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**Human Rights Council**

**Fifty-sixth session**

18 June­12 July 2024

Agenda items 2 and 3

**Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner   
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the   
High Commissioner and the Secretary-General**

Promotion and protection of all human rights,   
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights,   
including the right to development

Mapping report: human rights and new and emerging digital technologies

Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights[[1]](#footnote-2)\*

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| *Summary* |
| The present report, submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 53/29, maps the work and recommendations of the Council, the Office of the High Commissioner, the treaty bodies and the special procedures of the Council in the field of human rights and new and emerging digital technologies, including artificial intelligence, identifies gaps and challenges and makes recommendations on how to address them, while giving due consideration to related United Nations system-wide work. |
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I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 53/29, which requested the Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) to prepare a report, mapping the work and recommendations of the Human Rights Council (Council), OHCHR, the treaty bodies and the special procedures of the Council in the field of human rights and new and emerging digital technologies, including artificial intelligence, identifying gaps and challenges and making recommendations on how to address them, while giving due consideration to the United Nations system-wide work on new and emerging digital technologies.

2. The number of technology-related outputs by the UN human rights system has already reached an astounding level– an encouraging key finding of this mapping exercise. For example, at least 135 reports of the special procedures of the Council to date discuss aspects of digitalization.[[2]](#footnote-3) While mapping the work of the UN human rights system along thematic lines helps to capture the breadth and depth of the work undertaken and to effectively demonstrate thematic developments and trends, the inter-relatedness and indivisibility of rights and the intersectionality of topics inevitably leads to some overlap across thematic baskets. In view of the wealth and ongoing development of the material in this area, the report does not purport to be exhaustive, aiming instead to bring a bird’s eye perspective that can further facilitate work in this field by the UN human rights system, including the Human Rights Council.

II. Governance of the internet and internet-based communications

3. With the mass uptake of the internet, the United Nations has increasingly become a venue for discussions around its economic, social, cultural, and political impact and ways to govern it. The World Summit of the Information Society process led at an early stage to important commitments that highlighted the human rights enabling role of the internet and the centrality of human rights in its governance.[[3]](#footnote-4) The human rights system itself soon began to tackle internet-related questions, and from the outset[[4]](#footnote-5) highlighted the fundamental tension between the immense potential of the internet to facilitate the enjoyment of rights, particularly for expression and participation, and the risks of human rights abuses and violations.

Access to the internet as a human rights enabler

4. The internet is an indispensable enabler of human rights.[[5]](#footnote-6) Special Procedures reports have provided much supporting analysis, nuance and detail, analysing the benefits across the full spectrum of human rights.[[6]](#footnote-7) The Secretary-General[[7]](#footnote-8) and OHCHR consistently emphasize the need to achieve universal access to the internet to ensure full enjoyment of human rights by all.[[8]](#footnote-9) Treaty bodies on many occasions underscored the importance of equal access to the internet and digital technology.[[9]](#footnote-10) Accordingly, there is urgent need to overcome multiple digital divides within and between countries.[[10]](#footnote-11)

Restrictions to accessing and using the Internet

5. Reflecting the crucial role of the internet and digital technologies for the realization of human rights, a large body of work has developed analysing various restrictions on access and use of the internet and internet-based technologies imposed by state and non-state actors, often narrowing civic space.[[11]](#footnote-12)

6. Legislative and regulatory instruments that unduly restrict certain human rights, such as the right to freedom of expression, by restricting the use of internet in a way that contravenes the principles of legitimate aim, necessity and proportionality[[12]](#footnote-13), are consistently identified as key problems in the digital sphere.[[13]](#footnote-14) Such instruments, often carrying criminal penalties, relate to subjects such as terrorism and extremism-related speech, national security, disinformation, hate speech, cybercrime and cybersecurity, defamation, blasphemy, morality or directly prohibit criticism of authorities.[[14]](#footnote-15) Online harassment, threats and cyberattacks coming from a variety of actors, including via social media, are often also raised.[[15]](#footnote-16)

7. Various forms of *filtering and blocking* of websites and content also raise other major human rights concerns.[[16]](#footnote-17) State-imposed *shutdowns* of access to the internet and mass communication platforms, such as social media, are more severe human rights restrictions that have frequently been denounced in resolutions[[17]](#footnote-18), and by the Human Rights Committee[[18]](#footnote-19), special procedures[[19]](#footnote-20) and the High Commissioner.[[20]](#footnote-21)

Disinformation, hate speech and social media governance

8. Recent years have seen an upsurge in work on three interlinked areas: disinformation, hate speech and governance of social media platforms.

9. Building on art. 20(2) of the ICCPR and art. 4 of the CERD in combination with the prohibition of discrimination, there is expansive work on *online hate speech*. The Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence provides detailed guidance regarding the concept of incitement to national, racial, or religious hatred, while ensuring full respect for freedom of expression.[[21]](#footnote-22) The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has provided important guidance on hate speech, in particular in General Recommendation No. 35 on Combatting racist hate speech.[[22]](#footnote-23) Member State-driven processes have raised online hate speech as a major concern on numerous occasions.[[23]](#footnote-24) Special procedures have dedicated considerable work to various forms of hate speech, underscoring the indivisible link between freedom of opinion and expression and combatting online hate speech, including reports by the Special Rapporteurs on racism[[24]](#footnote-25), on freedom of expression (with extensive recommendations for content moderation practices),[[25]](#footnote-26) on freedom of religion or belief (discussing problems with many domestic hate speech laws protecting religious feelings),[[26]](#footnote-27) and on minority issues.[[27]](#footnote-28) Moreover, gendered hate speech is receiving increased attention.[[28]](#footnote-29) Hate speech is a priority for OHCHR, which recently developed guidance on rights-based responses to hate speech on grounds of religion or belief, and in electoral contexts and presents a report on cyberbullying against persons with disability at the 56th session of the Council.[[29]](#footnote-30)

10. *Disinformation*[[30]](#footnote-31) became a focus of the UN human rights system from the second half of the 2010s. Disinformation was the subject of resolutions,[[31]](#footnote-32) the Universal Periodic Review (UPR),[[32]](#footnote-33) and treaty bodies’[[33]](#footnote-34) discussions. Reports by the Secretary-General[[34]](#footnote-35) and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression[[35]](#footnote-36) made recommendations for human rights-based responses. Currently, a set of Global Principles for Information Integrity is being developed within the UN.[[36]](#footnote-37)

11. The *governance of social media* is a central issue for legal and policy discussions, with far-reaching implications for human rights. Many of the sources cited above regarding use restrictions, hate speech and disinformation are also relevant here. Among others, Special Procedures have discussed social media since the early 2010s.[[37]](#footnote-38) A 2018 report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression developed a comprehensive human rights-based framework for content moderation and curation and their regulation.[[38]](#footnote-39) Other reports discussed impacts of AI on the information space,[[39]](#footnote-40) and explained how content moderation can address hate speech[[40]](#footnote-41). Special procedures also sent numerous communications to States and companies concerning social media governance.[[41]](#footnote-42) While the UPR and concluding observations of human rights treaty bodies have raised social media-related issues on many occasions[[42]](#footnote-43), the recommendations generally do not provide detailed governance guidance. General Comments[[43]](#footnote-44) set valuable general guidelines but to date have not developed social media-specific governance frameworks. UNESCO has recently finalized a set of Guidelines for the Governance of Digital Platforms. [[44]](#footnote-45)

Technical standards

12. Technical standards are increasingly recognized as an instrument shaping the evolving digital environment with significant human rights effects. At the request of the Council, OHCHR published a report on the topic in 2023 and is currently working with standard-setting organisations, such as the International Telecommunication Union, and stakeholders on better integrating human rights considerations into standard-setting processes.[[45]](#footnote-46)

III. Surveillance, datafication and artificial intelligence (AI)

13. For decades, UN processes have recognized the human rights threats linked to the ever-increasing abilities of digital systems to collect and process data and to surveil. Early examples include the Guidelines for the regulation of computerized personal data files[[46]](#footnote-47) and the Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 16 on of the right to privacy. In the last 15 years, attention to these issues increased. Numerous resolutions on the right to privacy in the digital age have addressed a broad range of topics related to surveillance and data governance. In 2015, the Human Rights Council established the Special procedures mandate on the right to privacy.[[47]](#footnote-48)

A. Surveillance

14. Surveillance by government agencies has been a consistent concern raised by the United Nations human rights system. This includes the mass and targeted interception of communications, access and collection of communications-related data, intrusion into electronic devices through hacking, and surveillance of public spaces online and offline, increasingly through biometric and AI-based technologies.

15. In addition to numerous resolutions[[48]](#footnote-49), recommendations relating to surveillance have been made by the UPR[[49]](#footnote-50) and reflected in human rights treaty bodies’ Concluding Observations[[50]](#footnote-51). The Human Rights Committee refers to surveillance measures in its General Comments 16 and 37.[[51]](#footnote-52)

16. Special Procedures have provided extensive analysis concerning state surveillance. The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Counter-terrorism has repeatedly raised concerns and recommended measures to reign in surveillance-related human rights violations and abuses, including concerning the [use of biometric data](https://law.umn.edu/human-rights-center/research/use-biometric-data-identify-terrorists) and the spyware trade.[[52]](#footnote-53) The Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression has made important contributions, including a comprehensive overview of surveillance practices; the role of the ICT private sector, and an in-depth analysis of the surveillance industry and related duties and responsibilities.[[53]](#footnote-54) Other aspects addressed by Special Procedures include the use of new technologies against relatives of disappeared persons; and adequate oversight of intelligence operations.[[54]](#footnote-55) Special procedures sent numerous communications to States and to other actors addressing surveillance-related concerns.[[55]](#footnote-56)

17. OHCHR focused on surveillance trends and made related recommendations in several reports, including on mass surveillance, spyware, weakening of encryption, surveillance of public spaces in general and more specifically in the context of peaceful assemblies.[[56]](#footnote-57)

B. Datafication, data-intensive technologies and AI

18. Unlocking the value of data has been identified as key to boosting development, economic well-being, and scientific discovery, while also presenting significant human rights risks. The human rights system has recognized that implementing data governance, especially data privacy/personal data protection frameworks, is a human rights priority.[[57]](#footnote-58) The High Commissioner and the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy have described key challenges in this regard and outlined minimum requirements for such frameworks.[[58]](#footnote-59) These considerations have grown in importance with the emergence of ever-more powerful and data-intensive systems, including AI.

