

3 October 2023

Original: English

---

**Human Rights Council**  
Fifty-fourth session

**The acute risk of further atrocity crimes in Ethiopia: an analysis**

**International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia\***

---

\* The information contained in the present document should be read in conjunction with the official report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (A/HRC/54/55), submitted to the Human Rights Council at its fifty-fourth session pursuant to Council resolution 51/27.

## I. Introduction

1. Almost a year after the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (the CoHA) between the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the human rights situation in the country remains serious. The CoHA ended exceptionally brutal fighting between the signatories, but other armed actors continue to commit atrocities in parts of Tigray region, and key CoHA provisions have not been implemented. Meanwhile, the national human rights situation has deteriorated abruptly. The Federal Government declared a state of emergency on 4 August 2023 in response to the deterioration of the security situation in Amhara region. Also of concern is ongoing instability in Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Oromia, and Somali regions, among others. Violence, instability and reported human rights and other violations and abuses are now so widespread as to have alarming implications at the national level and across the sub-region.

2. The International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (the Commission) in its report to the fifty-fourth session of the Human Rights Council pursuant to resolution 51/27,<sup>2</sup> noted the presence in Ethiopia of many of the indicators identified in the United Nations Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes (the Framework).<sup>3</sup> It concluded that there is a high risk of further atrocity crimes in the country. The Commission highlighted the need for continued scrutiny and independent international investigation. Further detailed information, including on the Commission's mandate and methodology, is contained in its report A/HRC/54/55.

3. This paper elaborates on the Commission's findings to review indicators of the risks of further atrocity crimes in line with the Framework. This paper draws on the Commission's investigations to date in Tigray, Amhara, Afar and Oromia regions. The Commission has documented distinct patterns and trends of human rights violations and international crimes across these four regions. Based on information documented and received from other parts of the country, it finds a strong likelihood of similar violations in the future. Further investigation of risks and how they manifest in other regions is strongly recommended.

## II. Risk factors present in Ethiopia according to the United Nations Framework

### A. Common risk factors

#### *Risk factor 1: Situations of armed conflict or other forms of instability.*

4. Atrocity crimes often take place against a backdrop of armed conflict and other forms of instability, often characterized by high levels of violence, insecurity and a breakdown of law and order. Situations of non-international armed conflict and security crises place the State under stress and can generate an environment conducive to the commission of atrocity crimes. It is important to note, however, that atrocity crimes can occur even in times of peace.

5. Since November 2022 the CoHA significantly reduced hostilities in northern Ethiopia,<sup>4</sup> but it has not led to an outright cessation of serious human rights violations and atrocity crimes by armed actors. Several areas in Tigray, notably in the region's north-western, north-eastern, western and southern areas, remain extremely unstable or inaccessible. The Government of Ethiopia has so far failed to implement its commitments under the CoHA in full: in particular on the withdrawal of foreign and non-Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) forces, the return and reintegration of displaced populations and refugees, and unhindered humanitarian access, among others. The Commission found violations by Eritrean soldiers after the CoHA, including rape, sexualized enslavement and other forms of sexual violence. It also documented violations after the CoHA by Amhara forces and *fano* militia, including rape and other forms of sexual violence and forced expulsion of Tigrayan women, men and children from Western Tigray. The Framework notes

---

<sup>2</sup> A/HRC/RES/51/27.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A tool for prevention, 2014.

<sup>4</sup> This term is used in this paper to refer to Tigray, Amhara, and Afar regions.

that security crises caused by such “*defections from peace agreements*” or by “*threats of external interventions*” constitute indicators of this risk factor. Also relevant is armed conflict in neighbouring countries. The crisis in Sudan has driven many across the border into Ethiopia, while tens of thousands of Ethiopian refugees remain in vulnerable conditions in Sudan.

6. Beyond Tigray, other parts of Ethiopia are seeing violence and instability. The Commission is receiving regular reports of armed clashes between Government forces and Amhara armed groups, including *fano* militia, in the context of the state of emergency announced on 4 August 2023, in particular around Gondar, Gojjam, and North Shewa Zone, but with incidents reported in all zones of Amhara. Such clashes are ongoing, and the Commission has received credible information about extrajudicial executions and large-scale detentions, as well as at least one drone strike in West Gojjam Zone. Meanwhile, in Oromia, notably Western Oromia, the Commission has documented the use of airstrikes, in particular drone strikes, as part of the counter-insurgency strategy against the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA).

