 -15%). The share of opinions that national “minorities” have “too much power” is shrinking (from 47 down to 34%). The belief is maintained that social differences (as a basis for mass envy and projection of own complexes and frustrations onto others) are not determined by affiliation with a certain ethnic group. These shifts may be viewed as an erosion of social foundations underlying xenophobia. Besides, let us add that the categoric nature of all xenophobic opinions has slightly worn off.

However, over 20% of the surveyed are still ready to accuse the “foreigners” of being the reason of Russia’s unsatisfactory situation, of Russia’s “current troubles”, shifting the responsibility from their own social and political passive stance and the awareness of their own helplessness onto imaginary enemies or strangers, traitors, etc. This component of public consciousness is extremely important for understanding authoritarian tendencies in the Russian society and the grounds for potential aggressive antisemitism and xenophobia.

5.1 ANTISEMITIC COMPONENT OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

Compared to the treatment of other ethnic groups, public opinion of the Jews in Russia remains fairly favourable, with no aggression or dislike. This may be seen from the expressed minimum willingness to set a social distance and resort to other restrictive measures and actions (Table 1, Fig.2). But the same may be also said about the ideological component of antisemitism, being a basic element of Russian conspiratorial nationalism (if we take anti-Jewish views), and specifically, of the idea of the existence of a global Jewish conspiracy. In recent 25 years (after coming out in the open during the perestroika and the weakening of censorship of the darkest blackhundredist prejudices of the Russian nationalism), about a third of the population has been aware of this myth, with only the last measurement conducted this year showing a visible decrease in the awareness of this ideologeme. So far, it is hard to tell what exactly we are dealing with in this case: random measurement fluctuation or an appearing tendency of this idea being gradually wiped out from the public mind as it is disappearing from the information field.

Table 12

Sometimes, you may hear there is a “global Zionist conspiracy” aimed to establish the Jews’ dominance over other peoples. Have you heard about this conspiracy?

	1990 December	1992 April	1997 October	1999 September	2015 September	2018 August
Yes, I have	32	33	32	34	34	25
No, it’s the first time I hear about it	68	67	68	66	66	75
Number of surveyed	1700	1570	1500	1200	1600	1600

Of those who have heard about the conspiracy, normally, only 3-4% are fanatic believers in its existence, with another 11-13% admitting that such a conspiracy is highly likely (but do not have sufficient arguments for justifying their belief). It is such people who readily pick up such ideas and aggression. Others embrace this idea uncritically without any reasoning. It is noteworthy that, although in the capital cities (e.g., in Moscow) the awareness of this myth is much higher than in the province – in medium-size and small cities, in villages – the belief in the reality of this conspiracy is much lower – the ratio of “those who know” and “those who believe” in Moscow is 0.4 (19% and 44%), and in large cities – 0.6, in medium-sized cities – 0.8%, in smaller cities – 0.9 and 1.2 in villages (i.e., in the latter case, people are mostly certain of the conspiracy, although their awareness of it is twice as low as in Moscow – 21% and 44%). Social and demographic analysis of the distribution of opinions regarding the existence of the conspiracy points to the social environment where this myth is being maintained and reproduced (Table 14 b): these are the most socially frustrated groups of middle-aged and senior males, with a medium level of education, moderate to poor income, having an unstable social situation (lower middle class), mostly living in small towns.

Table 13

Do you believe this conspiracy really exists?

a) Opinion dynamics

	1990 December	1992 April	1997 October	1999 September	2018 August
Yes, it does	7	11	13	16	17
No, it doesn’t	24	29	38	40	56
Declined to answer	69	60	49	44	27
Number of surveyed	1700	1600	1500	1200	1600

b) Distribution of obtained answers dependent on the social and demographic properties of the surveyed (2018)

	Exists	Doesn't exist	Declined to answer	Yes/No
Males	20	57	23	0.35
Females	15	56	29	0.27
Age				
18-24 y.o.	9	68	23	0.13
25-39 y.o.	17	59	24	0.29
40-54 y.o.	22	56	22	0.39
55 y.o. and older	16	51	33	0.31
Educational background				
Higher education	16	61	23	0.26
Secondary professional education	19	54	27	0.35
Secondary education	16	57	27	0.28
Incomplete secondary education or lower	17	42	41	0.4
Consumer status				
Impoverished	18	50	32	0.36
Financially struggling	18	55	27	0.33
Moderate income	15	63	22	0.24
Type of residence				
Moscow	19	70	11	0.27
Big city (over 500 k citizens)	17	60	23	0.28
Medium-sized city (100 k to 500 k citizens)	18	51	31	0.35
Small town (up to 100 k)	15	60	25	0.25
Village	18	49	34	0.37

It is noteworthy that the conviction that there exists a "Zionist conspiracy" that emerged by the end of 1990s is far less prevalent than belief in the existence of a certain (non-Jewish) "global conspiracy against Russia". Such beliefs were shared in September 2004 by 45% of the surveyed, with only 39% not believing in them and 16% declining to answer, and these questions were not repeated by the Levada Center later.

At the same time, let us stress a very important point: a weakening **immunity** against the threat of emergence of organized radical nationalist movements that are the most dangerous for the society. Their first public appearance was in the years of the perestroika, when the elimination of censorship and legalization of all sorts of social and political forces created an impression of unrestricted freedom for all, including the Russian nationalists. The emergence of radical publications (minor but downright aggressive) caused a shock and made the people realize the threat. It was realized as a threat of Russian fascism and led to a consolidation of democratic forces understanding the need to combat such phenomena. Russian fascism was often used as a broad term embracing all sorts of manifestations – from skinheads and aggressive countercultural groupings of the young, demonstrating their nonconformism by wearing the Nazi insignia to speeches of high-level politicians and members of the “Union of Russian Writers”. It seems that today the immunity and realization of dangers of this kind have visibly weakened.

This is due to most people seeking to secure the priority and advantage of the Russians, stipulating them as a number of social privileges and guarantees when trying to gain access to social positions and distribution of social benefits and resources, on the one hand, and, on the other hand – a clear tendency for strengthening of the Russian nationalism completely supported by the domestic and foreign policies of the state – “revival of Russia as a great country”, revival of traditional values, coming back to the roots, a propaganda of militarism and imperial grandeur, that have become particularly pronounced after the suppression of opposition in 2011-2013, the “Crimean patriotic mobilization”. In any case, wide-spread concerns about the emergence of the Russian fascism registered by sociological means as far back as mid-2000s have now visibly weakened (Table 13). The share of opinions that fascists are currently inexistent in Russia or have become less numerous, is up from 32 to 49%, while the share of those believing that “they do exist and have become more numerous” has shrunk twice, from 47-53% to 26%.