19. States have addressed human rights in the context of AI in resolutions and also in the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of AI.[[59]](#footnote-60)

20. Special Procedures have discussed AI and human rights, including in reports on the implications of AI for the rights to freedom of opinion and expression;[[60]](#footnote-61) and on the right to privacy,[[61]](#footnote-62) on freedom of thought[[62]](#footnote-63), on the right to education[[63]](#footnote-64), on the right to health[[64]](#footnote-65), on the rights of older persons[[65]](#footnote-66), and on the rights of persons with disabilities[[66]](#footnote-67). Important insights concerning AI were also presented in areas, such as counter-terrorism[[67]](#footnote-68), extreme poverty[[68]](#footnote-69), racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance associated with digital technology in general[[69]](#footnote-70) and in the border and immigration enforcement context in particular[[70]](#footnote-71).

21. The Advisory Committee to the Human Rights Council discussed issues associated with AI in a 2021 report on new and emerging digital technologies.[[71]](#footnote-72)

22. Treaty bodies’ work on AI has put a strong focus on (racial and gender-based) discrimination and inequality issues,[[72]](#footnote-73) often in the context of surveillance and police measures.[[73]](#footnote-74)

23. The Secretary-General has identified AI as a priority area of human rights engagement,[[74]](#footnote-75) and in 2023 established a High-Level Advisory Body on AI that is developing principles and recommendations for international governance of AI.[[75]](#footnote-76)

24. AI is a key issue in OHCHR’s work concerning digital technologies. A 2020 report on new technologies the context of assemblies, including peaceful protests, dedicated a chapter to the rise of remote facial recognition technology,[[76]](#footnote-77) followed in 2022 by an in-depth study of AI,[[77]](#footnote-78) which developed key recommendations to States and businesses. OHCHR’s B-Tech project started developing guidance in 2023 on the application of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to generative AI.[[78]](#footnote-79)

IV. Economic, social, cultural and development aspects

25. Reflecting how digital technologies permeate all aspects of life, the UN human rights system has addressed many of their economic, social, cultural and development impacts, often as part of cross-cutting discussions that deal with a broad range of human rights issues. Resolutions focusing on the internet and digital technologies consistently underscore that technologies are driving forces accelerating development.[[79]](#footnote-80) The High Commissioner’s report on the right to privacy and AI delves deeper into privacy as an enabler of rights, exploring the role of AI in the context of social security, and in employment settings.[[80]](#footnote-81) Moreover, concerns about digital divides[[81]](#footnote-82) repeatedly discuss economic, social and cultural rights and obstacles to development. OHCHR’s report on internet shutdowns discusses the deep impacts on the rights to education, health, and an adequate standard of living.[[82]](#footnote-83)

26. In 2020, the Secretary-General presented a comprehensive report describing ways in which digital technologies can promote economic, social and cultural rights as well as development. The report develops a detailed vision for a human rights-based approach to technology that ensures that societies can benefit from digitization while minimizing human rights harms. It highlights core principles, including equality and non-discrimination, participation, accountability, legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality, inclusion, and accessibility, availability, affordability, adaptability and quality of new technologies.[[83]](#footnote-84)

27. The Special rapporteur on extreme poverty has worked extensively on aspects of digitization of government functions, including in reports on the role of digital technologies in the context of social protection.[[84]](#footnote-85) Other reports analysed the concept of universal basic income as a response to technology-related social and economic developments and developed a human rights-based approach to wages, inter alia, in the so-called gig economy.[[85]](#footnote-86)

28. The digitization of education was addressed in Council resolutions and in reports of the Special rapporteur on education.[[86]](#footnote-87) UN human rights treaty bodies frequently raise concerns about digital divides in education.[[87]](#footnote-88) The role digital technologies can play in advancing the development of treatments and facilitating universal health coverage has been recognized.[[88]](#footnote-89) OHCHR presented a series of reports, identifying access to health technologies as a fundamental building block of the right to health[[89]](#footnote-90) and calling for equitable, affordable, timely and universal access for all countries to vaccines.[[90]](#footnote-91) The Special Rapporteur on the right to health has raised concerns about adverse mental health impacts of surveillance measures.[[91]](#footnote-92) Neurotechnology is another area that has been taken up by the Council.[[92]](#footnote-93)

29. The Special Rapporteur on the right to development indicated that digital technologies were a mandate priority and reported on how technology companies can contribute to enabling the right to development.[[93]](#footnote-94)

30. The Special Rapporteur on cultural rights published reports on technology-related topics, including on the right to science[[94]](#footnote-95), and on the relationship between human rights and intellectual property rights[[95]](#footnote-96). The Independent Expert on foreign debt presented a report on international financial obligations, digital systems and human rights.[[96]](#footnote-97)

31. OHCHR is working on human rights dimensions of development finance including technology-related aspects. For example, a Benchmarking Study of Development Finance Institutions’ (DFI) Safeguard Policies, a study on Remedy in Development Finance, and several submissions to DFIs addressed technology-related policies and practices.[[97]](#footnote-98)

32. Finally, the Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Technology and the United Nations Development Programme, conducted a project developing a safeguards framework for digital public infrastructure.[[98]](#footnote-99)

V. Discrimination, equality and specific groups

33. Harms and benefits of new technologies are often experienced in different ways, depending on the identity of the individual and group affected. Based on the foundations of the principles of non-discrimination and equality, the human rights system has already deeply engaged with the disparate impacts of digital technologies. This work illustrates that differentiated adverse impacts on members of certain groups often intersect, and that discrimination and exclusion can only be fully grasped and addressed when adopting an intersectional approach.[[99]](#footnote-100) As noted above[[100]](#footnote-101), *digital divides* are a major theme across the system. While there are many expressions of and contributors to digital divides, gaps in digital literacy and skills that often affect women, children and disadvantaged groups are frequently mentioned.[[101]](#footnote-102)

34. Gender digital divides have been a major concern for years.[[102]](#footnote-103) An OHCHR report from 2017 outlines a human rights-based approach to such divides.[[103]](#footnote-104) Gender digital divides in the education context are discussed by CEDAW in General Recommendation No. 36,[[104]](#footnote-105) by CESCR in General Comment No. 25,[[105]](#footnote-106) and by the Special Rapporteur on the right to education in a 2022 report.[[106]](#footnote-107) The Special rapporteur on the right to health addressed gender digital disparities in a report on digital innovation, technology and the right to health.[[107]](#footnote-108)

35. *Online gender-based violence* has been raised by special procedures[[108]](#footnote-109), treaty bodies[[109]](#footnote-110) and the UPR[[110]](#footnote-111). The Secretary-General and UNESCO identified gender-based online violence as a major threat to women journalists.[[111]](#footnote-112) Another topic of major concern is the technology-mediated facilitation of trafficking of women.[[112]](#footnote-113)

36. There is a growing understanding of the *gender dimension of the* *right to privacy*, highlighted for example by OHCHR and the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy.[[113]](#footnote-114) Resolutions on the right to privacy prominently address gender questions, including gender-based violence, abuse and sexual harassment, discrimination, cyberbullying and cyberstalking.[[114]](#footnote-115)

37. The Special Rapporteur on *freedom of expression* has repeatedly addressed gender-related issues, including in reports on gender justice,[[115]](#footnote-116) gendered disinformation,[[116]](#footnote-117) and the safety of journalists.[[117]](#footnote-118) The Working Group on discrimination against women and girls raised concerns about pervasive online surveillance of women activists.[[118]](#footnote-119)

38. The Commission on the Status of Women devoted its 67th session entirely to technology-related questions.[[119]](#footnote-120)

39. The human rights of *children* are another key topic. General comment No. 25 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child[[120]](#footnote-121) provides comprehensive authoritative guidance relating to several fields associated with the enjoyment of human rights by children in the digital age. Discussions on child rights uniformly recognize that digital technologies are uniquely able to facilitate and expand children’s enjoyment of human rights. Reflecting SDG target 16.2, violence against children, including cyberbullying, sexual abuse and exploitation, and the sale of children and trafficking are key concerns extensively addressed.[[121]](#footnote-122) OHCHR will soon present Council reports on solutions to promote digital education for young people and to ensure their protection from online threat and on the use of digital technologies to achieve universal birth registration.[[122]](#footnote-123)

40. *Racial discrimination* in the context of digital technologies is widely recognized as a concern cutting across the full range of human rights and issues such as hate speech,[[123]](#footnote-124) content governance[[124]](#footnote-125), health[[125]](#footnote-126), surveillance[[126]](#footnote-127) and AI[[127]](#footnote-128). Resolutions consistently address racism and racial discrimination.[[128]](#footnote-129) Special Procedures frequently address racism in the digital environment, such as a series of reports of the Special rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism.[[129]](#footnote-130) Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination devoted a large part of its General Recommendation on racial profiling by law enforcement officials to algorithmic profiling.[[130]](#footnote-131)

41. Important work on people on the move[[131]](#footnote-132) includes a report on the use of technology at borders by the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism,[[132]](#footnote-133) papers by the Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism,[[133]](#footnote-134) and an OHCHR and University of Essex study on Digital Border Governance.[[134]](#footnote-135)