7. Ethiopia is also facing a national humanitarian crisis, with 20 million people in need of emergency relief.<sup>5</sup> This dire humanitarian situation coupled with economic instability, including as a result of the conflict in northern Ethiopia, may further exacerbate risks of renewed tensions and conflict. Other indicators of risk factors include political instability (related to contestation for power and radical opposition, and to political repression) and social instability to do with resistance and exclusion in different parts of the country.

***Risk factor 2: Record of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.***

8. Past or present serious violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law, including acts amounting to crimes against humanity, war crimes, and their incitement, are among the indicators of risk of future atrocity crimes. The Commission’s reports to the Human Rights Council make clear that there are reasonable grounds to believe that states and non-state actors have committed serious violations and abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law, many of which amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Commission has also found that many of these violations are ongoing, with atrocities continuing in Tigray.

9. The ongoing presence of Eritrean forces and their perpetration of atrocity crimes, in particular rape and other forms of sexual violence, has been widely documented, including by the Commission. Eritrean forces’ presence in Ethiopia almost one year after the CoHA confirms at a minimum the Ethiopian Government’s continued tolerance of such forces. Similarly, the Ethiopian Government continues to tolerate and has failed to hold to account Amhara forces, including *fano* militia, who have perpetrated serious violations against Tigrayan women, men and children, in particular in Western Tigray.

10. Other non-state armed groups in Ethiopia also have a record of committing serious violations. This includes Tigray forces, who are responsible for war crimes against Amhara and Afar civilians during the conflict. The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), its affiliates and splinter groups, as well as *fano* militia have also been implicated in serious abuses against Amhara and Oromo women, men and children in Oromia and Amhara regions.

11. According to the Framework, the risk presented by a record of serious violations is compounded in contexts where past crimes have not been adequately addressed. Actors in such situations are more likely to again resort to violence. Ethiopia has so far failed to take effective measures to ensure individual criminal accountability, or indeed any other form of accountability, for international crimes committed during the conflict; the Commission has observed an overall entrenched climate impunity for serious human rights and abuses in Ethiopia.

12. The Government has stated its commitment to transitional justice and launched a transitional justice consultation. As discussed in its report to the Council, the Commission considers this to be a deeply flawed process, which fails to meet African Union and

<sup>5</sup> UN OCHA, Ethiopia: Humanitarian Response Plan 2023 (February 2023).

international standards. Indeed, the Commission concluded that Government's transitional justice efforts indicate a strategy of "quasi-compliance"; that is, a deliberate strategy to evade international scrutiny by establishing commissions and other bodies of marginal efficacy.<sup>6</sup> The "*politicization of transitional justice processes*" is unlikely to lead to justice, truth, reparation, or reconciliation, or needed reforms to the security and judicial sectors. Rather, failure to address past crimes increases the risk of further atrocity crimes.

13. Finally, it is clear from the Commission's engagement with hundreds of victims, survivors, their families, and representatives, that there is "*widespread mistrust in State institutions*", including "*as a result of impunity*." These sentiments have been expressed by people from communities living across different regions in the country.

***Risk factor 3: Weakness of State structures.***

14. The Commission has observed significant weaknesses in State structures tasked with ensuring accountability for serious violations and abuses, in particular those constituting crimes under international law.

15. As an initial matter, the judiciary lacks independence and impartiality. Recent legislation handed military courts exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes, including international crimes, that involve a member of the defense forces, police, or militia on active duty. In addition to lacking independence, military court proceedings often lack transparency, and the Commission is concerned about protection of victims and witnesses. In 2021, legislation placed the Office of the Attorney-General under the Ministry of Justice, including the power to initiate and discontinue investigations, and appoint, administer and dismiss public prosecutors, undermining prosecutorial independence and impartiality. Prosecutors could face increased pressure from political actors in their choices of investigations, prosecutions and trials.

16. In addition, Ethiopia's domestic legal framework lacks provisions to effectively investigate and prosecute international crimes defined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. For instance, the Criminal Code does not incorporate crimes against humanity. Meanwhile, Ethiopia is not a party to the Rome Statute.