Table 13

Are there any fascists in Russia, and if there are any, have they grown or shrunk in number in the last few years? N=1600

	2004 August	2006 August	2018 August
Yes, there are	47	53	26
Yes, there are; they have become fewer	17	12	25
No, there aren't any	15	13	24
Hard to tell	22	23	25

Let us, first of all, mention a weak understanding of what “fascism” is, a vague idea of what kind of person should be considered to be a “fascist”. This survey indicates that the understanding of fascism as certain institutional practices and ideologies of racial and national exclusivity, national and ethnic supremacy is fading, with a growing emphasis given to external features (Table 15). At that (despite the diffused and vague demands that Russians be granted special rights and advantages), the majority denies this potential peculiarity of the Russian nationalism development. Fascists are mostly those wearing or using fascist insignia (for radical self-demonstration or identification of self as such – 72%), those preaching racial or national intolerance, but without linkage to Russian nationalists proper (59%), and to a lesser extent – those reasoning that Russians are superior to other nations (39%). The latter are visibly less numerous than the people denying the fascist nature of such statements.

Table 15

Should we consider fascists those who ...?

(The answers are ranked in descending order in column 2, 100% in a line)

	These are certainly fascists + most probably fascists	These are hardly fascists + certainly not fascists	Declined to answer	Difference of certain opinions
Speak in public using the “Russia for Russians” motto	20	69	11	-49
Demand that Russians be given preference as the “state-forming” nation	24	59	17	-35
Talk about superiority of Russians over other nations	39	47	14	-8
Preach racial or national intolerance	59	28	14	+31
Use fascist insignia	72	19	9	+52

6.1 SUPPORT OF XENOPHOBIC MOTTOS

In recent years, ethnic (including Russian) nationalism has almost disappeared from the Russian public agenda and fighting between the parties. However, its heritage in the form of the “Russia for Russians” and “Stop feeding the Caucasus” mottos is still supported by the population nowadays. Theoretical discussions about whether the endorsement of such mottos should be understood as a manifestation of xenophobia, or they do not on the whole conflict with the idea of good neighborly relations of the Russian majority with other ethnic groups and minorities are not included in the scope of this report. However, it should be noted that analysis of the Russians demonstrating in mass surveys sympathy to such mottos is showing a greater extent of ethnic isolationism, a feeling of international discomfort and migrantophobia in their environment than among those who object to these mottos or are unconcerned about them. And the higher the level of support, the stronger the endorsement of other xenophobic measures and ideas⁵.

If we have a look at how the population understands the “Russia for Russians” motto, we can see that each second person views it primarily as the state support of the Russian culture and traditions. Restrictive measures regarding the “non-Russian” ethnic groups are supported by a smaller number of the surveyed. At the same time, understanding of this motto is differentiated dependent on the ethnic affiliation of the respondents. The sample of this research does not allow differentiating during the analysis between the answers given by the people with a more or less fractional ethnic self-identification. Therefore, in this case, we divide the surveyed into “Russian” respondents and respondents belonging to other ethnic groups.

⁵ K.D. Pipiya. Understanding One Xenophobic Motto: “Russia for Russians” / K.D. Pipiya // Public Opinion Bulletin No. 3–4, 2017.

Table 16

What do you think the “Russia for Russians” motto means?

(a card was offered to the respondents and they could choose more than one answer; answers ranked in descending order in column two)

	2005 November	2018 August Sample in general	Ethnicity	
			“Russians”	“Non-Russians”
State support of the Russian culture and national traditions	47	50	52	40
Restrictions on residence of non-Russians in cities and towns in Russia	31	28	28	31
Administrative control of the actions of non-Russian groups showing hostility towards the values and traditions of the Russian people	37	27	30	15
Priority given to Russians when taking up state and other leadership positions, when entering a university	21	24	24	20
Expulsion of some non-Russian groups (e.g., Caucasians, Chinese, etc) from the originally Russian areas	31	22	22	21
Prohibiting non-Russians from taking up the most responsible positions in government, parliament, presidential office and regional administrations	25	19	19	14
Other	2	1	1	2
Declined to answer	10	12	10	18

The respondents with a “non-Russian” ethnic affiliation less often than Russians consider this motto to imply state support of the Russian culture and Russian traditions (40% vs 52%). They also twice less frequently note that this motto evidences administrative control of the actions of other ethnic groups, showing “hostility” towards the values and traditions of the Russian people (15% vs. 30%). They less frequently understand it as priority when taking up state and executive positions, preference when entering a university (20% vs 24%). Therefore, it is impossible to definitively view support of the “Russia for Russians” motto as only meaning that the state wants to give more support to the Russian culture, as for over a third of the respondents it is identified with ethnic isolation, discrimination in employment and education and administrative control of “non-Russian” ethnic groups. (This is partly evidenced by selective examination by police in the underground and when traveling, the so-called “racial profiling”, when the police is screening those who stand out from the crowd ethnically and visually and are considered to have a potential for public order disruption).

Table 17


Do you support the “Stop feeding the Caucasus” motto?

	Average for the sample						Ethnic affiliation	
	2011 XI	2012 XI	2013 X	2014 VII	2017 I	2018 VII	“Russians”	“non-Russians”
Certainly support	28	26	35	19	16	21	23	13
Rather support	34	39	36	33	28	24	26	14
Rather don’t support	18	17	15	23	25	26	26	25
Certainly don’t support	6	6	3	10	15	18	14	39
Declined to answer	15	11	11	15	16	11	11	9
Number of surveyed	800	800	800	800	1600	1600		

We have previously pointed to a lowering of the “Russia for Russians” motto support, reaching in 2017 its all-time minimum for all the years of measurement. However, in 2018, its support evened out, bouncing back to the more habitual levels. Notably, this happened due to a growing number of the surveyed choosing the most radical form of support “I support, this initiative was long overdue”: from 10% in 2017 to 19% in 2018. The share of Russians with an unbiased view – those who are not concerned about this issue and those who declined to answer this question – has fallen by 12 percentage points.

Figure 3

Level of support of the “Russia for Russians” idea



The public opinion regarding the “Stop feeding the Caucasus” motto that emerged during the second Chechen war demonstrates a more stable profile. Its overall support has not changed over the year, 44% in 2017 versus 45% in 2018. This partially corresponds to the ethnic isolationism data, in which “migrants from the Caucasus” are no longer the most unwelcome ethnic group (unlike the Gypsies, Chinese and others, the attitude to which has aggravated over the year). The differences in this motto support between the “Russian” and “non-Russian” ethnic groups have not disappeared, with Russians showing overall approval twice as often - 49% vs. 27%. However, at the moment, the negative image of the “migrants from the Caucasus” is no longer the main target of ethnic xenophobia among the Russian population.