42. The Independent expert on the human rights of *older persons* has published a succession of thematic and country reports that shed light on digital divides, the impact of assistive and robotics technology, AI and automation on human rights and the significance of data for protecting and promoting the rights of older persons.[[135]](#footnote-136) Several Special Procedures mandates and OHCHR are actively contributing to the technology-related work of the Open-ended Working Group on Ageing.[[136]](#footnote-137)

43. The intersection of the rights of *persons with disabilities* and digital technologies has been met with gradual attention. The opportunities of digital technologies as a rights enabler, as well as the lack of access of persons with disabilities to adequate digital technology, services and content, are frequently raised.[[137]](#footnote-138) The CESCR, in General Comment No. 25 was outspoken about “deep discrimination” against persons with disabilities in the enjoyment of their right to participate in and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, outlining minimum steps to be taken to combat that discrimination.[[138]](#footnote-139) The Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities published a comprehensive report on AI[[139]](#footnote-140), and also addressed aspects associated with digital technology and the rights of older persons with disabilities[[140]](#footnote-141). OHCHR presents a report on cyberbullying against people with disabilities at the 56th session of the Human Rights Council.[[141]](#footnote-142)

44. Regarding *minorities and Indigenous Peoples*, the human rights system has engaged with issues such as hate speech and social media; the role of indigenous women as scientific and technical knowledge keepers; and the right to science in the context of the science and traditional knowledge of Indigenous Peoples.[[142]](#footnote-143)

VI. International security, armed conflict and new and emerging technologies in the military domain

45. In addition to various specialised UN mechanisms,[[143]](#footnote-144) the Council has recently engaged with the issue of human rights law in cyberspace in international security contexts, adopting resolution 51/22 which requested the Advisory Committee to prepare a study for its 60th session, examining the human rights implications of new and emerging technologies in the military domain. It has also established an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group to elaborate and international regulatory framework relating to the activities of private military and security companies, which also discusses cyberspace-related matters.[[144]](#footnote-145)

46. The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 36 on the right to life is a key source for the interpretation of international human rights law in the use of new technologies in armed conflict and in the military domain. The Committee on the Rights of the Child in its General comment 25 on the rights of the child in the digital environment affirms that the State has a duty to ensure that children are not recruited or used in conflicts through technology-facilitated solicitation and grooming.

47. The use of drones or unmanned aerial vehicles to conduct targeted killings and the lack of transparency regarding the criteria for drone strikes was among the first issues considered by human rights treaty bodies regarding the human rights implications of new technologies in the military domain.[[145]](#footnote-146) The Human Rights Committee has raised concerns about the practice of targeted killings in extraterritorial counter-terrorism operations using drones, the lack of transparency for such attacks and the lack of accountability for loss of life resulting from such attacks. Several treaty bodies have further considered the use, transfer and regulation of military technologies.[[146]](#footnote-147)

48. Special Procedures have discussed human rights implications of technological developments in the military domain and armed conflict since the early 2010s. The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions discussed in several reports autonomous weapons and armed drones, including for targeted killings,[[147]](#footnote-148) and dedicated another report to examining the use of ICTs to secure the right to life.[[148]](#footnote-149) The Working Group on Mercenaries has addressed questions around cyberwarfare and provision of services of mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and security companies.[[149]](#footnote-150) Another topic discussed is the use of AI systems to identify bombing targets.[[150]](#footnote-151) Several Special Procedures communications have addressed the human rights implications of new technologies in the military domain and in conflict, particularly the use of drones for targeted killings as well as the sale of military technologies.[[151]](#footnote-152)

VII. Role of the private sector

49. The private sector holds enormous influence in the digital sphere, including its potential to foster rights-respecting conduct. Indeed, resolutions of the Council and General Assembly highlight the increasing centrality of the private sector in the context of digitization and its relevance to safeguarding and advancing human rights;[[152]](#footnote-153) specific recommendations both to States and businesses have increased in recent years.[[153]](#footnote-154) The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) are consistently referred to, confirming their role as the leading framework for preventing and addressing business-related human rights harms connected to digital technologies. The UNGPs underscore the business responsibility to respect human rights and re-emphasize the State duty to protect human rights and access to remedy for human rights harms related to business conduct. OHCHR Report on the practical application of the UNGPs to the activities of technology companies provides a comprehensive overview on the role and application of the UNGPs with regard to new and emerging technologies.[[154]](#footnote-155)

50. Other human rights mechanisms reflect growing attention to and steadily more granular analysis of the human rights issues arising from business activities in the digital space. Since at least the early 2010s[[155]](#footnote-156), Special Procedures mandates have reflected on many ways in which the enjoyment of human rights in the digital space depends on the private sector. The Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression should be mentioned in particular for a ground-breaking series of studies developing a clear human rights-based concept for business conduct by technology companies and approach to regulation of digital sectors.[[156]](#footnote-157) The Working Group on Business and Human Rights has devoted increasing attention to digital matters, including through the communication procedure, and has made optimizing digital transformation through respect for human rights a priority goal of the next decade for business and human rights.[[157]](#footnote-158) Many other reports consider business-related aspects; while only a selection can be mentioned here, thee include reports of the Special Rapporteurs on the rights of persons with disabilities[[158]](#footnote-159), on racism[[159]](#footnote-160), on violence against women[[160]](#footnote-161), on minority issues[[161]](#footnote-162), on the sale of children[[162]](#footnote-163), on freedom of religion or belief[[163]](#footnote-164), on counter-terrorism[[164]](#footnote-165), on privacy[[165]](#footnote-166), and on extreme poverty[[166]](#footnote-167). The Working Group on mercenaries examined in a report the provision of military and security products and services in cyberspace by mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and security companies and its human rights impacts.[[167]](#footnote-168) Special Procedures have also addressed businesses[[168]](#footnote-169) and States on matters related to business conduct, including relating domestic legal frameworks[[169]](#footnote-170).

51. The Forum on Business and Human Rights[[170]](#footnote-171) has increasingly considered issues related to digital technologies.[[171]](#footnote-172)

52. OHCHR has developed extensive guidance for States and the private sector in how to address business-related human rights challenges including in its reporting to the Council.[[172]](#footnote-173) OHCHR has deep expertise in the application of the UNGPs in the digital sphere.[[173]](#footnote-174) Its B-Tech project[[174]](#footnote-175) provides authoritative practical guidance and public policy recommendations on applying the UNGPs to the development, application and governance of digital technologies. It has established an innovative Company Community of Practice to provide a shared space for technology companies and OHCHR to collectively discuss common challenges, solutions, and best practices related to implementing human rights in company policies and processes. The project addresses business model-related human rights risks, human rights due diligence and end-use, access to remedy, investor responsibilities, and the State duty to protect and the smart mix of mandatory and voluntary measures to be taken by States to respond to human rights challenges linked to digital technologies. In 2023, B-Tech launched a project focusing on generative AI, which produced a foundational paper[[175]](#footnote-176), a taxonomy of generative AI human rights harms[[176]](#footnote-177), and an overview of human rights and a responsible AI company practice[[177]](#footnote-178).

VIII. Rule of Law and Administration of Justice

53. The UN human rights system has addressed the effects of digitization on the administration of justice. Crime investigation is a main topic, with a particular focus on surveillance, discussed above.[[178]](#footnote-179)

54. Another important aspect concerns the digitization of court systems, from e-filing and digitized case management systems[[179]](#footnote-180) to the conduct of online hearings[[180]](#footnote-181). Issues at the enforcement stage of court decisions include constant video surveillance of prisoners[[181]](#footnote-182), the use of CCTV cameras and other tools to surveil and monitor police and prison guards,[[182]](#footnote-183) and the use of electronic monitoring as an alternative to detention[[183]](#footnote-184). Other concerns raised include disinformation and online attacks targeting judges and lawyers.[[184]](#footnote-185)

55. The impacts of AI on the administration of justice, for example as when used for predictive policing, as an investigative tool, or in the context of making sentencing, parole or release decisions, is another area of major importance.[[185]](#footnote-186) Finally, the multifaceted ways in which neurotechnology may undermine fair trial guarantees is an emerging critical field, the exploration of which is only beginning.[[186]](#footnote-187)

IX. Summary of existing work and identification of gaps

Achievements

56. The review of outputs of the UN human rights system related to digital technologies revealed an impressive body of work. The breadth and depth of the existing work made it remarkably difficult to identify and adequately assess all relevant material within the confines of a Council report. This in itself confirms a key finding of the mapping: the human rights system has been immensely productive in responding to the manifold challenges of the ongoing digitization of societies – even if gaps and shortcomings remain.

57. The Council as well as the General Assembly have addressed human rights issues related to digital technologies in many resolutions, consistently affirming since 2012[[187]](#footnote-188) that the “same rights that people have offline must also be protected online”. Panel discussions and other official meetings dedicated to digital themes[[188]](#footnote-189) have added opportunities to deepen discussions among States and stakeholders.

58. The Special procedures have tackled the challenges of the digital age for at least 15 years, constantly expanding the scope of the work, covering new aspects of digitalization across the spectrum of human rights. Thematic reports have provided nuanced analysis on topics from internet access to surveillance, online information controls, hate speech, racism embedded in technology, health, worker’s protections in the gig economy, education and the alleviation of poverty, among others. Country visits and related reports as well as communications have enabled more concrete engagement with States and stakeholders.

59. Human rights questions around digital technology have also been raised many times in the UPR, although to date with a limited scope and depth. Treaty bodies have increasingly taken up topics related to digital technology, including through General Comments and General Recommendations which are particularly helpful in guiding the interpretation of human rights instruments. Concluding Observations on key issues can also prove instrumental in helping States adjust laws, policies and practices in order to reach compliance with their human rights obligations. As with UPR recommendations, due to their concise nature, treaty body Concluding Observations do not always allow for expressing nuanced views.