17. The absence of robust accountability structures and mechanisms decreases the level of protection afforded to individuals and communities, including vulnerable groups. Continuing failures to ensure accountability can contribute to an overarching climate of impunity and lead to further violations.

***Risk factor 4: Motives or incentives.***

18. The Framework sets out motives or incentives – that is, the "*reasons, aims or drivers that justify the use of violence against protected groups, populations or individuals*" – as indicia of potential for atrocity crimes. Motives can be political, particularly those aimed at the attainment or consolidation of power; economic, including safeguarding the dominant status or well-being of elites or identity groups, or control over the distribution of resources; strategic or military, including the protection or seizure of territory and resources; and other interests, such as those aimed at rendering an area homogeneous in its identity.<sup>7</sup> While no one motive or incentive will automatically lead to atrocity crimes, certain motives or incentives are more likely to do so, "*especially those that are based on exclusionary ideology, which is revealed in the construction of identities in terms of 'us' and 'them' to accentuate differences.*" Many of these motives are relevant to the Commission's investigative findings.

19. The Framework also identifies social trauma and revenge as potential motivating factors. In its engagement with victims and survivors, the Commission found that a recurring pattern across affected communities in Ethiopia was the strong perception that past and ongoing violence had not been adequately addressed. In addition to severe physical as well as psychological impacts, this has produced feelings of loss, displacement and injustice,

---

<sup>6</sup> A/HRC/54/55, paras. 74-93; *see also* Kate Cronin-Furman, *Hypocrisy and Human Rights: Resisting Accountability for Mass Atrocities*, (Cornell University Press, 2022).

<sup>7</sup> UN Framework of Analysis, p. 13.

reinforcing both the politicization of past grievances and the perception of threat from members of other groups.

20. The motives and incentives of actors beyond State borders are also relevant in the Ethiopian context, given the continued involvement of Eritrean forces in the country. Eritrean forces committed wide-ranging atrocities against Tigrayan, Irob and Kunama civilians, as well as Eritrean refugees; the Commission documented multiple instances where direct perpetrators expressed an intent to target the Tigrayan community on the basis of their ethnicity. There are strong grounds to believe that such motives have been and will continue to be among drivers of violence in Ethiopia.

***Risk factor 5: Capacity to commit atrocity crimes.***

21. Based on its investigations, the Commission considers that the ENDF as well as former regional state forces and non-state armed groups, retain the capacity to commit atrocity crimes. In the context of Ethiopia State forces, their allies and proxies, and opposing armed actors have used and may continue to use this capacity to commit serious violations and abuses, including atrocity crimes.

22. The Commission is gravely concerned about the presence of various armed forces and non-state armed groups in Ethiopia, as well as links between these actors. As noted above, Eritrean troops remain in Tigray and continue to commit atrocity crimes, in particular rape, sexualized enslavement and other forms of sexual violence; and Amhara forces and *fano* militia continue to operate in in parts of Tigray. Meanwhile, communities in both Amhara and Afar regions, who were subjected to serious violations and abuses by Tigray forces and allied fighters, also express strong feelings of insecurity due to the continued presence and proximity of these groups.

23. Similarly, the Commission is concerned about the presence of the Oromo Liberation Army, its affiliates and splinter groups, as well as *fano* militia in Oromia and Amhara regions, where they are implicated in attacks on Amhara and Oromo communities, respectively. The Commission has documented killings, rape and sexual violence, looting and destruction of property leading to large-scale displacement. Their ongoing presence means that internally displaced persons are often fearful of returning to their homes. The situation is exacerbated by a lack of trust in the ability and willingness of Government institutions to protect returning communities.

24. The Ethiopian Government's use of aerial attacks, including drone strikes, also increases the risk of atrocity crimes. The Commission has confirmed multiple airstrikes which killed or injured civilians in Tigray between June 2021 and September 2022, as well as in Oromia from October to November 2022. It has received further credible information of at least one drone strike that killed and injured civilians in Finote Selam, Amhara region, in August 2023. The Commission has previously expressed concerns that the Ethiopian armed forces' increasing use of drones since 2021 has changed the conflict landscape and exposed civilians to new and heightened risks.