Reduced relevance of radical nationalist rhetoric is also evidenced by the distribution of answers to the projective question about the number of Russians maintaining extreme nationalist views (it may be considered as an indicator of perception of ethnic nationalism as a public issue). While in 2004-2011, the prevalent opinion was that “Russian nationalists have grown in number” in the recent years, currently, assessment distribution across the sample is almost even. This points to an absence of an established public opinion, with 35% of the surveyed believing the Russian nationalists “have become more numerous”, 32% believing the number “has remained the same”, and 21% believing they “have become less numerous”.

Interestingly, such weak polarization of opinions is typical of both, respondents with a Russian ethnic affiliation, and of those classifying themselves as belonging to other ethnic groups. Moreover, “non-Russian” research participants more frequently point to a 9% reduction in the share of nationalists in the society (i.e., those who could potentially become a target for such nationalist groups and who should be basically more sensitive to an upswing in such nationalist sentiment in the society). On the contrary, “Russian” respondents have slightly more frequently noted a growing number of Russians sharing ultra-nationalist views (by 6 percentage points), although there is no significant differentiation of the distribution of opinions in both groups.

Table 18

In your opinion, has the number of Russians sharing ultra-nationalist views grown or shrunk compared to 5-6 years ago?

	2004 XII	2005 XI	2006 XII	2011 VIII	2018 VIII	Ethnic affiliation	
						“Russians”	“non-Russians”
Has grown	58	55	47	52	35	36	30
Has shrunk	8	8	10	14	21	20	29
Has remained the same	20	24	25	21	32	32	27
Declined to answer	14	13	18	14	13	12	15
Number of the surveyed	1600	1600	1600	800	1600		

The motivation of research participants who are feeling an upswing in the Russian nationalism in the society is built around the behavioral and economic factors. 43% of the respondents who have pointed to an upswing in Russian nationalism put it down to “provocative actions and behavior of national minorities” and terrorist attacks, actually viewing the perceived upswing as a forced protective mechanism against the “strangers”. Second most popular motif is the “bad living conditions in Russia”, often treated by researchers as resentment, i.e., projecting annoyance and anger onto “those who are different” (in this case, ethnically different) causing an upswing in xenophobia and nationalism in the society (as pointed out by L. Grinfeld, for example).

Table 19

What in your opinion is the main reason for the upswing in the Russian nationalism in Russia today?

(as a % of the respondents who believe their number have increased; respondents were offered a card and could select more than one option to answer)

	2004 XII	2005 XI	2006 XII	2011 VIII	2018 VIII	Ethnic affiliation	
						"Russians"	"non-Russians"
National prejudice of the Russian population	3	4	5	5	11	10	16
Provocative actions and behavior of national minorities	20	22	30	44	32	33	24
Bad living conditions in Russia	24	23	30	21	29	29	27
Terrorist attacks of the last few years	32	33	16	15	11	11	9
Weak government unable to handle outbursts of nationalism	8	4	5	6	3	3	4
The government being unwilling to combat nationalism and interested in incitement of nationalism	8	5	8	4	7	7	6
Other	<1	1	1	<1	2	1	3
Declined to answer	4	8	5	4	7	7	10
Number of the surveyed	1600	1600	1600	800	1600		

Financial troubles have a certain impact on how the attitudes to interethnic relations and nationalism are formed. This is indicated by the distribution of answers to the question regarding the reasons for the upswing in Russian nationalism being dependent on how the respondents assess their own situation in life and the position of their family.

While the surveyed who are happy with their situation or those who are ready to put up with hardships mostly demonstrate a protective understanding of nationalism, among the respondents confessing that “their predicament may hardly be tolerated anymore”, each second is pointing to bad living conditions as the reason for the upswing in nationalist sentiment. Even though it is almost impossible to establish a direct link between the economic factor and xenophobic sentiment, it all adds up to the conclusion that as long as the population is willing to adapt to the hardships, xenophobia is restrained, but as soon as they admit they are unable to adjust to the conditions, a resentment attitude is built or triggered, and they start looking for “another person” to be accused of their current circumstances. For example, overall support of the “Stop feeding the Caucasus” motto considered earlier is three times as high in the most disadvantaged group of the respondents compared to those who reported being “completely fine” (62% vs. 22%, respectively).

Table 20

Opinion re: the reasons for an upswing in Russian nationalism dependent on the assessment by the respondents of their situation and the situation of their families (% of the respondents believing they have become more numerous) August 2018, N = 1600

	Type of adjustment			
	Everything is fine	It could have been better, it's okay	Life is hard, but I can handle it	I can't handle it anymore
National prejudice of the Russian population	25	15	6	10
Provocative actions and behavior of national minorities	29	34	33	24
Bad living conditions in Russia	4	27	27	46
Terrorist attacks of the last few years	5	11	13	6
Weak government unable to handle outbursts of nationalism	3	3	3	3
The government being unwilling to combat nationalism and interested in incitement of nationalism	9	4	9	5
Other	4	–	1	4
Declined to answer	21	7	7	2

Each tenth of the surveyed believes that the main reason for the upswing in the Russian nationalism is the “national prejudice of the Russian population” (among the Russian respondents, this opinion is supported by 10% of the surveyed, among the non-Russians – by 16%).

It is noteworthy that the Russian public opinion hardly establishes any link between nationalist ideas and the government policy, unlike the current US situation where the actions of the president and his administration are often criticized for the overt nationalist and populist rhetoric triggering an upswing in xenophobia among the population.

7.1 “WHEN IN ROME, DO AS ROMANS DO”

A distinction between xenophobia and racism (which has never been a topical issue in the Soviet or post-Soviet history of the country) is often made on the two grounds below. The first one is understanding the nature of the phenomenon, that is mostly biological in case of racism and socially determined in case of xenophobia. The second one is the level of institutionalization and therefore, territorial, legal and other limitations based on racial affiliation. In the instance of xenophobia, this is to do with mass sentiment, usually not supported institutionally. At the same time, some of the researchers use the synthetic term of “cultural racism” meaning the attitudes, considering cultural and ethnic characteristics and behavioral models as unsurpassable and non-integrable peculiarities of certain ethnic and racial groups, inducing in the “majority” a negative attitude to the persons having such peculiarities.

Table 21

Would you agree that the negative attitude to the people arriving from the CIS countries may be partially explained by the behavior of the migrants themselves? August 2018, N = 1600

	2006 April	2007 April	2018 August
Certainly yes	22	35	36
Rather yes	40	43	44
Rather no	22	11	9
Certainly no	7	4	5
Declined to answer	9	7	6

The share of those believing that the negative attitude to the people arriving from the CIS countries may be partially explained by the behavior of the migrants themselves has not changed significantly over the 9 years, 78% vs. 80%. It is noteworthy that in 2014-2016, there was observed a real drop in the numbers of migrants to Russia, but this did not contribute to any significant improvement in the perception of the migrants. It should be stressed that migrants have long been equated to the people arriving from the CIS countries, which was largely due to both, the rational reason – dominance of migrants from Central Asia in the external migration to Russia, and the adoption of such (ethnically determined) images of the migrants by the mass media.