60. The High Commissioner’s work on digital technologies covers a growing range of topics, from the gender digital divide to data privacy, surveillance, end-to-end encryption, internet shutdowns, the role of technology in the context of peaceful assemblies, technical standards, governance of content on internet platforms, and border governance. Numerous thematic reports and studies have helped advance the human rights discourse around digital technologies. The Office’s B-Tech project has provided guidance to companies, States and other stakeholders regarding implementation of the UNGPs in the technology sector. In addition, OHCHR provides advice on national and international law-making processes, and plays a key role in mainstreaming human rights considerations in technology-related discussions across the UN. The endorsement in 2024 of Human Rights Due Diligence guidance for digital technology use, for example, was a crucial step towards ensuring that the UN itself uses digital technologies in ways that uphold human rights. Finally, OHCHR and the University of California, Berkeley published in 2022 the Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations identifying international standards for conducting online research of alleged violations of international criminal, human rights, and humanitarian law.

61. Overall, this mapping evidences the relevance and necessity of using the international human rights framework to govern the development and use of digital technologies. International human rights law provides the guardrails required to maximise the benefits and added value of digital technologies while reducing and containing their potential detrimental human rights impacts. Where there are protection gaps, these result from gaps in implementation rather than a lack of established obligations and responsibilities for States and businesses. A human rights lens ensures that necessary actions can be directed the right way, avoiding risks and realizing opportunities to promote well-being.

62. For example, several reports of Special Procedures and the High Commissioner have constructively impacted international as well as domestic processes. Many of the recommendations from such reports are reflected in human rights resolutions. Reports are cited by courts, including regional human rights courts[[189]](#footnote-190), used by lawmakers and technology companies and in public debate. Documents such as the Rabat Plan of Action, developed under the auspices of OHCHR, shape international approaches to hate speech, including online. Communications sent by Special Procedures mandate holders to governments and other stakeholders, such as international organizations and businesses remain an effective and nimble instrument for raising time-sensitive concerns in the rapidly evolving area of digital technologies. They provide a level of detailed, concrete analysis, in particular relating to specific laws or situations of concern and are an essential complement to more general thematic reports and UPR and treaty body recommendations. OHCHR also frequently provides inputs and technical assistance to legislative and regulatory processes where appropriate.

63. The mapping revealed that the human rights system has responded to impacts on the full range of human rights. It also confirmed the that key human rights principles remain highly relevant in the digital realm, including equality and non-discrimination, participation, accountability, legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality, and inclusion. With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, the mapping underscored the importance of accessibility, availability, affordability, adaptability and quality. It is also noteworthy that the concept of human rights due diligence has increasingly become a central element of efforts to respond to human rights challenges linked to digital technologies.[[190]](#footnote-191)

Gaps

64. The impact of the outputs of the UN human rights ecosystem is undeniably positive. Some gaps can, however, be identified. The large number of actors and processes in the human rights system addressing issues concerning digital technologies can lead to overlap and at times tensions between outcomes if coordination efforts are not sufficient. For example, in recent years, an increasing number of resolutions have been dedicated to or at least prominently addressed issues of digital technology, including AI. While this is a welcome sign of growing attention, there are some risks, including of duplication of effort, thinning already sparse resources, and degrees of ambiguity or lack of clarity, with separate initiatives approaching related issues in different ways. Given the engagement of an array of actors on a broad range of topics, the potential for inconsistencies and contradiction exists, particularly if new outputs do not adequately consider existing work. Some challenges may relate to the nature of some outputs from the mechanisms. As noted, UPR recommendations and treaty body concluding observations tend by their nature to be brief, which can sometimes limit adequate reflection of the complexity of an issue. For example, a short recommendation urging the regulation of social media may fail to provide sufficient guidance as to how adequately to address the human rights risks that such laws may entail.

65. More needs to be done to ensure that the recommendations from the human rights system are implemented by decision-makers “on the ground”. A major obstacle in this regard is a lack of visibility and easy access to relevant documents which are currently dispersed across several databases and websites, with only limited search functions at hand. The UN Digital Technology and Human Rights Resource Hub[[191]](#footnote-192), making UN documents on technology and human rights available, is a valuable initiative but will need considerably increased resources to become a fully functional ‘one-stop-shop’ for such information.

66. Other fora, for example those dealing with trade and e-commerce, intellectual property, technical standard-setting, and peace and security should actively include a human rights approach into their discussion and decision, taking duly into account views and recommendation by UN human rights mechanisms.

67. The review also revealed a gap in tools and capacity to regularly provide detailed, context-specific advice on technology-related questions. This holds particularly true in relation to legislative processes as well as large digital infrastructure processes where such capacity and advice is urgently needed – and often requested. UN human rights system capacity to provide detailed, tailored advice as a one-stop shop capable of addressing complex and intersecting issues arising from digital technologies must be expanded to be responsive to growing needs. This would mean increasing the pool of subject-matter experts that can work on such matters – both in human rights and in specific technologies and sectors, with relevant regional experience and language skills, with support to build on and share good practices and ensure coherence.

X. Recommendations

**68. The High Commissioner for Human Rights recommends:**

(a) **States, businesses and other stakeholders should duly take into account and implement the recommendations made by the United Nations human rights ecosystem that apply to the design, development, operation, use and regulation of digital technologies;**

(b) **The capacity and effectiveness of the UN human rights ecosystem should be further increased for comprehensive work on digital technology across the full range of rights and relevant technologies, in particular, the ability to provide guidance for the implementation of human rights obligations and responsibilities of States and businesses in the context of digital technologies;**

(c) **To address current gaps in applying human rights in the digital sphere, a service should be established by OHCHR to provide expert advice on human rights and technology issues to support Member States and stakeholders in integrating human rights into the design, development, operation, use and regulation of digital technologies, as suggested by the Secretary-General**[[192]](#footnote-193). **The service would:**

* **Support national and regional policy, regulatory and legislative efforts to integrate human rights standards and approaches relating to digital;**
* **Encourage the technology sector to meet its human rights responsibilities by providing advisory views on key issues with regard to business responsibilities; as well as accountability and remedy;**

(d) **Explore and take appropriate measures to improve discussion and coordination between United Nations human rights mechanisms to support complementarity and coherence in their work in this field. For example, Special Procedures mandates could enhance coordination of their work on digital technologies, including by the establishment of a coordination group. OHCHR could support and facilitate exchange between the various mechanisms and hold regular briefings about technological, policy and regulatory trends;**

(e) **Enhance efforts to ensure that human rights are fully considered across all policy areas relevant for the governance of digital technologies, such as trade, e-commerce, intellectual property, competition law, peace and security, cybercrime**[[193]](#footnote-194) **and cybersecurity. The Human Rights Council could take a leading role in this regard, for example by systematically hosting panels and other meetings with key actors in those fields or establish fora and avenues for coordination;**

(f) **Improve the information management infrastructure across the UN human rights ecosystem to ensure easy, streamlined access to all its outputs. Additional resources should be provided to enable OHCHR to create and maintain a state-of-the-art digital resource hub, building on the existing databases, search tools and the Digital Technology and Human Rights Resource Hub and in line with OHCHR’s feasibility study A/HRC/56/27;**

(g) **Deepen capacity on digital technology and human rights by supporting integration of technical expertise into human rights work through a variety of means, including providing dedicated technical expertise through OHCHR, strengthening joint efforts with technical entities and enhancing capacity building and training;**

(h) **Consider approaches building on the success of the UPR to have peer-review approaches allowing for deeper discussions in cross-cutting areas such as digital technologies and human rights. A digital peer process could be useful to surface good practices, identify gaps, and match resources with areas of need.**