25. The Commission in its first report to the Council found reasonable grounds to believe that a drone strike on an IDP camp in Dedebit, Tigray region, in January 2022 was carried out using MAM-L ("smart micro munition") laser-guided bombs manufactured by Roketsan, a Turkish arms manufacturer.<sup>8</sup> Given the reported ongoing use of drones leading to civilian deaths and injuries, the Commission considers that the provision of support to conflict parties – such as arms, finances, logistics or training – from external actors requires further investigation. The Framework identifies such external support as an indicator of capacity to commit atrocity crimes.

***Risk factor 6: Absence of mitigating factors.***

26. The Commission further finds an absence of mitigating factors which could help prevent future atrocity crimes. The Framework also identifies cooperation of the State with international and regional mechanisms as one such potential mitigating factor.

<sup>8</sup> A/HRC/51/46, paras. 45-54.

27. The Government of Ethiopia has refused to cooperate with the Commission and has not responded to any of its requests for access or engagement made after the Commissioners visited Addis Ababa in July 2022. The Government also failed to cooperate with regional human rights mechanisms, in particular the Commission of Inquiry established by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, which was quietly terminated in May 2023 without publishing its findings. The Joint Investigation Team, established by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the East African Regional Office of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, reported that its investigation staff faced significant challenges to undertake its work, including harassment and intimidation of staff, Government-imposed restrictions on communication equipment and obstacles to obtain security clearances for travel.<sup>9</sup>

28. The Framework further considers the “*lack of a strong, organized and representative national civil society and of a free, diverse and independent national media*” as an additional risk factor. Civic space in Ethiopia is extremely restricted, and human rights defenders, including journalists and LGBTQIA+ activists, told the Commission that they face arrest, detention, threats, intimidation and other reprisals when carrying out their work. Some have been forced to flee the country, while foreign journalists face serious challenges obtaining visas and permission to travel to all parts of the country, in particular conflict-affected areas.

***Risk factor 7: Enabling circumstances or preparatory action.***

29. The Framework identifies a number of events, contexts or actions, both gradual and sudden, which can provide an environment conducive to the commission of atrocity crimes or indicate a trajectory towards their perpetration.

30. The Commission has documented many of these indicators of enabling circumstances for atrocity crimes, potentially amounting to preparatory action, in Ethiopia. This includes the imposition of emergency laws or extraordinary security measures that erode fundamental human rights. For example, on 4 August 2023, following a significant deterioration of the security situation in Amhara region, the Government announced a six-month state of emergency. States of emergency in Ethiopia grant the Government excessively broad powers to restrict human rights and have been accompanied by violations of human rights in the past.

31. Also of concern is the imposition of “*strict controls [or limitations] on the use of communication channels*”, including internet shutdowns. Recent years have seen an increased tendency of the Government to suspend internet and telecommunications, in particular during times of conflict or instability. Such shutdowns can allow for the commission of atrocity crimes when the ability to monitor and report on them is severely limited. Internet and telecommunications access was suspended in Tigray from the outset of the conflict. Although it was gradually restored in some areas under the control of the Government, the region was placed under an internet shutdown from late June 2021 until November 2022. Services have not been fully restored in all areas. Interviewees in Oromia region, in particular Western Oromia, also describe frequent temporary interruptions to internet and telecommunication. Large parts of Amhara region have further been subject to internet and telecommunications blackouts or interruptions since the announcement of the state of emergency in August 2023.

32. In addition, the Commission has raised concern about the prevalence of “*inflammatory rhetoric*” and “*hate speech targeting protected groups*”, including prominent individuals belonging to such groups. It documented multiple instances of derogatory, dehumanizing and hateful speech against ethnic Tigrayans, both by direct perpetrators and senior Government officials, since November 2020. The Commission has also recorded stigmatizing and derogatory rhetoric against Amhara and Oromo communities. An emerging area of concern is the disturbing increase in hate speech against persons who identify as LGBTQIA+, including calls to kill, whip and beat them. Statements by Government officials

<sup>9</sup> Report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC)/Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 3 November 2021, para. 20.

and other public figures have openly called for violence against LGBTQIA+ persons and have been accompanied by credible information about alleged physical attacks.

***Risk factor 8: Triggering factors.***

33. The commission of atrocity crimes, and the circumstances that lead to it, are not uniform or linear. In some instances, atrocity crimes are committed following a very rapid deterioration of the situation, while in other contexts, they may unfold over time, including following prolonged periods of tension and instability. Unpredictable events or circumstances may also provide the spark that prompts a further or sudden deterioration in a situation that may lead to atrocity crimes.