Table 22

Is there anything annoying you personally in the people arriving from the CIS countries? If yes, what is it?

(pre-codifier, multiple choice; ranked in decreasing order) August 2018, N = 1600

They are too cocky, behave as if they own the place, and do not observe the customs of our country / insolent, uncivilized and rude / want to play it according to their own rules	41
Take up jobs, agreeing to work for a penny	22
Have flooded all markets / the market mob	20
Are engaging in criminal activities / petty crime / organizing terrorist attacks	17
Are hostile towards the Russians / harass Russian women	15
Speak their own language/do not know Russian	1
They have become too numerous / they are everywhere / their presence here	1
Other	2
Nothing is annoying me / no such thing / have not experienced it / don't know	11
Declined to answer	19

Behavioral peculiarities are leading in the list of possible reasons for which the people arriving from the CIS countries are annoying the population. Research participants were to give their own wording and the interviewer was register it in the pre-codifier or enter what was said in the "Other" category. Each tenth of the respondents said "nothing was annoying him/her" in the people arriving from the CIS, or he had never met them in person, however, most of the surveyed mentioned a reason or more.

For 41% of Russians, the most annoying factor was their cocky and insolent behaviour and non-observance of the customs of the host country. And the respondents giving the most detailed answers were specifically pointing to personal traits (insolence, arrogance, overbearing manner, rudeness, anger), rather than to collective peculiarities of culture or traditions. The opinion that the host population is mostly annoyed by the migrants speaking their own language seems exaggerated, with only 1% of the surveyed giving this reason during the survey (which is less than the statistical error for such research). Perhaps, most Russians are considering migrants to be temporary workers, and the duty of speaking Russian does not apply to them (unlike those claiming citizenship – in 2012, 87% of Russians said that the knowledge of Russian was mandatory for being considered a citizen of the country). Ranking second is the belief that the migrants are competing with the locals in employment and dumping salaries by agreeing to work for a lower wage. This opinion correlates with the perception of the migrants as highly specialized market workers (each fifth of the respondents mentioning that they "have flooded all the markets").

17% have noted ethnic crime as a factor of annoyance. Interestingly, this reason is one of the favorite mass media subjects, while according to the statistics of the Ministry of the Interior, the crimes committed by the CIS citizens in January-July 2018 amount to 3.3% of the number of all investigated crimes in the country⁶, due to which it is incorrectly to conclude that crime in Russia has “an ethnic face”.

Hostile attitude towards the Russians on the part of the people arriving from the CIS was evoked by each sixth research participant (17%). This category also included the respondents who noted harassment of “our” (Russian) women. Interestingly, the reasons for which the migrants annoy the locals, were largely unrelated to ethnicity, with ethnic terms (“Russians”, etc) rarely seen in the answers.

Even though the question did not invite one to voice his position on the desired policy regarding the people arriving from the CIS, some of the respondents, however, volunteered that “there should be restricted entry”, “why have they even come here? Let them live in their auls (translator’s comment: mountain villages)”, “We want them to leave”, etc. The results of another all-Russian survey conducted in July 2018 still evidence the prevalent isolationist attitude, which is way less common than acceptance of the influx of migrant workers in Russia. In their turn, economists have repeatedly pointed out that such migrantophobia is hampering the implementation of the economic policy of Russia as a country interested in foreign workforce, which, realizing the institutional and attitudinal prejudice of the host country and ensuing risks, may choose the labor markets of other countries⁷.

⁶ Brief characteristic of Criminal Situation in Russia in January -July 2018. URL: <https://мвд.рф/reports/item/14070836/>

⁷ V. Korovkin. The Cost of Distrust: how Xenophobia is Damaging the Russian Economy. URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/opinions/economics/28/08/2018/5b852b969a7947326a35a622>

Table 23

In your opinion, what policy should the Russian government pursue in respect of migrant workers?

July 2018, N = 1600

	2017 July	2018 July
Limiting the influx of migrant workers	58	67
Contributing to the influx of migrant workers	6	14
I don't care	30	17
Declined to answer	6	2

The respondents have mentioned almost no positive traits of the migrants. The “friendliest” thing said about them was the “nothing is annoying me in them” position, reported by a total of 11% of the respondents. Only three persons of the 1,600 surveyed characterized the migrants as “pedantic”, “well-behaved” and “normally behaving”.

It is therefore clear that most of the respondents are biased towards the migrants. Changes in this area evidence a weakening sensitivity to discrimination: in 2011, the share of those agreeing that the police is treating everyone similar (which should mean “objectively and without bias”) was 13%, and in 2018, 25% of those who disagree, judging from the actual situation on the street, 61% and 44%, respectively. In other words, opportunistic attitudes of the majority make people turn a blind eye to self-evident facts, if so dictated by the people’s own interests. Diminishment of the scope of discrimination by the police is dictated by conformism or a desire to suppress the existing pressures.

Table 24

To what extent would you agree with the fact that “police treats equally the people of different races and nationalities”?

August 2018, N = 1600

	2011	2018
Fully agree	1	9
Rather agree	12	16
Equally agree and disagree	22	21
Rather disagree	42	30
Fully disagree	19	14
Declined to answer	4	10

8.1 DOMESTIC XENOPHOBIA

Electoral preferences of the population and statistics of xenophobia driven crimes demonstrate an absence of political and institutional xenophobia in Russia and its extreme radicalization leading to violence. However, domestic xenophobia implying certain “excluding” and discriminatory practices in the day-to-day life of the Russians is present in the public opinion. Respondents were asked to measure the relevance of xenophobic sentiment in their day-to-day life. They were asked whether they had come across any rental or job ads containing restrictions on national or religious grounds, and how they felt about such ads.

On the whole, the survey deliverables indicate a wide spread of discriminatory ads seen by 87% of Russians. Among them, 39% of the surveyed voiced their “positive” attitude to such practice, with 29% of them “understanding” them and 10% approving of such limitations in the area of employment and rental. Each fifth of the respondents has a contrary attitude to such ads: 11% are “bewildered” and 10% are annoyed by them. But 27% of Russians have confessed having no particular feelings about them.