1. \* The present report was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline so as to include the most recent information. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. See the non-exhaustive list at <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/SP/List_SP_Reports_NewTech.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. E.g., [WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E](https://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs/geneva/official/dop.html) and [A/60/687](https://undocs.org/A/60/687). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. See Human Rights Council resolution 12/16 (2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. E.g., General Assembly resolution 78/187, Human Rights Council resolutions 53/7, 50/15, 47/16, 47/5; see Sustainable Development Goals, targets 9.c and 5.b. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. See A/66/290, A/HRC/17/27; A/HRC/67/326, A/HRC/26/49. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. [Roadmap for Digital Cooperation](https://www.un.org/en/content/digital-cooperation-roadmap/); [Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 5: A Global Digital Compact](https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/our-common-agenda-policy-brief-gobal-digi-compact-en.pdf); [A/HRC/43/29](https://undocs.org/A/HRC/43/29). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. A/HRC/50/55, A/HRC/44/24, A/HRC/35/9. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. CRC/C/GC/25; CEDAW/C/GC/39, [CRC/C/ZAF/CO/3-6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/2c49affc-6c2e-478e-996a-1723ec87e5cf" \t "_blank); [CEDAW/C/BTN/CO/10](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/031e603c-5589-401c-a7db-16ab8c2e1107), [CEDAW/C/UKR/CO/9](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/18baae2e-a7de-45b2-8a51-31d5ce5db244), [CEDAW/C/BTN/CO/10](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/031e603c-5589-401c-a7db-16ab8c2e1107), [CEDAW/C/CRI/CO/8](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/64875f0b-980e-4931-98db-5fda1e8a3d99); [E/C.12/IRQ/CO/5](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/11bcfb8e-4918-49ef-a54c-1326fef7cb55), [E/C.12/PSE/CO/1](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/a1768c7a-bb8f-4231-92b3-897acf1a3de7), [E/C.12/IDN/CO/2](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/f4055ab4-9156-4d1b-8e35-f16d1df32c6a), [E/C.12/CHN/CO/3](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/e8098211-98c0-4f03-8fab-51de1e244f8d), [E/C.12/ITA/CO/6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/364b85bc-5e4d-4598-a255-238918aa2aa1), [E/C.12/LUX/CO/4](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/f37f8eef-ff32-4259-8bf2-1a3a02827613). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. E.g., General Assembly resolutions 78/213, 78/265; Human Rights Council resolutions 53/29, 50/15, 47/16, 38/5; A/66/290, A/HRC/17/27, A/HRC/67/326, A/HRC/26/49, A/HRC/44/49, A/HRC/41/41, A/HRC/32/37, A/HRC/48/54, [A/HRC/53/39/ADD.1](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/480019ac-e080-421d-b0a0-0bfc1d0cc65d" \t "_blank), A/HRC/38/33/ADD.1; A/HRC/43/29, A/74/821, Policy Brief: A Global Digital Compact; A/HRC/35/9; CRC/C/GC/25; and concluding observations cited in preceding footnote. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. See A/78/269, A/HRC/50/25, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2023/05/ohchrs-report-digital-tech-and-civic-space-south-east-asia>**.**  [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. For authoritative guidance on these principles see CCPR/C/GC/34. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. See Human Rights Council resolutions 51/9, 49/21. A/66/290, A/71/373, A/HRC/32/38, 35/22; A/HRC/44/49, A/HRC/47/25; A/70/371, A/HRC/31/65, A/HRC/16/51, A/HRC/40/52, A/HRC/43/46; A/HRC/40/58; A/HRC/41/41. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, A/HRC/33/29; A/HRC/47/53, A/HRC/50/55. A/78/269, A/77/278; [CCPR/C/KHM/CO/3.](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/a6c39014-5bf5-4213-a92f-e9704ee2676c" \t "_blank)  [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. See A/71/373, A/HRC/43/46, A/HRC/41/41; [A/HRC/43/10](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/6cc09256-6f77-4cb5-a652-60c33db03ad2" \t "_blank); CCPR/C/KHM/CO/3, [CCPR/C/QAT/CO/1](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/5ad3e785-6c50-463b-a088-3d0fc9a0ec97); [VNM 6/2023](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28325), [SAU 2/2023](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27993) (and multiple parallel letters), [LBY 3/2022](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27150), [MDV 1/2022](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27545), [TUR 3/2022](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27140) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=36961), [EGY 12/2020](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25496), [MYS 3/2019](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24904) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=35328), [PAK 8/2016](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/PAK_8_2016.pdf), [RUS 7/2016](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=3261) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=33249). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. 'A/76/258, A/HRC/50/29 A/HRC/53/31, A/HRC/41/41; <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2023/05/ohchrs-report-digital-tech-and-civic-space-south-east-asia>, [HUN 1/2022](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27738), [MDV 1/2022](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27545), [TUR 3/2022](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27140) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=36961); [ARM 2/2020](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25788) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=35978); [PHL 6/2019](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24951); [CCPR/C/PHL/CO/5](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/9a831cbf-7964-422f-9cb5-057bea24bb76). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. A/74/486, A/HRC/44/24, A/HRC/43/46, A/HRC/41/41, A/HRC/35/22, A/HRC/29/32, A/HRC/17/27;OL [LBY 3/2022](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27150" \t "Com_27150), [RUS 2/2022](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27067) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=36892); [IRN 29/2021](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26736) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=37314); OL [SGP 1/2021](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26699) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=36815), [PAK 8/2016](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/PAK_8_2016.pdf) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=31656); <http://freedex.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/2015/files/2018/05/Flavus-OOO-SR-intervention.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. E.g., Human Rights Council resolutions 51/9, 50/15, 50/10, 49/21, 47/16, 44/20. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. E.g., CCPR/C/GC/34, CCPR/C/GC/37, [CCPR/C/IRN/CO/4](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/8862edc6-f29a-4fe9-ad9b-26abae191a7f" \t "_blank), [CCPR/C/ETH/CO/2](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/5110b9e8-051e-408d-831a-8b0bb87d769f), [CCPR/C/CMR/CO/5](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/475f5186-f46c-434d-8f77-e00cdaba235f), [CCPR/C/LKA/CO/6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/33048607-5946-4bec-b32b-ea60dd2c0bc9), [CCPR/C/RUS/CO/8](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/e224e3c2-3691-4a1a-b700-24e7f40f585d), [CCPR/C/TJK/CO/3](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/722f6192-8f4b-40f4-887f-806ca882cedd) [CCPR/C/KAZ/CO/2](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/4f1be133-706f-49a3-9b7f-86f992fee804). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. [A/HRC/47/25](http://undocs.org/fr/A/HRC/47/25), [A/HRC/35/22](http://undocs.org/fr/A/HRC/35/22), [A/HRC/41/41](http://undocs.org/fr/A/HRC/41/41), [A/HRC/17/27](http://undocs.org/fr/A/HRC/17/27). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. A/HRC/50/55, [A/HRC/44/24](http://undocs.org/fr/A/HRC/44/24). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. CERD/C/GC/35. See also General recommendations No. 7 relating to the implementation of article 4; no. 15 on article 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. E.g., Security Council resolution 2686, General Assembly resolutions 78/213, 77/211, Human Rights Council resolution 55/13; [A/HRC/54/5](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/a99c64ff-9ca3-4ab7-8567-815940a02737" \t "_blank), [A/HRC/53/4](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/f787f50c-8f24-4339-88d9-1821e9f99585), [A/HRC/52/15](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/e8b25c51-78ef-447e-b7e8-f275277893d7), [A/HRC/49/18](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/e90f9c25-06c0-4e53-9625-2cec771c0233), [A/HRC/41/11](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/f0f0467a-09c1-4599-b557-b45edce3841a), [A/HRC/36/8](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/02f721ed-f159-4676-b716-3eb05eb51fc8), [A/HRC/26/10](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/e71a0515-e94f-43e6-aaf2-c3dbe83eec65). [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. A/78/538, A/HRC/67/326, A/HRC/26/49. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. A/74/486. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. A/HRC/40/58. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. A/HRC/46/57, A/HRC/28/64. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. See A/76/258; [OTH 90/2023](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28221" \t "Com_28221) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=37688); [CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/7](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/bf7a380e-315a-46a1-9489-79b75af817d2), [CEDAW/C/URY/CO/10](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/0dfca132-3759-4686-b968-0dcffa373b44), [CEDAW/C/GMB/CO/6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/d9076d55-64dd-482e-8d66-705db63152e5); [CEDAW/C/CHE/CO/6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/44ea3f3d-1e9c-4de2-a8a0-c5d7ffe447b1), [CEDAW/C/BOL/CO/7](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/48c41eb8-e4dd-4376-9136-3fe6e9142e87). See further below para 35 on gender-based violence. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. See A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, A/HRC/55/74, <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2024-05/information-note-hate-speech-incient-hatred-in-electoral-context.pdf>. See also the [Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech](https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/hate-speech-strategy.shtml), A/HRC/56/31. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. On the conceptional vagueness of the term, see A/77/287. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. A/RES/76/227, A/HRC/RES/55/10, A/HRC/RES/49/21. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. [A/HRC/54/18](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/f6c2c09c-6d4d-4769-89c7-90ea49cdd633" \t "_blank); [A/HRC/52/15](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/e8b25c51-78ef-447e-b7e8-f275277893d7) ; [A/HRC/43/9](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/3ecd67e3-0171-4718-80b9-8f59b9c1a3b7); [A/HRC/13/4](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/7ad4137b-6585-4316-ad71-1cb947f459f0). [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. [CCPR/C/ETH/CO/2;](https://unitednations.sharepoint.com/sites/Techteam2/Shared%20Documents/Mapping%20report/Drafts/CCPR/C/ETH/CO/2%20(CCPR%202022%20);) [CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/20c7a5c7-1f2d-4fe6-a97d-ea48c6288309), CCPR/C/TUN/CO/6, CCPR/C/BHR/CO/1, [CCPR/C/KGZ/CO/3](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/bfca8546-24eb-412f-8089-5b8a919beb40), [CCPR/C/RUS/CO/8](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/e224e3c2-3691-4a1a-b700-24e7f40f585d), [CCPR/C/NIC/CO/4](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/d8dbd04e-f040-4ffc-b84f-02fbb5d64640); E/C.12/GC/25; [E/C.12/BRA/CO/3](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/84325726-aaac-4baf-abb1-9720cc415b26); [E/C.12/PAN/CO/3](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/6041aab7-e87d-4ca2-b4b6-55d2360d434d); [CRC/C/CZE/CO/5-6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/2887a7b1-f0ea-41f5-b239-b2d95d8045ea), [CRC/C/KHM/CO/2](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/03c674f0-a7c2-4fc4-979f-48feb677bf1c); [CAT/C/ETH/CO/2](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/a53cdd7f-6d6d-4a6c-9ea8-e7e87cb0406b). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. A/77/287. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. A/78/288, A/77/288, A/HRC/47/25. See A/HRC/50/29, A/HRC/44/49, A/HRC/38/35, A/73/348, [A/HRC/50/29/Add.1](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/522f8f2e-330d-4325-b4b6-57bf928377e2), [A/HRC/44/49/ADD.1](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/154bf8e8-8c2b-4d17-987f-397230551848); [BRA 6/2020](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25417), [BRA 7/2020](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25421), [FRA 5/2018](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=23864) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=34269); [ITA 1/2018](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=23704) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=34047); [LAO 1/2014](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=19986); [MYS 5/2021](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26287); [MYS 6/2018](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24287); [MYS 1/2018](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=23738) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=34127); [PAK 3/2020](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25108) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=35298); [QAT 1/2020](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25158) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=35801); [RUS 4/2019](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24548); [SGP 3/2019](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24559) and [State](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=34771) [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=34769) with [Annexes](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=34770); [LKA 9/2023](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28608) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=38341); [GBR 5/2022](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27148) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=36965); [ZMB 1/2021](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26374); <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2017/03/freedom-expression-monitors-issue-joint-declaration-fake-news-disinformation?LangID=E&NewsID=21287>. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. See <https://www.un.org/en/civil-society/information-integrity-digital-platforms>. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. E.g. in A/HRC/17/27, A/HRC/67/326, A/HRC/26/49. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. A/HRC/38/35. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. A/73/348. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. A/74/486. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. E.g., [BGD 2/2023](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27845" \t "Com_27845), [VNM 6/2023](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28325); [OTH 90/2023](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28221) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=37688); [KGZ 3/2023](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28183) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=37647); [OTH 229/2021](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26677), [IND 8/2021](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26385) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=36350); [IRN 29/2021](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26736) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=37314); [DEU 1/2017](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=23146) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=33627). [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. Particularly concerning hate speech, see the sources referred to above. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. Particularly CCPR/C/GC/34 and CRC/C/GC/25. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. <https://www.unesco.org/en/internet-trust/guidelines>. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. Resolution 53/29, A/HRC/53/42. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. General Assembly resolution [45/95](https://undocs.org/a/RES/45/95). [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. [Resolution 28/16](https://undocs.org/A/HRC/RES/28/16). [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. See General Assembly resolutions 78/213, 77/211, 68/167 and Council resolutions 54/21, 51/9, 50/17, 50/15, 28/16. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. E.g., [A/HRC/54/5](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/a99c64ff-9ca3-4ab7-8567-815940a02737" \t "_blank), [A/HRC/53/11](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/0c39df55-e657-48a8-95c8-edd257fb9bf3), [A/HRC/52/10](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/0c1eb04a-3f2e-4678-870c-fc980ea7c254), [A/HRC/44/9](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/fc8770d3-9605-4b9c-82f2-d57e3628f8e0), [A/HRC/41/17](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/346a393b-d550-4216-8021-9a2c7fd32830), [[[A/HRC/15/11](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/e269b330-7229-4377-9a43-de039986165a).](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/1783ac94-1c93-47f4-bebf-f7152b96a1a5)](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/a169a915-5718-4648-8b52-b9b9ef855be2) [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. E.g., [CCPR/C/SRB/CO/4](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/8b738ff0-5e0f-443f-8a61-70e445dce7da" \t "_blank), [CCPR/C/USA/CO/5](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/43284bab-ad7d-4d8e-a1b4-3097e97bab3f), [CCPR/C/KOR/CO/5, [CCPR/C/IRN/CO/4](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/8862edc6-f29a-4fe9-ad9b-26abae191a7f), [CCPR/C/UGA/CO/2](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/7446b258-a5d3-4cdc-ba4e-d14f18a65efa), [[[[CCPR/C/NIC/CO/4](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/d8dbd04e-f040-4ffc-b84f-02fbb5d64640).](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/9a831cbf-7964-422f-9cb5-057bea24bb76)](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/12a3af2f-ef0c-425c-b963-3cbf9a850f2a)](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/20536212-1467-45d1-b9f7-4c185930a2e9)](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/72a0fd15-b892-492f-89e9-311befae623e)  [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. [https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/\_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno= INT%2FCCPR%2FGEC%2F6624&Lang=en](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=%20INT%2FCCPR%2FGEC%2F6624&Lang=en) and [CCPR/C/GC/37](https://undocs.org/CCPR/C/GC/37). [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