34. The Framework identifies a number of triggering factors that are relevant in the Ethiopian context. These include “*attacks against the life, physical integrity, liberty or security of leaders, prominent individuals or members of opposing groups,*” such as those on senior Amhara officials and leaders since April 2023. Another factor is the “*sudden deployment of security forces or commencement of armed hostilities*” such as those that have occurred in Amhara region since August 2023. Further triggering factors can include spill over of armed conflicts or serious tensions in neighbouring countries, such as that in Sudan as indicated above.

## **B. Specific risk factors**

***Risk factor 9: Intergroup tensions or patterns of discrimination against protected groups.***

35. Ethiopia is home to myriad different ethnic, religious and linguistic communities. As noted in the Framework, the existence of diversity within the population of a country, or differences between those communities, do not necessarily cause conflict between groups. Rather, discrimination based on such differences can create divisions in society, especially when such patterns become entrenched over time. It is clear from the Commission’s investigations that Ethiopia has a recent history of atrocity crimes committed with impunity against protected groups. The Commission also heard from victims, survivors and their representatives of similar crimes committed against such groups predating 3 November 2020, when the Commission’s mandate begins.

36. Long-standing and/or ongoing “*tensions between groups that are defined along religious or ethnic lines*” can trigger conflict or atrocity crimes. The Commission is concerned about ongoing violence against Amhara and Oromo minorities in Amhara and Oromia and regions, respectively, including killings, rape and other forms of sexual violence and destruction of property by the OLA, its affiliates, splinter groups and *fano* militia. Patterns of violations against ethnic minority communities, including the Irob, Kunama and Qemant, require further investigation.

37. In this context, the “*lack of national mechanisms or initiatives to deal with identity-based tensions or conflict*” along particular ethnic, racial, or religious lines, is worrisome. While Ethiopia has some mechanisms which could in theory deal with identity-based tensions or conflict through dialogue and reconciliation, the Commission does not consider them to be effective as they lack inclusivity, representation and public trust. For example, the National Dialogue Commission has failed to make any meaningful progress since the Commission first reported to the Human Rights Council in September 2022.

***Risk factor 10: Signs of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population.***

38. The Commission has previously established the existence of a widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population in Tigray, concluding that ENDF, Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF), Amhara Special Forces, Afar Special Forces and Amhara militias including *fano* have perpetrated crimes against humanity. Ongoing atrocities, in particular rape, sexualized enslavement and other forms of sexual violence as well as the continuing expulsion of Tigrayan women, men and children from Western Tigray indicate the continuation of such an attack.

39. The situation in Amhara is still evolving, and the Commission has been unable to investigate in detail allegations of human rights violations and abuses that are emerging from the region. However, it has received credible reports of extrajudicial killings and large-scale

detentions of Amhara civilians, in addition to at least one Government drone strike that killed and injured civilians. The Commission notes that signs of patterns of violence against civilian populations, or against members of an identifiable group, their property or livelihoods are potential indicators of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. As such, the Commission strongly urges further independent investigation into the situation in Amhara region.

40. Of particular concern is the establishment of militarized governance structures linked to the deteriorating situation in Amhara region. Following the announcement of the state of emergency, the government confirmed it would establish a Command Post system in Amhara region. The Commission has found reasonable grounds to believe that the ENDF, EDF, Amhara forces and *fano* militia have all perpetrated war crimes and crimes against humanity against Tigrayan civilians while Tigray was under the control of a Command Post system. It has similarly documented serious human rights violations by Government forces, including extrajudicial executions and torture and ill-treatment, in areas of Oromia under the control of the Command Post system. Credible information also indicates the existence of Command Posts or other similar militarized governance structures in the Oromo Special Zone in Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' regions, and further investigation of patterns of trends in these areas is strongly recommended.