Figure 4

Attitude to discriminatory ads

(as a % of all surveyed) July 2018, N = 1600



Doubtless, such ads are mostly related to migration issue, both, internal (from the North Caucasus to mainland Russia), and external (from Central Asian countries to Russia). Therefore, the larger the city, the higher the frequency of such ads, and the share of those “understanding” such restrictive practice of rental and hire. On the contrary, in the province and villages not targeted by the main migration flows, the citizens come across such ads less frequently (or they pay attention to such ads less frequently), and the attitude to such discrimination is mostly indifferent. Loyal attitude to such restrictive practices is more pronounced among the citizens of Moscow who, due to a large-scale migration influx to the capital, are more sensitive to the issue of migration and highly supportive of restrictive measures towards the migrants, compared to residents of smaller localities.

Table 24

“One can see in public places and online rental and job ads containing restrictions of a national or religious nature, e.g., “apartment for rent to a Russian family” or “not meant for the Caucasians”. What do you personally feel about such ads?”

(distribution by type of locality)

	Overall for the sample	Size of locality				
		Moscow	Cities with over 500 k population	Cities with a population of 100 to 500 k	Towns of up to 100 k	Village
Approval	10	19	12	8	7	11
Understanding	29	44	31	31	25	23
Bewilderment	11	7	12	13	11	9
Indignation	10	4	8	10	12	13
No particular feelings	27	22	28	24	32	27
Have not seen any such ads	11	3	6	13	12	17
Declined to answer	2	3	3	1	1	1

Another way to determine the level of domestic xenophobia is by projective questions immersing the respondents in an imaginary situation in which he has to select a particular behavior option. This principle is partially employed in the well-known social distance scale of E. Bogardus.


Five situations were offered to the respondents: hiring a babysitter for their kid, renting out their apartment, a bus trip, offering advice to a friend and taking a taxi.

In each of the situation they could interact with a black person or choose to avoid such contact damaging own interests (i.e., putting racial dislike above personal interests).

Figure 5

Which decision of the two possible options would you personally take in the following situations ...

(a card was offered to the respondents; one answer in each line; the sum total of “certainly the first” + “rather the first” and “certainly the second” + “rather the second” answers) N = 1600



The closest (declared) social distance is demonstrated by the Russians during contacts in transport. Nearly two thirds of the surveyed are ready to take a seat next to a black person on a bus (69%) or take a taxi with a black driver returning home late (60%). That means that the so-called biological racism operating at the level of physiological intolerance (unpleasant possibility of body contact, i.e., taking the next seat, smell, etc) is not typical for most Russians⁸. On the contrary, the largest (racial) distance is observed with the kids: almost each second surveyed preferred a Russian but less qualified babysitter for his kid to a black qualified one (with 34% of the surveyed having a contrary opinion).

The share of Russians who are ready to offer support to a friend wanting to marry a person of a different nationality is twice lower – only each third of the respondents is willing to do so in the sample (39%). We have previously noted a high level of social distance with respect to ethnic groups, concluding that there existed a persistent public opinion taboo on inter-ethnic and interracial marriage.

38% of Russians are ready to rent their apartment out to a black couple (vs. 45% of the respondents who are willing to rent the apartment out to a Russian couple but at a lower cost, i.e., contrary to their personal benefit). Among the residents of Moscow, where the rental market is most developed, the willingness to rent to “your own kind” is twice higher than the overall sample figure, with 64% of the surveyed Muscovites willing to rent their apartment out to a Russian couple.

In all five situations, 14% of the research participants would choose to contact a black person. On the contrary, 12% of the surveyed in the sample have chosen to avoid such contact, even if such distance is contrary to their financial or other interests. Therefore, the share of nominal domestic racists in the sample amounted to a tenth of all respondents. However, other research of the Levada Center also indicates that the share of respondents supporting, for instance, ethnic isolation of all ethnic groups also totals 8-10%. That is, there is a stable 10% in the Russian society who are negative about groups of other ethnicity and race.

Considering age differences in situations of possible racial contact shows a closer social distance of the young and senior respondents tending to avoid racial contacts more. In the youngest age cohort (18-24 y.o.), readiness for racial contacts in the closest (projective) contact situations of marriage and hiring a nanny for a kid is higher than refusing a black partner in favor of a Russian (1.5 to 1 ratio). Research in other European countries also demonstrates a higher level of ethnic (racial) tolerance among the young, having a positive perception of ethnic diversity, unlike the elderly age cohorts.

⁸ Although the recent US history evidences that such physical dislike can also happen. Let us remember, for example, the existence of separate toilets for black and white.

Acceptance of interracial marriage is more pronounced in the group of respondents with a university degree, where almost each second would support a friend wanting to marry a person from a different race, and, on the contrary, each third of the surveyed would try to talk a friend out of it. In other education groups, this distribution is reversed, with a half of the respondents being “against” an interracial marriage and a third being “for” it.

Table 25

Preference of “same race” or different race partner dependent on the age and educational level of the respondents

	Overall sample	Age				Educational background			
		18-24 y/o	25-39 y/o	40-54 y/o	55 +	Higher	Secondary professional	Secondary	Below secondary
Would hire a black babysitter	34	43	41	34	25	39	33	32	26
Would hire a Russian babysitter	47	39	43	46	54	46	49	45	55
No answer	19	18	16	20	21	16	18	23	19
Would rent out to a black family	38	44	45	39	30	43	37	35	31
Would rent out to a Russian family	45	41	39	44	51	41	44	49	54
No answer	17	15	17	16	19	16	19	16	15
Would take a seat next to a black person	69	68	72	71	66	73	70	66	59
Would look for another seat	20	19	18	20	23	18	19	22	33
No answer	10	13	10	9	11	9	11	12	7
Would support an interracial marriage	39	47	47	39	31	44	38	37	36
Would be against an interracial marriage	42	32	33	43	51	37	43	44	49
No answer	19	21	20	18	18	19	19	19	15
Would take a taxi with a black driver	59	64	65	59	53	63	60	56	50
Would rather book another driver	29	24	23	30	34	28	28	29	37
No answer	12	12	12	12	13	9	13	15	13

While in a situation of racial contact in the transport, there are almost no differences between “Russian” and “non-Russian” research participants, the choice of a Russian babysitter, a Russian tenant and a Russian marriage partner is more pronounced among the “Russian” respondents.