52. A/HRC/13/37; A/69/397; A/70/371; A/HRC/52/39 and papers available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-terrorism/activities>. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
53. A/HRC/23/40, A/HRC/35/22, A/HRC/41/35. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
54. A/HRC/37/62. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
55. E.g., [IRN 29/2021](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26736) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=37314); [PHL 4/2020](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25384) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=35537); [TUN 8/2022](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27796); [GBR 4/2015](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=15850) and [responses](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=32864); [USA 9/2016](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=3365); [USA 7/2017](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=23105) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=33702) ; [VNM 7/2013](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=22145) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=31983); [ZMB 1/2021](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26374). [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
56. A/HRC/27/37; A/HRC/39/29; A/HRC/44/24; A/HRC/48/31; A/HRC/51/17, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/tools-and-resources/digital-border-governance-human-rights-based-approach>. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
57. General Assembly 71/199, 73/179, 75/176, 77/211, Human Rights Council 54/21, 48/4, 34/7; CRC/C/GC/25. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
58. [A/HRC/39/29](file:///C:\Users\smullerrappard\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook\JZDMPJHU\A\HRC\39\29);[A/77/196](https://undocs.org/A/77/196), [A/HRC/55/46](https://undocs.org/A/HRC/55/46), [A/HRC/49/55](https://undocs.org/A/HRC/49/55)**.** See <https://www.ohchr.org/en/privacy-in-the-digital-age> and <https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-privacy/annual-thematic-reports>. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
59. General Assembly resolutions 78/213, 78/265, 77/211, 75/176, 73/379; Human Rights Council resolutions 54/21, 53/29, 48/4; <https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/recommendation-ethics-artificial-intelligence>. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
60. A/73/348. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
61. [A/78/310](https://undocs.org/A/78/310" \o "A/78/310: Principles of transparency and explainability in the processing of personal data in artificial intelligence), [A/77/196](https://undocs.org/A/77/196), [A/73/438](https://undocs.org/A/73/438), [A/HRC/46/37](https://undocs.org/A/HRC/46/37). [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
62. A/76/380. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
63. A/HRC/50/32. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
64. A/HRC/53/65. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
65. A/HRC/36/48; A/HRC/45/14. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
66. A/HRC/49/52. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
67. A/HRC/52/39 and <https://law.umn.edu/human-rights-center/research/use-biometric-data-identify-terrorists>. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
68. A/74/493; A/HRC/38/33/Add.1; A/HRC/41/39/Add.1; A/HRC/50/38. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
69. A/HRC/44/57, A/HRC/42/59. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
70. A/75/590; A/HRC/48/76. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
71. A/HRC/47/52. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
72. [CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/7,](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/bf7a380e-315a-46a1-9489-79b75af817d2" \t "_blank) [[CEDAW/C/JAM/CO/8](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/bf7a380e-315a-46a1-9489-79b75af817d2" \t "_blank)](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/ec258fe4-662b-4f3e-9b1e-0671ef6677dc)[,](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/bf7a380e-315a-46a1-9489-79b75af817d2" \t "_blank) [CEDAW/C/OMN/CO/4](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/1b30f6ea-288f-469e-a511-440bb8f2e470), [CEDAW/C/DEU/CO/9](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/3b078f94-df0f-44d0-98e4-2bd4d35ba897), [CEDAW/C/ESP/CO/9](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/9a6b1eb9-6011-4eb0-870c-fe13fce8d132), [[CERD/C/DEU/CO/23-26](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/0c0be6a2-6924-4475-86ea-fdff640dbfbc).](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/64875f0b-980e-4931-98db-5fda1e8a3d99)  [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
73. [CERD/C/GC/36](https://undocs.org/CCPR/C/GC/36); [CCPR/C/GC/37](https://undocs.org/CCPR/C/GC/37); [CERD/C/ITA/CO/2](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FITA%2FCO%2F21-22&Lang=en)1; [CERD/C/BRA/CO/18-20](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/9955cd8a-1e66-4dd6-a2b6-7aac5a0d1d93), [CERD/C/THA/CO/4-8](file:///\\fshq.ad.ohchr.org\redirected$\kate.fox\My%20Documents\AdminofJustice\ResolutionsAdminJustice\GA\CERD\C\THA\CO\4-8); [CCPR/C/GBR/CO/8](https://undocs.org/CCPR/C/GBR/CO/8); [CEDAW/C/ITA/CO/8](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/cde79cb7-3d77-488f-bd33-a75354c4b2d1). [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
74. See A/74/821, <https://www.un.org/en/content/action-for-human-rights/index.shtml>, <https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/our-common-agenda-policy-brief-gobal-digi-compact-en.pdf>, [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
75. <https://www.un.org/en/ai-advisory-body>. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
76. A/HRC/44/24. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
77. A/HRC/48/31. See A/HRC/35/9 and A/HRC/39/29. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
78. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/business-and-human-rights/b-tech-project>. Also see below Section XX. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
79. See General Assembly resolutions 78/213, 77/211, Human Rights Council resolutions 47/16 [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
80. A/HRC/48/31. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
81. See paras 4 and 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
82. A/HRC/50/55. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
83. A/HRC/43/29. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
84. A/74/493, A/HRC/50/38; see A/HRC/38/33/Add.1 and A/HRC/41/39/Add.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
85. A/HRC/35/26, A/78/175. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
86. Resolutions 53/7, 47/6, 47/5; A/HRC/32/37, A/HRC/50/32. See[A/HRC/56/58/ADD.1](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/ffd2fd38-3b5f-41c8-b6f5-176eb12d99af). The mandate also plans a report on education and AI, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2024/call-contributions-artificial-intelligence-education-and-its-human-rights>. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
87. See CEDAW/C/GC/36;[E/C.12/IDN/CO/2](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/f4055ab4-9156-4d1b-8e35-f16d1df32c6a), [E/C.12/PRT/CO/5](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/11eef3eb-b3b9-4fc2-a8bc-1e56f8772ed3), [E/C.12/KHM/CO/2](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/37e881bf-5024-4e67-addb-71ca8cf28a25), [E/C.12/GTM/CO/4](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/34e6eb4b-226b-4dfe-ab47-27eaeda97525), [E/C.12/COD/CO/6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/afd8a991-7f17-4bc0-8a2c-08f2cb87fa97), [E/C.12/BOL/CO/3](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/8c1c7f33-a1c2-48b0-83ed-75f300ae565e)**.**  [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
88. Human Rights Council resolution 49/25; A/HRC/43/29, A/HRC/53/65. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
89. E/2023/74. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
90. A/HRC/52/56, A/HRC/47/23. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
91. A/HRC/44/48. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
92. Resolution 51/3, requesting the Advisory Committee to draft a report on neurotechnology, to be presented at the 57th session. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
93. [A/HRC/54/27](https://undocs.org/A/HRC/54/27), [A/78/160](https://undocs.org/A/78/160). [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
94. A/HRC/55/44. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
95. A/70/279, A/HRC/28/57. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
96. A/HRC/52/34. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
97. See <https://www.ohchr.org/en/development/development-finance-institutions>. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
98. <https://www.dpi-safeguards.org/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
99. General Assembly resolution 78/187; Human Rights Council resolutions 51/10, 47/16, 40/12, 38/5; A/HRC/44/57, A/HRC/50/25, A/HRC/44/52, A/HRC/38/47, A/HRC/40/60, A/75/590; CEDAW/C/GC/35, CEDAW/C/GC/39; CERD/C/GC/36;[CRC/C/GBR/CO/6-7](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/5f34fb63-7b42-40dd-b6db-951f62bc8015); [CRC/C/CRI/CO/5-6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/d5d67cf9-61f6-4200-8e6c-7339c3ade2e8), [CRC/C/BOL/CO/5-6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/a98db232-61de-4d49-9830-f61a1b7b8ea2), [CRC/C/VNM/CO/5-6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/9c66399f-cabd-48bd-93f2-71d3eac460e3), [CEDAW/C/FRA/CO/9](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/b7802f01-9266-415a-82bb-52162b037f86), [CEDAW/C/ESP/CO/9](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/9a6b1eb9-6011-4eb0-870c-fe13fce8d132), [CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/9](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/be29416e-d5c2-4bef-b974-defe10f3fffe), [CEDAW/C/NZL/CO/8](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/d438947f-6cc8-4fca-8a2d-c776992e9be6). For a general explanation of intersectionality, see CEDAW/C/GC/28, CERD/C/GC/32 and <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/minorities/30th-anniversary/2022-09-22/GuidanceNoteonIntersectionality.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
100. Paras 4 and 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
101. General Assembly resolution 78/213; Human Rights Council resolutions 51/10, 50/15, 47/16; A/66/290, A/HRC/53/65, A/HRC/50/25; CEDAW/C/GC/36;CRC/C/GC/25; [CEDAW/C/BTN/CO/10](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/031e603c-5589-401c-a7db-16ab8c2e1107" \t "_blank) [CEDAW/C/UKR/CO/9](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/18baae2e-a7de-45b2-8a51-31d5ce5db244), [CEDAW/C/VEN/CO/9](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/cc2a28c6-5239-43a9-be3f-2d167422edd0), [CEDAW/C/CRI/CO/8, [CEDAW/C/BOL/CO/7](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/48c41eb8-e4dd-4376-9136-3fe6e9142e87);](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/64875f0b-980e-4931-98db-5fda1e8a3d99) A/HRC/35/9. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
102. See Human Rights Council resolutions 53/7, 50/18, 47/5, 44/12, 23/2. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
103. A/HRC/35/9. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
104. CEDAW/C/GC/36; see also [CEDAW/C/BTN/CO/10](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/031e603c-5589-401c-a7db-16ab8c2e1107) , [CEDAW/C/UKR/CO/9](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/18baae2e-a7de-45b2-8a51-31d5ce5db244), [CEDAW/C/VEN/CO/9](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/cc2a28c6-5239-43a9-be3f-2d167422edd0). [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
105. E/C.12/GC/25. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
106. A/HRC/50/32. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
107. A/HRC/53/65. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
108. A/HRC/38/47; [A/HRC/44/52/ADD.2,](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/57377b2d-fd0b-4d32-93c4-968e292df1e6" \t "_blank) [[A/HRC/41/42/ADD.1](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/57377b2d-fd0b-4d32-93c4-968e292df1e6" \t "_blank)](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/465c2381-8c43-4590-b335-14a202be35d1)[,](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/57377b2d-fd0b-4d32-93c4-968e292df1e6" \t "_blank) [[A/HRC/41/42/ADD.2](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/57377b2d-fd0b-4d32-93c4-968e292df1e6" \t "_blank)](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/b7ebed8c-6086-40d1-a6cd-b6c3f818d6bb)[,](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/57377b2d-fd0b-4d32-93c4-968e292df1e6" \t "_blank) [[A/HRC/38/47/ADD.1](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/57377b2d-fd0b-4d32-93c4-968e292df1e6" \t "_blank)](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/220d0453-b979-43d9-8e2b-0529651ecfdd)[; A/76/258.](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/57377b2d-fd0b-4d32-93c4-968e292df1e6" \t "_blank)  [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
109. CEDAW/C/GC/39,[CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/7](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/bf7a380e-315a-46a1-9489-79b75af817d2), [CEDAW/C/URY/CO/10](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/0dfca132-3759-4686-b968-0dcffa373b44), [CEDAW/C/DEU/CO/9, [CEDAW/C/VEN/CO/9](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/cc2a28c6-5239-43a9-be3f-2d167422edd0), [CEDAW/C/GMB/CO/6, [CEDAW/C/CHE/CO/6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/44ea3f3d-1e9c-4de2-a8a0-c5d7ffe447b1), [CEDAW/C/BOL/CO/7, [CEDAW/C/LBN/CO/6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/0e797b84-04d9-4695-8b35-f6b84309d618), [CEDAW/C/ECU/CO/10](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/6e2f10ee-aa41-4fbd-a967-68bdab0afa7c); [CRC/C/FIN/CO/5-6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/dd7ce91f-a15a-4152-9748-9de7131afab6), [CRC/C/JOR/CO/6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/d12fdbed-b26f-4dcf-bda9-a68fcb96870b), [CRC/C/SWE/CO/6-7](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/e6d38189-bc1a-4282-b1b3-fc6e2f7cd514).](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/48c41eb8-e4dd-4376-9136-3fe6e9142e87)](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/d9076d55-64dd-482e-8d66-705db63152e5)](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/3b078f94-df0f-44d0-98e4-2bd4d35ba897) [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
110. [A/HRC/53/11](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/0c39df55-e657-48a8-95c8-edd257fb9bf3" \t "_blank), [A/HRC/52/6,](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/9026c05b-6c1a-41b1-b13c-0e3371a06abf)  [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
111. A/72/290, <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000375136.locale=en>. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
112. CEDAW/C/GC/38; [CEDAW/C/HUN/CO/9,](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/5466ace7-24c4-4537-884b-f043b2e5fd5a" \t "_blank) [[CEDAW/C/TUN/CO/7,](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/5466ace7-24c4-4537-884b-f043b2e5fd5a" \t "_blank) [[CEDAW/C/LIE/CO/5/REV.1](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/5466ace7-24c4-4537-884b-f043b2e5fd5a" \t "_blank)](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/e0235aaf-26fe-4ee8-b889-77e67e6bccc5)[.](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/5466ace7-24c4-4537-884b-f043b2e5fd5a" \t "_blank)](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/807b0328-2cd7-468d-a28a-81e647f87bd0) [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
113. A/HRC/35/9, A/HRC/40/63 and Annex, available at <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Privacy/SR_Privacy/2019_HRC_Annex2_GenderReport.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
114. E.g., General Assembly resolutions 77/211, 75/176, Human Rights Council resolution 54/21. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
115. A/76/258. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
116. A/78/288; see A/77/288. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
117. A/HRC/50/29. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
118. A/HRC/50/25. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
119. E/CN.6/2023/L.3. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
120. CRC/C/GC/25. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
121. E.g., General Assembly resolutions 78/187, 74/133; Human Rights Council resolutions 54/21, 52/26, 51/10, 50/15, 38/5, 31/7; panel on cyberbullying against children at the 54th session of the HRC, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/09/human-rights-council-holds-panel-discussion-cyberbullying-against-children-hearing-it>.