***Risk factor 11: Signs of a plan or policy to attack any civilian population.***

41. The Commission is aware of allegations from several groups and communities about signs of a plan or policy to attack a specific civilian population, in particular based on that population's ethnicity. With regard to the Commission's investigative findings, the forced expulsion of Tigrayans from Western Tigray by Amhara forces and *fano* militia, in addition to discriminatory measures imposed against Tigrayans living in both Western and Southern Tigray by Amhara regional authorities and militias, raise concern about the adoption of measures that have "*altered the ethnic composition of the overall population in defined geographical areas*". The fact that expulsions have continued from Western Tigray even after the CoHA, and that displaced Tigrayan civilians have so far been unable to return to their homes in these areas requires further scrutiny and investigation.

***Risk factor 12: Serious threats to those protected under international humanitarian law.***

42. Since the eruption of the crisis affecting Amhara region, the Commission has received reports of hundreds of armed clashes between Government forces and non-state armed groups in Amhara, believed to be Amhara forces and *fano* militia. Many of these clashes are reported in or close to heavily populated urban centers or other civilian areas. The Commission has been unable to investigate allegations of alleged human rights and other violations; however, there are clear and ongoing risks to Amhara women, men and children in these areas.

43. The current crisis stems, in part, from the Federal Government announcement in April 2023 that it would disband Regional Special Forces and incorporate their personnel into Ethiopia's armed forces or law enforcement bodies or support reintegration into civilian life. The subsequent defection of a significant number of trained and armed members of the Amhara Regional Forces, many of whom then joined Amhara militia, has contributed to a fragmentation of armed actors, and increased the potential for further and more violent hostilities. The "*mistrust between parties based on past or present breaches of commitments or agreements*" is identified as an indicator in the Framework.

***Risk factor 13: Serious threats to humanitarian operations.***

44. The Framework identifies "*interference, limitation, or prohibition of access or movement of humanitarian operations or their personnel*" as an indicator of risk of atrocity crimes.

45. United Nations entities and non-governmental humanitarian organizations operating in Ethiopia are seriously constrained in their access to conflict-affected areas and communities residing in them. As of September 2023, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) describes multiple parts of the country as being "hard-to-reach", noting that, in practice, this means:



*The security situation is volatile, compromising the safety and security of the population and aid workers, impeding [sic] relief operations on a quasi-permanent basis. Aid workers may be arbitrarily detained, threatened, or relocated, and activities temporarily suspended. Relief assets and supplies may be stolen, and public and humanitarian premises damaged. The humanitarian response is frequently disrupted and completely substandard, even with adequate resources partners would only be able to reach a minority of people in need.*<sup>10</sup>

46. Many of these areas – for example Western Tigray, Southern Tigray, Western Oromia and Southern Oromia – are also areas where the Commission has documented serious human rights violations, and in the case of Tigray, past and ongoing atrocity crimes. In recent weeks, large swathes of Amhara region have been newly classified as “hard-to-reach.”

47. Ongoing restrictions on humanitarian operations take place against a backdrop of attacks on humanitarian workers, in particular during the conflict in northern Ethiopia. According to OCHA, 36 humanitarian workers have been killed on duty in Ethiopia since 2019, the vast majority of them national staff.<sup>11</sup> The Commission documented the killing of aid workers in Tigray, in addition to the arrest, detention, harassment and intimidation of humanitarian workers in the country. Impunity for such attacks further exacerbates risks to aid workers and humanitarian operations.

### III. Conclusion

48. The Commission considers that all eight of the Common Risk Factors for atrocity crimes are present in Ethiopia and that there is evidence to suggest that certain indicators of majority of the Specific Risk Factors for atrocity crimes are also present. Further investigation is required into the wider social, political and economic indicators identified in the Framework under each of the relevant risk factors. However, on the basis of its own findings, the Commission finds strong evidence of the presence of multiple risk factors for further atrocity crimes in Ethiopia.

49. Most, if not all, of the structural drivers of violence and conflict – including persistent gender inequality and intersecting forms of discrimination – remain unaddressed. In combination with the unaddressed impacts of conflict, violence and instability, the risk of further and future atrocities is very real.

50. In light of the mandate of the UN Human Rights Council to contribute to the prevention of human rights violations and respond promptly to human rights emergencies, the Commission strongly recommends the Council ensure continued international scrutiny and independent investigations into past and ongoing violations in Ethiopia.

---

<sup>10</sup> OCHA, Ethiopia – Situation Report, 7 September 2023.

<sup>11</sup> The Humanitarian Community in Ethiopia condemns the killing of two humanitarian workers, 12 April 2023.