9.1. INFLUENCE OF THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON THE LEVEL OF XENOPHOBIA

Speaking in general, xenophobia represents, in its meaningful aspect, rudimentary layers of long-standing ideological views, tribal stereotypes, superstitions, archaic myths, phobias and idealistic references mixed with each other and compressed into a bulk of hardly distinguishable perceptions about “others” or “strangers” who inspire fear, suspicion or envy and covert admiration. A greater part of these ethno-national, political or religious attitudes arose a long time ago (behind the horizon not only of our time but of many generations ago, in distant past). A specific analysis would show that such attitudes are related to various phases of Russia’s modernization and the interests of former elites and political groups who competed over the influence, or traces of imperial colonization at the end of the 19th century – the first half of the 20th century; that certain provisions that were relevant for the Soviet propaganda and the policy of industrialization are being taken into the common space of mental images. However, this task is beyond the scope of our report. Since these beliefs are not a response to current events, they are maintained and reproduced in a social environment that has no means for their social reflection and conscious exploration. In such day-to-day environment, ethical perceptions are more often transferred in a non-critical manner or suggestively, as they are included in the initial socialization and early formation of our perceptions about surrounding people and ourselves. The more routine and traditional such groups are (as a rule, they don’t have a high level of education and are occupied with labor that does not require specialist education or intellectual skills), the more sustainable such perceptions turn out to be. They play primarily a role of negative images based on which the «groups» set positive perceptions about themselves and their merits, as well as barriers towards alien groups and communities; in other words, they are a means of expressing own (negative) identity.

However, this does not mean that ethnic images of this kind, preconceptions and prejudices towards any “aliens”, “others” or “different” will always remain the same. Under the influence of propaganda, techniques of political manipulation, administrative pressure and control over the mass media, it is possible to emphasize certain features of ethnic perceptions while suppressing other features, to elaborate on threats and dangers coming from certain “foreigners” or “aliens” or, on the contrary, to increase the sympathy towards other foreigners. For instance, over the last 5 years we have been seeing a sharp increase in dislike and hostility towards Ukrainians, who have always been perceived in Russia as our people and close to Russians, almost as one and the same nation or a nation that has the same roots as Russians and Byelorussians; and, at the same time, an increase in sympathy towards Chinese (or, more precisely, a reduction of former hostility, suspiciousness and dislike)⁹. To a certain degree, it is possible to record the same observations about Chechens who were, in the second half of 1990s a target for particular dislike and fears.

⁹ In this aspect, China has advanced to ranking second as a friendly, allied or partner country. See the press release “Russia’s friends and enemies”. URL: <https://www.levada.ru/2018/06/14/druzya-i-vragi-rossii-3/>

Therefore, it would be more correct to say that it is not the structure of xenophobia that changes but rather the intensity of its manifestations under the influence of certain institutions (including political, mass media, propaganda, religious, educational and other institutions).

If we analyze the correlation between the sources of information most relevant for the respondents and the manifestation of xenophobic or racist views, we can establish the following pattern: the correlation is the most intense between the audience listening to various radio stations and the level of xenophobia; the second place is taken by the Internet media (information portals, websites, etc.); the third and fourth places are taken by the social media and inter-personal networks of relationships (friends, relatives, colleagues, neighbors, etc.) Contrary to expectations, TV is not distinguished here in any noticeable manner: the TV audience (as a whole) is characterized by medium values of xenophobia and racism. A possible explanation to this is that: first, the TV has a massive coverage, which gives averaged answers of the TV audience (from 67% of adult population in Moscow to 76-77% in the provinces, small towns and villages watch TV, where one (or, more rarely, two) of the federal TV channel is (are) the only means of mass media covering issues of overall importance); second, our questions do not make it possible, in this case, to differentiate between the audience of different TV channels and programs, while they can drastically vary from each other by the level of intolerance, xenophobia and demagoguery on national issues; for instance, the "Tzargrad" or the "Territory of Delusions" drastically differs from the programs shown on the "Culture" or even the "Spas" channel.

One can put forward the following hypothesis, which explains such an allocation of xenophobic perceptions and the preferences given to certain information channels and sources of xenophobic (racial, antisemitic) information about the social realm. Both, radio and the Internet (however, not the social media) are far less subject to censorship and restrictions. A great number of small and local radio stations broadcast live interactive shows where people with reduced self-control and low civil culture of tolerance gain access to live programs and can make open statements (albeit short). Many websites of even Russia-wide newspapers or Internet portals have comments sections, which attract aggrieved, insecure and aggressive people for whom this is the only opportunity to make public statements. These sections demonstrate a level of off-the-scale uncontrolled aggression, xenophobia and resentment that are characteristic of informal communication among "your own kind" but that would be unacceptable in any other circumstances. Reserved and founded judgements or weighted arguments are very rarely seen in such segments of media communications, being mostly an outburst of irritable mind, unrestrained aggression and hate. As for its structure (not for the level of emotion or rudeness), this is no different from the level of domestic or everyday way of thinking and xenophobia that is characteristic of "friends, neighbors, etc."

Table 26

Negativism manifested towards people of different ethnicity or race depending on the respective source of information regularly used

August 2018, N = 1600

Sources of information	Gypsies	Chechens	Blacks	Uzbeks	Jews	English	Total negative answers (for the channel)
Radio	54	41	25	25	12	14	171
Friends, etc.	50	39	26	28	10	12	165
Internet	45	29	17	25	9	12	137
TV	46	28	17	19	10	17	137
Newspapers	40	18	20	22	10	24	134
Social media	45	28	14	24	10	11	132
Magazines	36	20	13	19	6	16	110
Found it difficult to name a channel or source	47	18	28	20	17	14	144
Total negative answers (towards ethnic groups)	363	221	160	182	84	120	***


10.1 TRUST

Social trust is one of the basic sociological indicators determining attitudes and human behaviors. As for the study of xenophobic feelings, we can assume that the high level of “trust to others” (which is a standard measure of the radius of social trust and social capital in international surveys) largely softens the dislike to “another person” and vice versa (the problem of reduced trust in a host society due to an influx of immigrants was noted, for example, by Paul Collier¹⁰). If we look at the results of the survey, we can note that respondents with a low level of interpersonal trust (who believe that it would not harm to be cautious in their relations with other people or who do not trust others at all) more often support institutional limitations with respect to other (“non-Russian”) ethnic groups than the respondents who rather trust others.

¹⁰ Paul Collier «Exodus: How Migration is Changing Our World», Moscow, 2016. Page 384

Figure 6

Level of interpersonal trust and support of institutional limitations



Every second “distrustful” respondent is of an opinion that one should take into account the nationality of a person when hiring him or her for a public office (as opposed to each third among the «trustful» respondents), thus, in fact, advocating the restoration of “section five” (nationality) in the passport. The surveyed with a low level of interpersonal trust also note more often that one should take into account the nationality when hiring people to the state security authorities (47% against 35%), and should give preference to Russian candidates for taking up public positions (48% against 40%); they agree with the opinion that “national minorities enjoy too much power in our country” (35% against 28%). We cannot draw a conclusion, however, that a high level of interpersonal trust makes a person more tolerant towards ethnic or other minorities. However, it considerably neutralizes the person’s attitude towards such minorities by avoiding polarization towards only negative or positive images. During the survey, the “trustful” respondents tended more often to assess their attitude towards Gypsies and Chechens as «peaceful, without any special feelings» rather than the surveyed who did not trust others.