     CRC/C/GC/25; CRC/C/156, see <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/CRC/OPSC-Guidelines-Explanatory-Report-ECPAT-International-2019.pdf>; [CCPR/C/SWE/CO/7](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/bfbf8dde-d7c1-4c9a-a772-a0e61a2bd10b); [CEDAW/C/HUN/CO/9](https://undocs.org/CEDAW/C/HUN/CO/9), [CEDAW/C/LIE/CO/5/REV.1](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/e0235aaf-26fe-4ee8-b889-77e67e6bccc5), [CRC/C/BGR/CO/6-7](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/2c7c0e72-199e-43f6-bc98-2e7bc92915d7), [CRC/C/AND/CO/3-5](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/ca52b8a5-086d-4d4d-bfb5-2049b2895db5), [CRC/C/LIE/CO/3-4](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/68831cea-a1b1-4cc8-92db-46602acc30d4), [CRC/C/FRA/CO/6-7](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/819eba1d-eff2-43e4-900b-19bf76d27071), [CRC/C/FIN/CO/5-6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/dd7ce91f-a15a-4152-9748-9de7131afab6), [CRC/C/BOL/CO/5-6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/a98db232-61de-4d49-9830-f61a1b7b8ea2), [CRC/C/IRL/CO/5-6](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/bd441cac-bfc2-4e29-bbdb-f9f8e5f50b8f).

     A/HRC/49/51, A/HRC/46/31, A/HRC/43/40, A/HRC/28/56, A/HRC/17/27; [OTH 11/2023](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27883) (and several parallel letters), [OTH 21/2021](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26074) (and several parallel letters to States and companies), [OTH 5/2021](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25853) (and several parallel letters), [OTH 39/2020](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25272) (and several parallel letters).

     See the work of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on violence against children, A/HRC/31/20, A/HRC/52/61; [A safer digital environment for children: now is the time to act](https://violenceagainstchildren.un.org/news/a-safer-digital-environment-for-children-now-is-the-time-to-act), [Ending the torment: tackling bullying from the schoolyard to cyberspace](https://violenceagainstchildren.un.org/news/ending-torment-tackling-bullying-schoolyard-cyberspace), and the Secretary-General reports A/71/213 and A/73/265. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
122. A/HRC/57/28; resolution 52/25. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
123. See para 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
124. See para 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
125. A/HRC/53/65. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
126. See, e.g., A/HRC/51/17, A/HRC/50/49, A/HRC/44/57, and paras 14-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
127. A/HRC/48/31, A/HRC/47/CRP.1, CERD/C/GC/36 and paras 18-24. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
128. E.g., General Assembly 78/213, 77/211; Human Rights Council 54/21, 53/29, 51/10, 49/21. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
129. A/76/538, A/75/590, A/67/326, A/HRC/48/76, A/HRC/44/57, A/HRC/26/49. See also A/HRC/42/59 and a forthcoming report of the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent, A/HRC/57/70. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
130. CERD/C/GC/36. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
131. General Assembly resolution 78/187, Human Rights Council resolution 53/7. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
132. A/75/590. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
133. <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/sr/statements/2023-10-30-a-ct-travel-gotravel-position-paper.pdf>; <https://law.umn.edu/human-rights-center/research/use-biometric-data-identify-terrorists>, and A/HRC/52/39. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
134. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/tools-and-resources/digital-border-governance-human-rights-based-approach>. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
135. A/HRC/51/27/Add.1, A/HRC/42/43, A/HRC/36/48, A/HRC/45/14/Add.1 (response: A/HRC/45/14/Add.3), A/HRC/45/14. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
136. A/HRC/52/49, A/AC.278/2024/CRP.2, see<https://social.un.org/ageing-working-group/index.shtml>. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
137. General Assembly resolutions 78/213, 78/187; [CRPD/C/MRT/CO/1](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/ee75b693-71b5-4613-a99a-4b670c3d1b45), [CRPD/C/MNG/CO/2-3](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/c9e91697-16c9-4388-bf3a-fe5516691021), [CRPD/C/ISR/CO/1](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/def66b88-504d-42cb-b480-86fcf419c4d4). [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
138. E/C.12/GC/25. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
139. A/HRC/49/52. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
140. A/74/186. [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
141. A/HRC/56/31. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
142. A/HRC/46/57, A/HRC/51/28, A/HRC/55/44, E/C.12/GC/25; <https://www.ohchr.org/en/events/forums/2020/thirteenth-session-forum-minority-issues>; see Human Rights Council resolutions 53/29, 50/17, 38/5. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
143. Such as Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, see A/76/135, A/70/174; Open-ended working group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, see A/AC.290/2021/CRP.2; Programme of action to advance responsible State behaviour in the use of information and communications technologies in the context of international security, see [A/RES/77/37](https://www.undocs.org/A/RES/77/37" \t "_blank). [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
144. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/pms-cs/igwg-index1>. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
145. [CCPR/C/USA/CO/4](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/424a1966-ad37-4d63-9e7c-defe8331c282) ; [CCPR/C/USA/CO/5;](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/43284bab-ad7d-4d8e-a1b4-3097e97bab3f) [CCPR/C/DEU/CO/7](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/a286a144-77b2-4902-944e-ea3042eb0431). [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
146. [CRC/C/OPAC/MDA/CO/1](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=crc%2FC%2FOPAC%2FMDA%2FCO%2F1&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False); [CEDAW/C/ITA/CO/7](https://undocs.org/CEDAW/C/ITA/CO/7). [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
147. A/HRC/23/47; A/HRC/26/36; A/HRC/29/37; A/69/265; A/68/382; A/65/321; A/71/372; A/HRC/56/CRP.5; A/HRC/44/38. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
148. A/HRC/29/37 [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
149. A/75/259, A/76/151. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
150. [A/HRC/55/73](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session55/advance-versions/a-hrc-55-73-auv.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
151. JAL USA 5/2015; JAL YEM 1/2015; JAL ISR 9/2014; AL OTH 131/2023; AL ISR 8/2023. [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
152. General Assembly resolutions 68/167, 69/166; Human Rights Council resolutions 26/13, 28/16. [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
153. General Assembly resolutions 78/213, 77/211, 75/176, 73/179, 71/199; Human Rights Council resolutions 54/21, 48/4, 42/15, 34/7, 47/23, 53/29. [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
154. A/HRC/50/56. [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
155. See, e.g., A/HRC/17/27. [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
156. A/HRC/32/38, A/HRC/35/22, A/HRC/35/22/Add.4, 38/35, A/HRC/41/35, A/73/348. [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
157. A/HRC/50/40/Add.3. [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
158. A/HRC/49/52. [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
159. A/75/590, A/76/326, A/HRC/44/57, A/HRC/26/49. [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
160. A/HRC/38/47. [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
161. A/HRC/46/57. [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
162. A/HRC/49/51, A/HRC/28/56. [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
163. A/76/380. [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
164. A/HRC/52/39. [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
165. A/HRC/46/37. [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
166. A/78/175. [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
167. A/76/151. [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
168. E.g., OL [OTH 90/2023](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28221) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=37688), JAL [OTH 62/2023](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28135) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=37654), JAL [OTH 11/2023](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27883) and JAL [OTH 10/2023](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27882), JAL [OTH 126/2022](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27731) and company [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=37418) (plus three parallel letters to other companies), JAL [OTH 211/2021](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26564) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=36555), . [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
169. See, e.g., JOL [USA 13/2024](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=29056), [ISR 5/2023](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28134), OL [GBR 5/2022](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27148) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=36965), OL [BRA 6/2020](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25417), [IND 3/2019](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24347) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=35080), OL [PAK 3/2020](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25108) and [response](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=35298); and the reference in footnote 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
170. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrc-subsidiary-bodies/united-nations-forum-business-and-human-rights>. [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
171. See [A/HRC/47/50](https://undocs.org/A/HRC/47/50), [A/HRC/44/56](https://undocs.org/A/HRC/44/56), [A/HRC/41/49](https://undocs.org/A/HRC/41/49), [A/HRC/38/49](https://undocs.org/A/HRC/38/49). [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
172. A/HRC/53/42, A/HRC51/17, A/HRC/48/31, A/HRC/39/29, A/HRC35/9, A/HRC27/37. [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
173. See [A/HRC/50/56](https://undocs.org/A/HRC/50/56), [A/HRC/50/56/Add.1](https://undocs.org/A/HRC/50/56/add.1), [A/HRC/50/45/Add.1](https://undocs.org/A/HRC/50/45/Add.1). [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
174. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/business-and-human-rights/b-tech-project>. [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
175. <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/business/b-tech/recommendations/advancing-responsible-development-and-deployment-of-GenAI.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
176. <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/business/b-tech/taxonomy-GenAI-Human-Rights-Harms.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
177. <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/business/b-tech/overview-human-rights-and-responsible-AI-company-practice.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
178. Section III. [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
179. See A/78/184 and CEDAW/C/BTN/CO/10. [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
180. On online hearings see the report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, A/HRC/47/35 and <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/ruleoflaw/Briefer-Online-hearings-justice-systems.pdf>. See also CCPR/C/111/D/2041/2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
181. [CAT/C/ITA/CO/5-6](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2FC%2FITA%2FCO%2F5-6&Lang=en), [CAT/C/KAZ/CO/4](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/c36c7d5a-5e86-4391-8d18-44e9b99ea5ad). [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
182. [CAT/C/AZE/CO/5](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2FCAT%2FCOC%2FAZE%2F58382&Lang=en), [CAT/C/ROU/CO/3](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2FC%2FROU%2FCO%2F3&Lang=en), [CAT/C/BRA/CO/2](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/6a307009-4210-4409-8ab4-594af1ec1abb). [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
183. [CCPR/C/GC/35](https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g14/244/51/pdf/g1424451.pdf?token=2xlZVxNkXo2TVc6Wpi&fe=true), [CAT/OP/MKD/1](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/c08fa3f7-6648-4d34-860e-e11660369e32); [CCPR/C/BEL/CO/5](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/1e7dfddd-af79-4e36-9cbb-f5b3e7de8233); [CCPR/C/KAZ/CO/1](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/5237a803-ede2-411c-993f-1fb1690b6c5d); [CCPR/C/TUR/CO/1](https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/881d7b7f-a951-47b3-9db4-417a3f02472c). [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
184. A/HRC/53/31. [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
185. A/HRC/48/31, A/HRC/51/17, A/HRC/53/31, CERD/C/GC/36; see also CEDAW/C/ITA/CO/8. [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
186. See A/76/380, A/HRC/53/31 and Council resolution 51/3. [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
187. Council resolution 20/8. [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
188. E.g., panel discussion on the right to privacy in the digital age, 27th HRC session, summary report A/HRC/28/39; [Panel discussion on the impacts, opportunities and challenges of new and emerging digital technologies](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session44/Documents/CN_HRC44_newtechupdated.docx)with regard to the promotion and protection of human rights, 44th HRC session; Panel discussion on digital, media and information literacy, 53rd HRC session, summary report A/HRC/54/49; Annual [full-day meeting on the rights of the child](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session52/panel-discussions/CN_RoC_annual-day_23-03-02.docx) on Rights of the child and the digital environment, 52th HRC session; [Panel discussion on cyberbullying against children](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session54/cn-cyberbullying-panel-23-09-22.docx)**, 54th HRC session;** [Intersessional meeting](https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/to-mark-the-75th-anniversary-of-the-convention-genocide) to mark the 75th anniversary of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and to discuss the role of social media – 4 December 2023. [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
189. E.g., <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng/?i=001-230854>. [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
190. See General Assembly resolution 78/213; Human Rights Council resolutions 54/21, 53/29; A/HRC/48/31, A/HRC/53/42. [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
191. <https://www.digitalhub.ohchr.org/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
192. Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 5: A Global Digital Compact. [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
193. But see OHCHR’s work concerning the elaboration of a new cybercrime convention, <https://www.unodc.org/documents/Cybercrime/AdHocCommittee/First_session/OHCHR_17_Jan.pdf>, <https://www.unodc.org/documents/Cybercrime/AdHocCommittee/6th_Session/Submissions/Multi-stakeholders/OHCHR1.pdf> and <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/tools-and-resources/human-rights-and-draft-cybercrime-convention>. [↑](#footnote-ref-194)