11.1 TYPOLOGY OF MASS XENOPHOBIC ATTITUDES

The results of the present and previous studies of xenophobia, antisemitism and racism in the USSR and Russia make it possible to distinguish analytically a number of social types of xenophobes or mass attitudes meaningful for the problems of studying and preventing xenophobia. The following will be two key criteria for us: the function of a certain type of xenophobia and its incidence in the total population. The typology is built on the basis of a nucleus, its closer and outer layers and an amorphous and diffused periphery where negativist reactions are weak.

1. The nucleus of xenophobes is comprised of 7-8% of adult population. It can increase up to 15-18% or even 20% during the periods of an acute social crisis and can then go down to a relative minimum. As a rule, the nucleus grows up to its maximum once the peak of the crisis is over, with a certain time lag compared to the peak of crisis tension. Importantly, the “nucleus» of xenophobes combines negative responses of all types towards any “aliens”, including not only dislike, which can go as far as verbal aggression, towards various ethnic and national communities, representatives of other races but also towards migrants and people who do not share the confessional beliefs of the Russian Orthodox Church (as well as the radical Islam), towards Catholics, Protestants, Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Judaists, etc., representatives of artistic avant-garde, counter- or alternative culture, LGBT supporters, etc., as well as towards political opponents of the authoritarian regime: Western liberals, democrats and, sometimes, communists, etc. The respondents included in the “nucleus” that combines antisemitic, racist and xenophobic views are characterized by a stronger tendency and readiness for aggression, a feeling of deprivation and resentment, considering themselves victims and feeling that their life circumstances are determined not by them but by some external forces. The supporters of such beliefs have a medium level of education (as a rule, these are people with a professional secondary degree); however, they can include chauvinistic marginals with a higher level of education who are able to bring this mixture of negativist perceptions to more or less formulated ideologies (Russian traditionalism or anti-liberal Orthodox nationalism) with a focus on the central role of the state, the Great Power, Empire, Army, etc. By their beliefs, these people are dogmatic nationalists (of a wide variety), who have recently “come to believe” and taken communion in one of the traditional confessions and who, therefore, ascribe to themselves a special feeling of superiority towards others. A very important aspect for such respondents is that they stress the need to use harsh, autocratic, forceful and oppressive methods in carrying out the policy with respect to anybody who is declared to be “alien” for the majority, an “enemy” that is jeopardizing the traditional values of the “majority”. This is the environment out of which activists of radical nationalistic organizations come, who are ready to take “proactive actions”, including massacres, participation in paramilitary associations of a SERB kind, “Officers of Russia”, Cossack bodyguards or Orthodox gonfalon-bearers and similar youth groups (football fans, successors of skinheads, Russian fascists, etc.).

2. It should be noted that the potentially aggressive xenophobic and racist nucleus contains not only Russian; it may include other «nationalists» from ethno-national minorities (Tatars, Yakuts, Chechens and others).
3. The next type of people who “sympathize” with radical xenophobes is a rather passive layer of people who support nationalists and agree with the views of the radical «nucleus». However, these people are not ready to make any public statements and they shift onto the state the responsibility for the critical or “unsatisfactory”, in their opinion, state of affairs in the country and tend to approve of and support rough administrative measures against migrants and people of other faiths, guarantees of advantages or privileges for Russians in accessing socially important benefits and positions (priority for Russians in health care, access to education, limitations on hiring for the state bodies of governance, police, Army, the mass media, propaganda, etc.). The parameters of this type are rather elastic and depend on the social and political situation and the economic position in the country. The incidence of attitudes of this kind may be estimated as 20-30% of the Russian population.
4. The third type of “protective or compensatory” xenophobia, as identified in sociological studies, is represented by reactions of the population with completely different functions. This type could be named “tribal” xenophobia, where prejudices and preconceptions against “others”, “strangers” are the prerequisites for maintaining and expressing their own group identity; without comparing to others, no specifics or merits of their own community or group could be expressed. These perceptions about “strangers”, which are reproduced in the form of jokes, irrational prejudices and stereotypes about imaginary other people with whom these people have never actually met are the most amorphous and primitive perceptions by their nature and semantics. The absolute majority of Russians have never met an Englishman, a Chechen, a Chinese or a Jew. They know about them and their culture only from intermediary sources, including stories of more experienced people (“tales”, at third-hand), from the mass media, etc. This is the widest circle of people who share potential or dormant antisemitic, racist or xenophobic attitudes. As the respondent noted during the interview, “we do not have people like that”, that’s why their attitude towards other ethnic groups is “peaceful, indifferent, same as to all other nations”. In other words, the expression of such routine xenophobic, negative or, on the face of it, discriminatory or offensive attitudes is not related to any social interests. Therefore, the perceptions of this kind turn to be neutral and they cannot be activated during public campaigns to mobilize “our own kind” against “stranger” or external “enemies”. Such perceptions can cover as much as two thirds of the population.

5. It should be taken into account that no precise empirical boundaries can be drawn between various types of people sharing xenophobic views since the second and third types overlap with each other, they partially intersect and, in some circumstances, they can be combined and can form temporary agglomerations of tense social groups during aggressive propaganda and mobilization by the state and state-controlled mass media, political parties and public organizations. For instance, until mid- 2000s, we did not record any noticeable hostility towards Ukrainians (and before that, say, until 1993, – towards Chechens, as special ethnically distinguished categories of population). However, after 2013, we have been recording a sharp and continuous growth in dislike, in combination with hostility, towards Ukrainians.
6. Only a relatively small portion of the Russian population, from 15% to 20%, has a sustainable immunity against xenophobia, antisemitism and racism. This is the most educated and liberal part of the Russian society, who have solid humane and legal beliefs and who are mostly people living in the metropolitan and major cities.

2. CONCLUSIONS

1. In the time after the collapse of the USSR, the level of diffused mass xenophobia has considerably increased. The latest outbreak of ethno-national tension occurred in 2013, after which, as a result of the confrontation with the Western countries and the hybrid war in Ukraine, the overall “internal” xenophobia somewhat decreased and changed its structure: the anti-Caucasian attitudes lost their leadership to anti-Gypsy, anti-migrant (especially, towards the migrants and guest workers from the Central Asia) and racist (towards black people, Chinese and other nations) attitudes, while anti-Chechen attitudes have narrowed down to moderate. A new thing has become the growth of anti-Ukrainian prejudices and preconceptions, which has never been recorded before during the entire period of social surveys and studies. This is partly explained by the fact that today’s day-to-day agenda no longer addresses the relations with migrants from the Trans-Caucasian region (Azerbaijanians, Georgians and, to a lesser degree, Armenians). The level of antisemitism remains low.
2. For our purpose, we can identify several types of xenophobic and anti-xenophobic forms of mass consciousness. 8% to 15% of adult population make up the nucleus of xenophobes, which can increase up to 20% during the periods of an acute social crisis and can then go down to a relative minimum. The respondents included in the «nucleus» that combines antisemitic, racist and xenophobic views are characterized as showing a stronger tendency and readiness for aggression, feeling deprived and resentful, victimized, and believe that they are not the ones determining their own circumstances, but rather some external forces. The potentially aggressive xenophobic and racist nucleus contains not only Russian; it can include other “nationalists” from ethno-national minorities.
3. The nucleus of xenophobic people is surrounded by a far passive environment of those who “sympathize” with radical xenophobes and nationalists of various kinds (Russians or non-Russians “title” or “native” nations), who share their main ideas and slogans but who are not ready to take direct public actions or make public statements in support of radical activists. They shift onto the state the responsibility for the critical or “unsatisfactory”, in their opinion, state of affairs in the country. They expect and are ready to approve and support tough administrative measures against migrants, people of other faiths and any “strangers”; they demand guarantees of advantages or preferences for Russians in accessing socially important benefits and positions (this includes not only a priority for Russians in healthcare and access to education, the setting of limitations for “others” when hiring employees for the state bodies of governance, police, Army, the mass media, propaganda, etc.). The parameters of this type are rather elastic and depend on the social and political situation and the economic position in the country. In any case, the incidence of attitudes of this kind can be estimated as 20-30% of the Russian population.

4. Xenophobia of the third type is a layer of routine domestic perceptions about others, strangers and foreigners, which are not immediately targeting other ethnic communities or nations. This is a rather amorphous mixture of perceptions about the nations that surround the ethnic group. These perceptions are reflected in the folkloric and traditional perceptions, jokes and stories which are, in the first place, a prerequisite for own identity (by opposing to the images of strangers, others, “people different from us”).
5. In general, the status of mass xenophobia may be estimated as “dormant aggression”, which can evolve into open expression of ethnic or national hostility and aggression only if the government promotes mobilization and propaganda, in other words, the government intentionally follows an instigated and sustainably pursued policy of targeted aggression against specific ethnic groups (as was the case, for instance, with the Georgians after the 2008 war or with the Chechens during the first and second Chechen wars, or with the Latvians or Estonians during short-term propaganda campaigns). However, even in this case, it is impossible to provoke xenophobic campaigns against certain ethno-national groups without the effort of organized groups and movements, which are discretely promoted by the state authorities. The policy of the government comes down to constantly exercising control over radical nationalist groups and organizations (up to their complete destruction, as was the case with various small groups of far-rightist Russians) and to unofficially supporting groups that are loyal to the government (Cossack bodies, SERB, Anti-Maidan, Officers of Russia and Orthodox associations of various degree of extremism). Despite the fact that the government constantly monitors and exercises control and pressure over various nationalist organizations (whether Russian or Islamic), the nucleus of xenophobic, racist, antisemitic and nationalist attitudes reproduces itself, which creates conditions, in certain circumstances, for quickly deploying certain xenophobic campaigns if they involve the state-controlled mass media, social and political organizations and government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGO) supported by the state authorities.
6. Over the last 25 years we have been seeing an erosion of a group of Russians, which used to be quite specific and meaningful, that speaks against any forms of ethno-national discrimination and uses slogans of tolerance, multi-culturalism and opposition to any open expression by radicals of ethnic or ethno-confessional aggression, hostility and dislike. While back in the mid-1990s, over 50% of the Russian population were immune to such manifestations, today the signs of such immunity may be noticed in only 28-30% of adult population.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICAL POLICY

- 1.** An efficient policy to combat massive xenophobia, antisemitism and racism requires a differentiated approach to different forms of ethnic negativism and dislike. As noted above, it is pointless to try to remove or eradicate xenophobia and racism as such in the society. This is not possible. We can only talk about the need to regulate extremely dangerous forms of the manifestations thereof and to assess whether the available means are suitable for these purposes, on the one hand, and carry out a reasonable work to educate and socialize the young to build more tolerant forms of social life, on the other hand, while hoping to have a moderate success in future.
- 2.** In this aspect, an efficient policy could only be possible with the use of the basic social institutions: the mass media and the formation of public opinion (other countries, Europe and the USA, have been successful in this department), the law enforcement authorities and the courts with a continuous monitoring by the same public opinion, as well as continuous efforts of public organizations in monitoring any such violations and incidents. The police and the courts must be able to stop and impose legitimate sanctions for any manifestations of xenophobia and racism at all levels of social hierarchy without exceptions. Today, this is not being fully implemented since the police itself acts as one of the main factors of ethno-national violence. As for the policy makers, they are released from any liability for corresponding statements and actions, which can often be offensive towards certain ethnic or religious groups.
- 3.** The long-term strategy should target the young people (with a focus on the groups that have large cultural and social resources and capital). Only in this group the policy of education could be efficient. This policy must be based on expanding the knowledge about other people and nations, ethnic communities, their problems and values and must promote social imagination and empathy. Only in this group will it be useful to present the historic experience of cooperation between nations, to familiarize the youth with various samples of national policy and similar things. Such work with other groups will be futile. It is important to realize that, in this case, large-scale educational efforts would not create possibilities for such work since this work only responds to intra-departmental state imperatives and directions. We need model behavior and relationships towards people of different skin color or form of the eyes, which would set role models in the sphere of mass culture and would be able to influence the young.
- 4.** Other aspects of such work require a regular and systemic monitoring of any manifestations of diffused and dispersed xenophobia (and not only in the society or, more precisely, among the population but also in mass media and mass culture: cinema, literature, opinion-based journalism, variety shows, etc.) and its dynamics, rather than a monitoring of nationalist and racist extremism, assaults on representatives of ethnic minorities, massacres or publication of materials provoking aggression in mass media, on the Internet or on social media. Racist and ethnic stereotypes,

imperial prejudices and nationalist conceptions are constantly broadcast by from TV channels and on the Internet. This flow is so constant that it is not perceived as something extreme or unacceptable. The important factor is to continuously and constantly make people comply with the rules of civilized interaction rather than propagate good manners or judge people like Zhirinovskiy or Tolstoy.

5. No calls for tolerance, reservation and «friendship among nations» work today since they are perceived as empty rhetoric.
6. Another topical issue is for the government and public organizations to form a positive public opinion about national and civil (all-Russian) identity. It is the feeling of positive involvement, responsibility and consolidation with the country and their citizens (which must be real and not just declared), irrespective of their ethnicity or confession, that could restrain the growth of xenophobia. However, in order to do this, the population should understand the fundamentals of such consolidation and its government symbols (public holidays, etc.) and should be able to find no difficulties in answering the question of “who the Russians are”.

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